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RESPONSIBLE DEVOLUTION OF 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
Andrea J. Boyack* 
ABSTRACT 
The federal government has been heavily involved in promoting 
housing affordability since the 1930s and continues to have a critical 
role to play.  Over the past several decades, the federal government 
has financed affordability by promoting development and income 
subsidies, but specific allocation decisions have devolved.  Housing 
inequities can best be addressed locally, but only if localities are held 
to high standards of fairness and regional coordination is facilitated.  
Successful and sustainable local solutions to housing affordability will 
also require a substantial financial investment, one that the federal 
government can and should reliably and adequately provide.  Each 
year, Congress permits households with the least household need to 
receive billions of taxpayer dollars in unnecessary housing subsidies 
— Congress must correct this misallocation of funds in order to help 
those facing the severest housing burdens. 
Much of federal affordable housing policy today involves a 
patchwork of insufficient and ineffective measures mitigating 
affordability harms.  These measures provide critical short-term relief 
for the minority of genuinely needy households who receive 
assistance, but the federal government has inadequately invested in 
long-term solutions for housing instability.  The federal government’s 
responsibility to address persistent housing inequity arises in part 
from decades of its own harmful, racist housing policies.  Although 
the inherently local nature of housing markets suggests that the actual 
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implementation of housing assistance programs should continue to 
devolve, responsibility for ensuring fair access to quality housing 
ultimately lies with the federal government. 
Part I of this Article describes the ubiquity and impacts of the 
problem of unaffordable housing.  Part II examines the spectrum of 
approaches that a government can use to address housing 
unaffordability, from police power mandates to supply- and demand-
side subsidies.  Part III makes the normative case for significant but 
reimagined federal involvement in the affordable housing sphere.  
Part IV points out the risks inherent in relying on federal funding and 
oversight and suggests ways the law might mitigate such risks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At its inception in 1934, the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) established underwriting guidelines to ensure that taxpayer-
funded home mortgage insurance would be channeled to 
neighborhoods with stable or increasing property values, defined by 
the government as white-only neighborhoods.1  For many decades, 
 
 1. The FHA greatly impacted U.S. homeownership by introducing the thirty–
year, self–amortizing, fixed–rate residential mortgage loan as the primary lending 
tool for “prime mortgage loans” and through offering generous homebuying 
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homeowners in the United States have had the particular benefit of 
deducting mortgage interest payments from their federally taxable 
income, a tax policy that has provided a disproportionate benefit 
(80%) to the highest income quintile, at a fiscal cost of more than $70 
billion a year.2  Federal programs helped to raze entire urban 
communities and replace them with concrete mega-block public 
housing structures, simultaneously concentrating poverty and 
entrenching racial housing segregation.3  Five million households 
 
assistance in the form of mortgage insurance for first-time homebuyers. David Reiss, 
Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal Housing Administration 
and the Low Down Payment Loan, 50 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1023–24, 1073 (2016). For 
decades, white homeowners in white neighborhoods were the exclusive beneficiaries 
of FHA’s programs and funding. See generally Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: 
A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America, 26 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 5 (2017). See also RICHARD R.W. 
BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 109 (2013); KENNETH T. JACKSON, 
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 190–91 
(1985). The FHA’s own Underwriting Manual mandated that mortgage funding be 
used primarily in non-diverse communities and advised communities to preserve their 
property values by creating real covenant-based barriers to minority occupancy. FED. 
HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL: UNDERWRITING AND VALUATION 
PROCEDURE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT § 980(3), 980(3)(g) 
(1938) (“Recommended restrictions should include provision for the 
following . . . [p]rohibition of the occupancy of properties except by the race for 
which they are intended.”). 
 2. Until 1986, all interest payments could be deducted by taxpayers, but the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 limited interest deduction to certain specified types of loans, 
including loans on up to two residences. Although mortgage interest deductions are 
politically popular, economists have shown that the vast majority of households who 
receive a benefit under the mortgage interest deduction have incomes in the highest 
quintile. WILL FISCHER & CHYE-CHING HUANG, MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
IS RIPE FOR REFORM, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1–3 (2013), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/mortgage-interest-deduction-is-ripe-for-reform 
[https://perma.cc/7AWR-F4LV]; BRUCE KATZ, BROOKINGS INST., CUT TO INVEST: 
REFORM THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION TO INVEST IN INNOVATION AND 
ADVANCED INDUSTRIES, (2012), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/06-mortgage-interest-deduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYL6-
PD6Q]. The cost of the mortgage interest deduction has been estimated as 
somewhere between $70 billion and $100 billion (or even more) annually. See infra 
notes 218–28 and accompanying text. 
 3. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Government and Slum Housing, 32 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1967) (discussing displacement and slum clearance in public 
housing development in the 1960s). Public housing was not originally designed to be 
low-income housing, but by the 1960s it was reconceived and employed to create 
large multi-family developments in urban centers. By the 1980s, “living conditions in 
the nation’s most dilapidated public housing developments were deplorable, and a 
complex layering of problems left these developments mired in the most destructive 
kind of poverty.” SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., URB. INST., A DECADE OF HOPE VI: 
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 7 (2004), 
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411002_HOPEVI.pdf 
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currently live in rental homes subsidized by and ultimately under the 
supervision of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD),4 but thousands of these dwellings are 
uninhabitable, infested with rodents, covered in mold, or exposing 
children to poisonous lead.5  Half of low-income households cannot 
afford their housing costs, but for every one such household receiving 
government housing assistance, another three go without.6  
Affordable housing need is critical and increasing, but funding is 
erratic.  When it comes to achieving lasting and equitable housing 
improvements, the government’s record is abysmal. 
Housing costs today are so high relative to income that 
affordability is deemed a national “crisis.”7  The federal government’s 
inequitable and ineffective historic impact on housing markets 
suggests that, when it comes to promoting housing affordability, 
perhaps Uncle Sam is not the right man for the job.  Housing markets 
are quintessentially local, and the affordability challenges facing 
a given community may arise from any of a number of different 
underlying factors.  In some communities, the lack and misallocation 
of affordably priced housing units inflates housing prices.8  In other 
 
[https://perma.cc/46LA-X86F]. “These developments had become dangerous and 
destructive communities in which to live, undermining the welfare of families and 
children.” Id. 
 4. National and State Housing Fact Sheets & Data, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES  (May 9, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/national-and-
state-housing-fact-sheets-data [https://perma.cc/EU8J-4VKU]. 
 5. Suzy Khimm et al., Under Ben Carson, More Families Live in HUD Housing 
That Fails Health and Safety Inspections, NBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2018, 4:17 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/under-ben-carson-more-families-live-
hud-housing-fails-health-n935421 [https://perma.cc/FG2K-3GE8]; MSNBC FOIA 
request documents, available at http://media1.s-
nbcnews.com/i/today/z_creative/InfillFoiaReacReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8YD-
QYPS]. 
 6. Will Fischer & Barbara Sard, Chart Book: Federal Housing Spending is 
Poorly Matched to Need, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/chart-book-federal-housing-spending-is-
poorly-matched-to-need [https://perma.cc/6AT5-GXT4]. 
 7. For example, in 2014, Shaun Donovan, Secretary of HUD, said that the 
United States is facing “the worst rental crisis in this nation, ever.” Ben Lane, HUD’s 
Donovan: “This Is the Worst Rental Crisis in This Nation, Ever,” HOUSINGWIRE 
(Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/29757-huds-donovan-this-is-
the-worst-rental-crisis-in-this-nation-ever [https://perma.cc/9EWF-6MTU]. See also 
Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues 
Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 415 (2003) (pointing out 
— 15 years ago when housing affordability was better than it is today — that for 
several decades there had been an “acknowledged crisis in affordable housing”). 
 8. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 230 (2001); see also 
Andrea J. Boyack, Limiting the Collective Right to Exclude, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
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communities, there are a sufficient number of housing units, but 
affordable units are of unacceptable quality.9  Impoverished 
neighborhoods and neighborhoods of color face disparate residential 
realities in terms of the quality of schools, transportation, and 
community services.10  In many areas, unaffordable housing is 
primarily a symptom of intractable poverty.11  Different housing 
problems require different strategic responses, and the specific 
challenges faced by a given locality are likely best understood and 
addressed at the local level. 
Nevertheless, there are several justifications for broader, federal-
level involvement in the realm of housing.  National funding for local 
housing projects is likely necessary to create sustainable and equitable 
housing support in all parts of the country, particularly in more 
impoverished areas.12  Coordination among jurisdictions in a given 
region is critical for assessing and addressing problems of housing and 
poverty, particularly in cases where communities individually would 
 
451, 469–70 (2017) [hereinafter Boyack, Exclude]; infra notes 47–77 and 
accompanying text. 
 9. See Steven Hwang et al., Housing and Population Health: A Review of the 
Literature, Sociology and Criminology Faculty Publications 126 SOC. CRIMINOLOGY 
FAC. PUBLICATIONS 1, 28 (1999); see also Michael Weitzman et al., Housing and Child 
Health, 43 CURRENT PROBS. IN PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 187, 187–
189 (2013) (describing the effects that low-quality housing and housing instability 
have on child health); Williams, supra note 7, at 419–20. See generally Gary 
Adamkiewicz et al., Moving Environmental Justice Indoors: Understanding 
Structural Influences on Residential Exposure Patterns in Low-Income 
Communities, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S238, S238 (2011). 
 10. Andrea J. Boyack, Sustainable Affordable Housing, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 455, 465 
(2018) [hereinafter Boyack, Sustainable]; BARBARA SARD & DOUGLAS RICE, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, CREATING OPPORTUNITY FOR CHILDREN 1, 6 
(2014); see also infra notes 106–13 and accompanying text. 
 11. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN 
CITY 296–97, 302–03 (2016) [hereinafter DESMOND, EVICTED]. See generally 
Matthew Desmond, Unaffordable America: Poverty, Housing, and Eviction, 22 INST. 
FOR RES. ON POVERTY 1, 5 (2015) [hereinafter Desmond, Unaffordable]. 
 12. There is a wide fiscal disparity among municipalities and states in terms of 
resources and availability of financing. Some states grapple with fiscal gaps and 
others enjoy budget surpluses. See, e.g., TRACY GORDON ET AL., URB. INST., 
ASSESSING FISCAL CAPACITIES OF STATES vi-vii, 1–5, 11–33 (2016), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/140136/2000646-
assessing-fiscal-capacities-of-states-a-representative-revenue-system-representative-
expenditure-system-approach-fiscal-year-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PNY-LF2T]; 
Hal Wolman et al., Comparing Local Government Autonomy Across States, NAT’L 
TAX ASS’N PROCEEDINGS 377 (2008), https://www.ntanet.org/wp-
content/uploads/proceedings/2008/046-wolman-comparing-local-government-2008-
nta-proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8M2-Y723]. 
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prefer to offload and ignore affordability issues.13  Negative 
externalities from local housing affordability crunches impact the 
country as a whole.14  Furthermore, it was the federal government, 
through its policies and programs, that created some of the biggest 
obstacles to accessing affordable housing today.15  Regional 
inequalities and the need for regional coordination, economic 
externalities of inequitable housing systems, and the persistent, 
adverse effects of historic federal housing policies all justify a national 
framework to adequately address housing affordability. 
Part I of this Article describes the ubiquity and impacts of the 
problem of unaffordable housing.  Part II examines the spectrum of 
approaches that a government can use to address housing 
unaffordability, from police power mandates to supply-and-demand-
side subsidies.  Part III makes the normative case for significant but 
reimagined federal involvement in the affordable housing sphere.  
Part IV points out the risks inherent in relying on federal funding and 
oversight and suggests ways the law might mitigate such risks. 
 
 13. For example, Kansas City straddles the state line, and the metropolitan area is 
in both Missouri and Kansas. Recognizing the imperative of a metropolitan region 
approach rather than one artificially separated into states, HUD provided funding for 
coordinated planning efforts spearheaded by the Mid-America Regional Council. 
Results of regional planning evidence the absolute necessity of a regional approach. 
See, e.g., MID-AMERICA REG’L COUNCIL, HOUSING ELEMENT: CREATING 
SUSTAINABLE PLACES 9 (2014), http://marc.org/Regional-
Planning/Housing/pdf/Housing_Element.aspx [https://perma.cc/M8PR-YMKQ]. 
Nevertheless, Kansas City’s public housing funds and planning are ultimately 
controlled by state-specific public housing agencies: The Housing Authority of 
Kansas City, Missouri, and the Kansas City Kansas Housing Authority, and each 
state develops its own housing plan for the city. See also AMERICAN PLANNING 
ASS’N, REGIONAL APPROACHES TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING PAS REPORT 513/514 
(2003). See generally URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE, A HOUSING POLICY FOR 
KANSAS CITY (2018), https://uni-kc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/KCMO-Draft-
Housing-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FGW-32RH]. Ironically, this plan, which starts 
by invoking Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities, deals only with the part of 
Kansas City located within the state of Missouri, without recognizing that a 
significant part of the “two cities” in Kansas City is the part of the metropolitan 
region within Kansas. 
 14. See Ed Glaeser & Joe Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing 
Supply 21 (Zell/Lurie Real Estate Ctr., Working Paper No. 802, 2017), 
http://realestate.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/802.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7AGW-CEL4]; Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities 
Matter? Local Growth and Aggregate Growth 34–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 21154, 2015). 
 15. See supra note 1; infra notes 302–13 and accompanying text. 
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I. DIAGNOSIS OF THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS 
Housing today is unaffordable for one-third of all U.S. households, 
and nearly half of Americans who rent.16  Because of rapidly inflating 
purchase prices and rental rates, more than 38 million households in 
the United States spend more than 30% of their income on housing 
costs (an allocation that renders housing “unaffordable” according to 
HUD metrics).17  Half of all renter households cannot afford to pay 
their rent and still have sufficient income remaining for food, 
healthcare, childcare, transportation, and other necessities.18  Housing 
unaffordability deepens inequalities and leads to housing instability 
 
 16. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUS. 2018 30–31 (2018) [hereinafter STATE OF HOUSING 2018], 
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations
_Housing_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ8S-QNY9]. Housing affordability is typically 
measured by calculating the percentage of a household’s gross income that must be 
allocated to housing costs, with anything more than 30% rendering the household 
“cost burdened” and anything more than 50% causing the household to be “severely 
cost burdened.” CHAS: Background, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/cp/CHAS/bg_chas.html 
[https://perma.cc/CBN9-S5DG]. 
 17. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 5. The 30% figure evolved from the 
1969 “Brooke Amendment” to the 1934 Housing Act, proposed in response to 
complaints that rents in public housing were going up. The amendment capped the 
rent charged in public housing at 25% of a tenant’s household income, but Congress 
raised the cap to 30% in 1981, and that percentage has remained the industry 
standard for whether housing costs are considered “affordable” ever since. Housing 
and Urban Development Act of 1969 (Brooke Amendment), Pub. L. No. 91-152, 
§ 213, 83 Stat. 379, 389 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (2012)). The 
income to housing comparison is not universally recognized as the appropriate 
measure of housing unaffordability. See, e.g., Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14, at 
2–3; Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 458–62. See generally CHRISTOPHER 
HERBERT ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., MEASURING 
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: ASSESSING THE 30 PERCENT OF INCOME STANDARD (2018) 
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_Herbert_Hermann_
McCue_measuring_housing_affordability.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6N4-JY8Z]. 
 18. Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 463. See generally Ezra Rosser, Laying 
the Foundation: The Private Rental Market and Affordable Housing, 44 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 499, 522 (2017); Press Release, MacArthur Found, Pessimism About 
Prolonged Housing Affordability Crisis Is On the Rise, 2016 How Housing Matters 
Survey Finds, (June 16, 2016), https://www.macfound.org/press/press-
releases/pessimism-about-prolonged-affordable-housing-crisis-rise-2016-how-
housing-matters-survey-finds/ [https://perma.cc/REE4-3MQS] (quoting MacArthur 
President Julia Stasch). The tradeoff between housing and other necessities is 
particularly difficult for low-income households with children. Such households have 
an average of $490 to spend after paying housing costs, but by the Economic Policy 
Institute’s estimate, the minimum needed to support families with children in even 
affordable metro areas is $2700 per month for non-housing expenses. See STATE OF 
HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 31. 
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with its myriad ill-effects.19  Unaffordable housing is not a new 
problem,20 but over the past decade, the issue has broadened and 
deepened.21  From 2001 to 2015, the number of “very low-income” 
renter households (making less than 50% of the area median income) 
has increased by 4.181 million, with 2.551 million of those households 
earning less than 30 of the average median income.22  In 2018, the 
average amount of monthly rent that a very low-income household 
(family of four) could afford was only $660, but the average cost of a 
 
 19. Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershensen, Housing and Employment Insecurity 
Among the Working Poor, 63 SOC. PROBS. 46, 49–50 (2016). “High housing costs 
have eroded renter incomes and exacerbated inequality among renter households. 
After paying for their housing, the amount of money that lowest-income renters had 
left over for all other expenses fell 18 percent from 2001 to 2016.” JOINT CTR. FOR 
HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING 31 (2017) 
[hereinafter RENTAL HOUSING 2017], 
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/harvard_jchs_americas_rental_housin
g_2017_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KGP-LRD5]. For median rentals in lower income 
quartile, only $500 a month of gross household income is left after paying for housing. 
Id. For further discussion of the broad and persistent impacts of housing instability, 
see generally DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 11; KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE 
SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING IN AMERICA (2015); Raj Chetty 
et al., Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational 
Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1553 (2014); Rosser, supra note 18. 
 20. See JOHN I. GILDERBLOOM & RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING RENTAL 
HOUSING 3 (1987). 
 21. HUD’s most recent report to Congress on housing indicated that 8.3 million 
households have “worst-case housing needs,” meaning they are very low-income 
renters who receive no government housing assistance and pay more than half of 
their income for rent, live in severely inadequate conditions, or both. The number of 
households with worst-case housing needs has increased from 7.72 million in 2013. 
OFF. OF HOUS. POL’Y DEV. & RES., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WORST CASE 
HOUSING NEEDS: 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ix–xi, figs.1–3 (2017), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Worst-Case-Housing-Needs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YH4U-BLZU] [hereinafter WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2017]; 
see also JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 1–6 (2016), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/jchs_2016_state_of_the_natio
ns_housing_lowres.pdf [https://perma.cc/45M9-9G6A]; BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., 
HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY 7 (2013); 
MEGAN BOLTON ET AL., NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 4 (2015), 
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2015_FULL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y82A-
UN3L] (“the number of renters spending more than they can afford on housing is 
unacceptably high and growing”). 
 22. WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2017, supra note 21, at 60. The number of 
households to which HUD provided rental assistance during this period actually 
decreased by 720,000. Id. at 29. See also STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 5 
(tracking the gap between housing needs and housing assistance). 
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two-bedroom apartment that year was $1149.23  From 2001 to 2015, 
median rental rates increased by 8.6%, but median income for renters 
decreased by 6.2%.24  Seventy-five percent of low-income, cost-
burdened households obtain no government assistance to help them 
afford a home.25 
Part I of this Article explores the complexity of the problem of 
unaffordable housing, conceptualizing it along a spectrum of need 
with variations driven by multiple factors including, for example, 
income, location, race, marital status, and job type.  After Section A 
frames the problem as involving different levels of housing 
inadequacy, Section B then examines the extent to which 
unaffordability is driven by lack and misallocation of affordable 
housing unit supply.  Section C discusses the problem from the other 
side of the equation, namely, the lack of adequate household income.  
Finally, Section D focuses on a less quantifiable but equally important 
aspect of affordability, specifically, the cost of poor-quality housing 
and poor-quality neighborhoods. 
A. Prioritizing Housing Need 
Affordability concerns exist both in the context of homeownership 
and in the context of renting.  In the two decades from 1998 to 2018, 
the median sales price of homes in the United States has more than 
doubled, from $153,000 (Q4 1998) to $322,880 (Q4 2018).26  
Household incomes grew during this same period, but only at a 
modest 4.7%, from $58,612 (1998) to $61,372 (2017),27 and nearly all 
 
 23. ANDREW AURAND ET AL., NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH: 
THE HIGH COST OF HOUSING (2018) [hereinafter NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018], 
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/424A-V62Z]. 
 24. See Fischer & Sard, supra note 6. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Median Sales Price of Houses Sold for the United States, FED. RES. BANK ST. 
LOUIS: FRED ECONOMIC DATA (updated July 24, 2019) 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MSPUS [https://perma.cc/37VX-Z44X]. Even a 
decade ago, in the depths of the great recession, the median home price of $222,500 
(Q4 2008) was still up 45% from 1998. Id. Median home prices rose 41% faster than 
overall inflation in the period from 1990 to 2016. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 
16, at 1. 
 27. Real Median Household Income in the United States, FED. RES. BANK ST. 
LOUIS: FRED ECONOMIC DATA (updated Sept. 12, 2018) 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N [https://perma.cc/FD98-B9XA]; 
Erin Duffin, Average (Median) Household Income in the United States from 1990 to 
2017 (in US Dollars), STATISTA (Sep 24, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/200838/median-household-income-in-the-united-
states/ [https://perma.cc/4TT8-YFNF]. Incomes, particularly those in the lower four 
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income gains have been concentrated in the top income quintile.28  
The disproportion between the growth in home prices and the growth 
in incomes makes buying a home relatively less affordable today than 
it was 20 years ago, and comparisons over a longer period (three or 
four decades instead of two) show an even larger disparity.29  
Increases in rental rates during the past two decades are steeper than 
home purchase price increases, however, and incomes of renters as a 
group have grown at a slower pace than owners’ incomes.  Rental 
unaffordability, therefore, continues to be an even more pronounced 
problem than unaffordability caused by high home prices.  In 1990, 
the median monthly rental rate for an unfurnished apartment was 
$600; in 2017, the median monthly rental rate was $1492, nearly 150 
higher.30  In the 1960s, less than a quarter of renter households were 
cost burdened, but today, nearly half of all renter households are cost 
burdened — a statistic that has been called “the new normal.”31 
Housing affordability affects households at most income levels, but 
its impact is the greatest among the lowest income households, 
particularly low-income renter households.  Renters are on average 
 
quartiles, have not grown in tandem with GDP per capita growth, which has 
increased 52% from 1988–2017. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 2. 
 28. See Jill Mislinkski, U.S. Household Incomes: A 51-Year Perspective, 
ADVISOR PERSPECTIVES (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/2018/10/16/u-s-household-
incomes-a-51-year-perspective [https://perma.cc/G73Q-E9Z3]. The bottom four 
income quintiles have remained virtually flat since 1998 and have increased less than 
10% since 1980. Id. The real median income of households in the bottom quartile has 
increased only 3%. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 1. 
 29. For example, the median price for a new home in December 1967 was $22,200, 
3.08 times the median income that year of $7200. In December 2017, 40 years later, 
the median price for a new home had increased to $343,300, a price that represented 
5.60 times the median income of 2017, $61,327. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN 
AND AVERAGE SALE PRICES OF NEW HOMES SOLD IN THE UNITED STATES, 
https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/uspricemon.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TNE-
X4KC]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1967 AND SELECTED 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS (July 15, 1969), 
https://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-062.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD4J-6SDV]; 
Mislinkski, supra note 28. 
 30. Jennifer Rudden, Asking Rent for Unfurnished Apartments in the U.S. 1980–
2017, STATISTA (July 17, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/200223/median-
apartment-rent-in-the-us-since-1980/ [https://perma.cc/63VC-FERG]. Median rent 
rose 20% faster than overall inflation in the period from 1990 to 2016. STATE OF 
HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 1. 
 31. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 4; STATE OF HOUSING 2018 supra 
note 16, at 5. There are also more renter households today than in prior decades, 
both in real and relative numbers. Id. at 2–3. See generally Andrea J. Boyack, 
Equitably Housing (Almost) Half a Nation of Renters, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 109 (2017) 
[hereinafter Boyack, Equitably]. 
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more housing cost burdened than owners, low-income households are 
more likely to rent than own, and among renters, the poorest 
households bear the most significant housing cost burdens.32  For 
example, in 2016, 80% of rental households earning less than $30,000 
were cost burdened, and 55% were severely cost burdened.33  Among 
owner households earning less than $30,000, 63% were cost burdened, 
and 42% were severely cost burdened.34  As a comparison, only 6% of 
renter households with an income of over $75,000 in 2016 were cost 
burdened.35  Low-income households, those earning less than 80% of 
the local area median income (AMI) are often further categorized 
into very low-income, earning between 30% and 50% of AMI, and 
extremely low-income, earning below 30% of AMI.36  The rough 
estimate snapshot of housing burdens faced by low-income families is 
stark.  The majority of low-income households spend half their 
income on housing, and a quarter of such households must dedicate 
more than 70% of their income to stay sheltered.37  Low-income 
 
 32. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 4. Demographic changes, financial 
downturns in the wake of the Foreclosure Crisis, increasing student debt, and 
changed perceptions regarding homeownership mean that this decreased 
homeownership level is unlikely to rebound anytime soon as evidenced by the 
decreased homeownership rate for people under age 45. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
QUARTERLY RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP, SECOND QUARTER 
2019, Table 6 (2019), https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XTF3-FY46]. Note that the average median income of renter 
households has recently increased, but this increase represents a shift among higher 
income households to renting rather than an improvement in income among the 
lower income households. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 26. 
 33. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 30. HUD uses the terms “cost 
burdened” and “severely cost burdened” to refer to households respectively spending 
more than 30% and 50% of gross income on housing. Affordable Housing, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/affordablehousing/ 
[https://perma.cc/T5V3-Y4F2] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
 34. See STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 30; see also supra note 13. 
 35. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 28. 
 36. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP REPORT: A SHORTAGE OF 
AFFORDABLE HOMES 2019, 2–3 (2019) [hereinafter NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT], 
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZD8Q-ST7W]. There are 10.7 million severely housing cost-
burdened renter households: approximately 7.8 million are extremely low-income, 2.1 
million are very low-income, and 684,000 are low-income. Id. at 5. 
 37. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 27. The housing instability 
associated with paying such a high percentage of income to housing costs is often 
coupled with job instability, leading to a situation that has been called “double 
precarity.” Desmond & Gershenen, supra note 19, at 47–50. “Extremely low-income 
renters are much more likely to be severely housing cost-burdened than other income 
groups. Thirty-two percent of very low-income, eight percent of low-income, and two 
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households are disproportionately composed of seniors, disabled 
persons, and adult caregivers.38  Minority households (Native 
American, black, and Hispanic) are more likely to be extremely low-
income than are white households.39  The 11 million extremely low-
income households in the United States face the most severe cost 
burdens in the country: 71% (7.8 million) of extremely low-income 
households spend more than half of their income on housing.40  
Extremely low-income renter households make up 73% of the 
severely cost-burdened renters in the country.41 
Many commentators on housing affordability challenges focus on 
urban areas, particularly in large coastal cities, but affordable housing 
shortages plague populations in all areas of the country, albeit driven 
by slightly different factors from place to place.42  For example, the 
states of New York, Florida, California, Colorado, and Hawai’i all 
have about the same percentage of cost-burdened households (51–
54%), but the housing and income realities of each of these states 
differ.43  In California and Hawai’i, nominal housing prices are sky 
high, but median incomes are as well.  Meanwhile, in Florida, 
Colorado, and New York, the median incomes are lower, but lack of 
supply keeps housing costs high.44  Generally speaking, more rural 
areas are relatively less cost burdened, but rural America does not 
escape the housing affordability crunch, even in places where housing 
 
percent of middle-income renters are severely cost-burdened.” NLIHC 2019 GAP 
REPORT, supra note 36, at 1. 
 38. NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra note 36, at 1. 
 39. “Among renters, 38% of American Indian or Alaskan Native households, 35% 
of black households, 28% of Hispanic households, and 22% of white non-Hispanic 
households have extremely low incomes.” Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 7. 
A majority of extremely low-income renters are severely housing cost-
burdened in every state. The states with the greatest percentage of 
extremely low-income renter households with severe cost burdens are 
Florida (80%), Nevada (79%), Arizona (78%), California (76%), and 
Colorado (76%). Maine has the smallest, but still significant, percentage of 
extremely low-income renters with severe cost burdens (53%). 
Id. 
 43. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 27. 
 44. Id. “Median rents have risen at twice the national pace in markets with rapid 
population growth, such as Austin, Denver, and Seattle. And within these fast-
growing metros, rents in previously low-cost neighborhoods rose nearly a percentage 
point faster each year than in high-cost neighborhoods.” Id. at 4. Housing Needs by 
State: Colorado, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, https://nlihc.org/housing-
needs-by-state/colorado [https://perma.cc/7TRQ-BABQ] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
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costs are relatively low.45  Even in states with the smallest percentage 
of cost-burdened renters (Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
and Wyoming), more than a third of renter households still allocate 
more than 30 of their income to housing.46 
B. Supply Allocation and Demand Elasticity 
Even though the size of the supply gap varies widely from place to 
place, a gap between affordable housing need and available, 
affordable dwelling units exists in every single state.47  Such a 
ubiquitous problem of housing affordability seems to demand a 
national solution, but specific local concerns shape housing challenges 
in a given community.48  In many, but not all, areas, a lack of supply 
of lower-priced housing units is the chief cause of expensive housing.  
On a national basis, there is a significant lack of supply of housing 
units affordable to the lowest-income households.  There are 7 million 
more extremely low-income households than there are homes that 
can affordably house them; for every 100 extremely low-income 
households, only 37 appropriately priced units are available.49 
 
 45. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 27. Even though Alabama, 
Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi and West Virginia enjoy relatively low housing costs, 
more than 40% of the renter households in these states are cost burdened. Id. “Cost-
burdened households in rural areas are often more dispersed than in metro areas, 
making it difficult to target effective policy interventions.” Id. at 28. In fact, some of 
the nation’s worst housing situations are found in the most rural areas, particularly 
among Native American tribes. Native American Housing, NAT’L LOW INCOME 
HOUS. COAL., https://nlihc.org/explore-issues/policy-priorities/native-american-
housing [https://perma.cc/YZY7-W6DK] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019); U.S. COMM’N 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BROKEN PROMISES: CONTINUING FEDERAL FUNDING SHORTFALL 
FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 136–38 (Dec. 2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/12-20-
Broken-Promises.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6UP-W4QG]; Tim Henderson, Housing 
Affordability Crisis Spreads to Rural America, GOVERNING: STATELINE (March 25, 
2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/sl-housing-
affordability-crisis-rural-america.html [https://perma.cc/TEH2-VAH5]; RENTAL 
HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 27. Gillian B. White, Rural America’s Silent 
Housing Crisis, ATLANTIC (Jan. 28, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/01/rural-americas-silent-housing-
crisis/384885/ [https://perma.cc/FZ3U-YJPP]. 
 46. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 27–28. 
 47. NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra, note 36, at 1. “The current relative supply 
ranges from 19 affordable and available homes for every 100 extremely low-income 
renter households in Nevada to 66 in Wyoming” and “[t]he shortage of affordable 
homes ranges from 5,800 in Wyoming to one million in California.” Id. “On average, 
smaller counties have a higher ratio of supply to demand than larger urban counties, 
while large urban counties have the greatest deficit.” RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra 
note 19, at 30. 
 48. Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 458–66. 
 49. NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra note 36, at 1. 
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Although there is a supply gap in all states (the size of that gap 
varying significantly from place to place), there is not a supply gap 
among all income levels.  Basic economic forces of supply and 
demand work well at the top end of the market, and higher-income 
renters find an ample supply of units they can afford in most housing 
markets.50  Although the recent boom in rental production has 
created a sufficient number of market-level rental units to house the 
number of renter households that can afford to pay market rents in 
many areas,51 there is an insufficient number of units that are 
affordable to lower-income renters.52  The gap between demand for 
housing and affordable housing supply widens as the household’s 
income decreases.53  Comparing rental stock at certain price points to 
rental demand at those price points may itself reveal a shortage of 
supply compared to demand, but it is misleading to compare existing 
inventory to demand without considering actual availability of such 
units.  For example, there are 7.4 million rental homes in the nation 
that are affordable to the 11 million extremely low-income 
households, but only 4 million of those homes are allocated to 
extremely low-income households — higher-income renters occupy 
the remaining 3.4 million of those homes.54  This imperfect matching 
 
 50. SeAN CAPPERIS ET AL., NYU FURMAN CTR. & CAPITAL ONE, RENTING IN 
AMERICA’S LARGEST CITIES 5 (2015), 
http://furmancenter.org/files/CapOneNYUFurmanCenter__NationalRentalLandscap
e_MAY2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/238H-6EMY]; NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra 
note 23; see also RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 2, 17. 
Virtually all of the 88 metros with data available had more homes for sale in 
the top third of the market by price than in the bottom third. In 46 of these 
metros, more than half of the available supply was at the high end. The 
largest imbalances were in moderately sized, moderately priced, and fast-
growing metros such as Boise, Charlotte, Des Moines, and Durham, where 
about 65 percent of existing homes for sale were at the upper end of the 
market. 
STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 4. 
 51. In certain geographic locations, a shortage of market-level rental housing still 
exists. For example, extremely low rental vacancy rates in the Atlanta, Dallas-Fort 
Worth, New York-New Jersey-Pennsylvania, and Phoenix urban centers suggest that 
a deficit of market-rate rental housing still exists in those markets. Natalia 
Siniavskaia, What Do Vacancy Rates Tell Us About the Shortage of Housing?, 
NAHB EYE ON HOUSING (Feb. 15, 2019), http://eyeonhousing.org/2019/02/what-do-
vacancy-rates-tell-us-about-the-shortage-of-housing/ [https://perma.cc/7DHS-DKFF]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. As of 2019, the total rental inventory in the United States is 35.3 million units, 
and some 26.6 million households rent. But this statistic belies the reality that at 
every below-median-income level, households’ demand for rentals priced at 
affordable levels far exceeds demand. See NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra note 36, 
at 3. 
 54. Id. 
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of income levels and housing prices means that the actual number of 
units available at each of the lower-income levels is far lower than the 
number of existing units that rent at low-income-affordable levels.  As 
mentioned, only 37 available homes are affordable for every 100 
extremely low-income households, and only 58 available homes are 
affordable for every 100 very low-income households.55  The gap for 
low-income households earning between 50% and 80% of Area 
Medium Income (AMI) is much smaller: there are 94 available homes 
affordable for every 100 such households.56  At 80% of median 
income and above, there is no general shortage.57  Furthermore, a 
simple comparison of available homes to housing demand in a given 
community fails to account for location relative to employment 
opportunities and in preferred neighborhoods with better schools and 
community amenities. 
The government has tried to promote affordability through supply-
side incentives, but the problem with exclusively focusing on 
increasing the number of dwelling units is that it may not — and 
historically has not — ensured that such units are optimally priced 
and placed.58  Because developers can make a higher profit in 
creating and selling or renting higher-end units that rent at or above 
the median levels, higher-income households can rely on the forces of 
supply and demand to meet their rental needs.  However, 
development at the high end of the market appears to crowd out 
development affordable to lowest-income renters.  For example, from 
2005 to 2015, some 6.7 million housing units were added to the 
nation’s rental stock, but there was a 260,000-unit decline in the total 
number of rentals charging less than $800 a month.59  During that one 
decade, the number of homes renting for $2000 or more a month 
increased by 97% and the number of homes renting for $800 or less 
per month decreased by 2%.60  Thus, the vast majority of new rental 
units created during the decade following the Foreclosure Crisis61 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.; RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 29. 
 58. See, e.g., infra notes 204, 205, and 212–15 and accompanying text. 
 59. NLIHC Out of Reach 2018, supra note 23, at 6. 
 60. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 28, 36 (noting that between 1990 
and 2016, 2.5 million occupied rental units priced below $800 per month were lost, 
but an additional 2.6 million occupied rental units priced above $2000 were added to 
the rental housing stock). 
 61. After eight years of rapidly inflating U.S. real estate prices, residential home 
values plummeted in 2007 just as the interest rates for adjustable rate residential 
subprime mortgages were adjusting upwards. The result was a wave of foreclosures, 
1198 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
were medium- or high-priced rental units, but the increase in demand 
for rental housing has been most pronounced among lowest-income 
households.62 
The economic theory of supply and demand63 suggests that, 
although increasing demand motivates price increases in the short 
term, it also motivates increases in supply which, in the long term, will 
push prices down.  This economic theory works imperfectly for 
housing, however: because shelter is essential to survival, higher-
priced housing will not necessarily reduce demand.  Even if housing is 
priced at unaffordable levels for lower-income households, people 
must somehow pay that higher price, even if that means forgoing 
other sorts of spending, including spending on other basic needs like 
healthcare, childcare, transportation, and even food.  Lack of 
 
first in the subprime and then prime residential mortgage sectors, rapid devaluation 
of mortgage-backed securities in both sectors, followed by credit downgrades of the 
issuers and invested financial institutions. In October 2008, the federal government 
intervened to provide capital to the market. During the decade following the 
September–October 2008 securities collapse and bank bailouts, foreclosures and 
home losses reached ten times the pre-crisis levels, and millions of homeowners lost 
their homes and their nest egg in one fell swoop. Loss of an owned home coupled 
with tight mortgage credit during and following the Foreclosure Crisis shifted a huge 
number of households from owning to renting their homes, increasing the demand 
for rental housing.  Much has been written about the Financial Crisis in general and 
about the shift from owner-occupancy to rental housing for millions of Americans. 
See generally, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD (2013); ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, 
HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT RECESSION, AND HOW 
WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN (2015); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. 
STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., RENTAL MARKET CONDITIONS (2011), 
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/ahr2011-2-rentalmarketconditions.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/2RCP-GJPM]. For a broader look at the worldwide causes and 
impacts of the crisis, see ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL 
CRISES CHANGED THE WORLD (2018). For a concise retrospective on housing market 
changes during the decade from 2008 to 2018, see Michelle Lerner, 10 Years Later: 
How the Housing Market Has Changed Since the Crash, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/10/04/feature/10-years-later-
how-the-housing-market-has-changed-since-the-crash/ [https://perma.cc/BP68-
Y8VU]. 
 62. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 27–30. Between 1990 and 2016, 2.5 
million occupied rental units priced below $800 per month were lost, but an 
additional 2.6 million occupied rental units priced above $2000 were added to the 
rental housing stock. Id.; see also NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
 63. Elementary economic theory posits that increasing demand for a product 
relative to its supply will increase its price in the short term, and increasing the supply 
of a product relative to demand will lead to a price decrease. ALFRED MARSHALL, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 199 (Macmillan and Co. 1946) (1890). Studies have 
confirmed that economic theory holds true for housing and that limited supply of 
housing does indeed increase its cost. See, e.g., Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14, at 
2–4. 
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sufficient means to afford all their basic needs forces low-income 
households to make “impossible choices.”64  The “invisible hand” 
fails to respond the same way in the context of markets for survival 
essentials, like housing, where demand is inelastic.65 
Rising housing production costs further encourage housing 
producers to build at the high end of the market, where it is easier to 
turn a profit.  Development costs are driven by the cost of inputs: 
land, labor, and materials, all of which have become significantly 
more expensive in the past few years.66  In the one year between 2016 
and 2017, for example, estimated costs of building a “basic, three-
story apartment building” increased by 8%.67  Land use regulations 
inflate development costs and ultimately put downward pressure on 
the supply of housing priced too low to recoup such additional 
expenses.68  Zoning tools can also directly limit the supply of homes 
in a community, driving up home values and increasing the wealth of 
 
 64. NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra note 23, at 3; see also NABIHAH 
MAQBOOL ET AL., CTR. FOR HOUSING POL’Y, THE IMPACTS OF AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING ON HEALTH: A RESEARCH SUMMARY 1–2 (2015), 
https://www.rupco.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/The-Impacts-of-Affordable-Housing-
on-Health-CenterforHousingPolicy-Maqbool.etal.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X4K-
NNMM]. 
 65. Adam Smith’s foundational economic theory of the “invisible hand” posits 
that at some point, prices will be too high and this will drive down demand. ADAM 
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
349 (Metalibri 2007) (1776). Incidentally, Smith also opined that “[n]o society can 
surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are 
poor and miserable” and theorized that although laws interfering with the market 
and favoring economic elites are by definition unjust, regulations that are “in favour 
of the workmen” are “always just and equitable.” Id. at 66, 115. 
 66. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University: 
Between 2012 and 2017, the price of vacant commercial land — a proxy for 
developable multifamily sites — was up 62 percent. Over this same period, 
the combined costs of construction labor, materials, and contractor fees rose 
25 percent, far faster than the general inflation rate of just 7 percent. Cost 
increases for key building materials, such as gypsum, concrete, and lumber, 
have also outpaced inflation in recent years. 
RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 17. 
 67. Id. at 3. 
 68. See Richard A. Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Affordable Housing 
Mandates, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 64, 66–67 
(Lee Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keyes eds., 2017) (explaining that gaps in housing 
supply “are only aggravated by stringent zoning and excessive permitting 
restrictions”). Local governments can “promote construction of much-needed rental 
units (particularly lower-rent units) by expediting approvals; guaranteeing by-right 
development of small multifamily buildings, particularly those with affordable units; 
reducing parking and other property requirements; and allowing higher densities for 
projects that are transit-accessible.” RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 18. 
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local “homevoters” as well as municipal tax revenues.69  Housing 
prices in some of the country’s most expensive real estate markets are 
largely affected by aggressive exclusionary zoning that keeps existing 
home prices high and new homes out.70 
Low-income rental housing supply has been hit with the double 
whammy of rising development costs that crowd out new affordable 
units and an accelerated loss of existing affordable units, either 
through conversion from rented to owned homes or from low-income 
to higher-income rentals, or through physical deterioration.71  In 
markets where demand for rental housing is robust, financial 
incentives lead owners to convert affordable units to luxury or 
market-rate ones.72  In markets where demand is weak, there is little 
incentive for the upkeep of low-income housing and, in some cases, 
lack of landlord income to allocate to that effort in any case.73  Lack 
of maintenance results in unit obsolescence and uninhabitability, and 
under-maintained housing is likely to end up demolished or 
abandoned.74  More than 8.7 million affordable units, a majority of 
the nation’s low-income housing supply, exited housing inventory 
between 1985 and 2013.75  The National Housing Trust estimated that 
 
 69. FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 69 (coining the term “homevoter” to reflect 
homeowners whose policy choices are driven by their desire to maximize the value of 
their real property assets); Boyack, Exclude, supra note 8, at 472–74; Kristine Nelson 
Fuge, Exclusionary Zoning: Keeping People in Their Wrongful Places or a Valid 
Exercise of Local Control?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 148, 159 (1996). 
 70. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building 
Restrictions on Housing Affordability, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 21, 
23, 28–30 (2003); Eliza Hall, Divide and Sprawl, Decline and Fall: A Comparative 
Critique of Euclidean Zoning, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 915, 925–26 (2007). 
 71. See Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 469–70. 
 72. KAROLINA GORSKA & MITCHELL CRISPELL, URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT, 
UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION POLICY BRIEF 2 (2016). See 
generally PETER MOSKOVITZ, HOW TO KILL A CITY: GENTRIFICATION, INEQUALITY, 
AND THE FIGHT FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD (2017). 
 73. “If landlords are unable to charge enough rent to cover debt service, taxes, 
insurance, ongoing maintenance and repair, and a fair return on their investment, the 
most discretionary of these expenditures will be the most expendable.” SANDRA J. 
NEWMAN, URB. INST. LOW-END RENTAL HOUSING: THE FORGOTTEN STORY IN 
BALTIMORE’S HOUSING BOOM 16 (2005). “As one landlord put it, ‘A furnace is a 
furnace, and it costs the same whether you put it in a $600 unit or a $300 unit.’” Id. 
 74. See RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 30; see also infra note 143 and 
accompanying text. 
 75.  
The biggest reductions were due to permanent removals, with 27 percent of 
affordable rentals in 1985 (4.1 million units) demolished, destroyed in 
disasters, or reconfigured into fewer units. About 18 percent (2.7 million 
units) were converted to owner-occupied or seasonal housing, while 12 
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“for every new affordable apartment created, two are lost due to 
deterioration, abandonment or conversion to more expensive 
housing.”76 
In many places, therefore, one of the most effective ways to combat 
affordability challenges is to enable and incentivize increases to the 
supply and maintenance of lower-priced housing units.  A preliminary 
step to encouraging the development of lower-priced units is to make 
the development of such units less expensive.  Removing artificial 
barriers to production, such as unjustifiable land use restrictions, can 
help leverage natural economic forces to create affordable housing.77  
For example, land use regulation can add up to 30% to the cost of 
housing development, and any savings in reducing this burden can be 
passed on to residents in the form of reduced rent.78  New housing 
development can be channeled toward the lower end of the market by 
offering subsidies and other incentive programs that provide offsets 
or contributions to the cost of producing housing, in exchange for 
commitments to keep the units priced at affordable levels.  In 
addition, supply deficits can be managed by preserving existing 
affordable units, possibly through the government funding the gap 
between net rental revenues and necessary maintenance costs. 
 
percent (1.7 million units) were upgraded to higher rents through 
gentrification. 
RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 30. 
 76. What Is Preservation?, NAT’L HOUSING TR., 
http://www.nationalhousingtrust.org/what-preservation [https://perma.cc/Q7GF-
QXLW] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
 77. See Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 466–67; Epstein, supra note 68, at 
64, 76; see also WILLIAM APGAR, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING: EXPANDING THE 
ABILITY OF RENTAL HOUSING TO SERVE AS A PATHWAY TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
OPPORTUNITY 28 (2004) (arguing that reducing the costs of zoning and regulatory 
approvals would positively impact housing affordability); James J. Hartnett, 
Affordable Housing, Exclusionary Zoning, and American Apartheid: Using Title 
VIII to Foster Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 97 (1993) 
(concluding that “overregulation directly increases housing development costs both 
through lengthy and expensive approval processes and the imposition of high permit 
fees — costs that are passed on to home buyers and renters.”). 
 78. See AFFORD. RENTAL HOUS. A.C.T.I.O.N., BUILDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
COMMUNITIES USING THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 6 (2015), 
www.taxcreditcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Housing-Credit-Ed-Deck-
March-2015-ver-14-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9L-HQGH] (estimating that land 
development costs would have to be reduced by 28% to make it profitable for the 
private sector to create affordable housing). 
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C. Ability to Pay 
The problem of unaffordable housing not only represents a market 
disequilibrium of undersupply, resulting in prices that are too high, 
but it also represents the problem of incomes simply being too low.  
The income piece of the puzzle is particularly salient in communities 
with lower-priced housing, the modest cost of which is still out of 
reach for the very poorest residents whose incomes are almost non-
existent.  For people whose incomes cannot support the costs of a 
modestly priced home, increasing supply of lower-priced units may 
prove insufficient to address housing needs.  Where the critical 
component of housing unaffordability is poverty, viable solutions 
must address the ability to pay and not just rental supply. 
The long-term solution to a renter’s lack of income is for the 
renter’s income to increase, ideally through improved employment — 
but for a majority of the households that are severely cost burdened, 
the problem is not as simple as a lack of employment.  The majority 
of low-income renters are already employed or suffer some 
impairment that limits or prevents employment.79  Full-time 
employment does not guarantee sufficient income to afford housing 
in most areas of the country.  A full-time employee in the United 
States earning the federal minimum wage would have to work three 
full-time jobs in order to afford a modest two-bedroom apartment.80  
 
 79. See Affordable Housing Advocates Tell HUD and Congress — Keep Housing 
Affordable for Low Income Families, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://nlihc.org/news/affordable-housing-advocates-tell-hud-and-
congress-keep-housing-affordable-low-income-families [https://perma.cc/4986-5G96]; 
Ann Stevens, Employment and Poverty, ECONOFACT (Jan. 7, 2018), 
https://econofact.org/employment-and-poverty [https://perma.cc/E3DV-3Y7S]. 
Poverty and especially housing instability are factors that make it more difficult for 
people to obtain stable and consistent employment. See generally AARP POL’Y 
INST., 19 MILLION WORKING-AGE AMERICANS HAVE A DISABILITY THAT LIMITS OR 
PREVENTS WORK (2009), https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/fs153_ssdi.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MT3T-ADGW]; Kristin F. Butcher & Diane Whitmore 
Schanzenbach, Most Workers in Low-Wage Labor Market Work Substantial Hours, 
in Volatile Jobs, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 24, 2018), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/most-workers-in-low-wage-
labor-market-work-substantial-hours-in [https://perma.cc/GSZ9-NGRW]; Desmond 
& Gershensen, supra note 19. 
 80.  
A full-time worker earning the federal minimum wage of $7.25 needs to 
work approximately 122 hours per week for all 52 weeks of the year, or 
approximately three full-time jobs, to afford a two-bedroom rental home at 
the national average fair market rent. The same worker needs to work 99 
hours per week for all 52 weeks of the year, or approximately two and a half 
full-time jobs, to afford a one-bedroom home at the national average fair 
market rent. 
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Full-time workers earning the applicable federal- or state-mandated 
minimum wage in their jurisdiction cannot afford a two-bedroom 
home in any state, metropolitan area, or county in the nation.81  In 
fact, such a worker would only be able to afford a one-bedroom home 
in 22 counties in the United States (out of more than 3000 counties 
nationwide), each of which is located in a state that mandates a 
minimum wage higher than the $7.25 per hour federal minimum.82 
Ability to pay is best considered at local levels rather than based on 
national averages because not only does the price of housing vary 
widely based on location, but income levels do too.  Considering 
housing costs in isolation tells only half of the affordability story.  
Certain coastal cities, including San Francisco, New York, Boston, 
Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Miami, have some of the 
nation’s highest home prices and are easily perceived as housing 
markets that are unaffordable or “out of reach” for many renters.  
The median rent in San Francisco, California, for example, is a 
whopping $4580 a month, whereas median rent in Topeka, Kansas is 
only $800.83  Even though affordability is less apparent in cheaper 
housing markets, however, such lower-priced homes may still be 
unaffordable to local populations.84  Incomes in many areas with 
 
NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra note 23, at 1. The NLIHC cautions that raising 
the minimum wage will not, alone, solve housing affordability issues. The report 
notes that “[t]hirty-eight local jurisdictions have their own minimum wages higher 
than the state or federal minimum-wage, but all fall short of the local one-bedroom 
Housing Wage.” Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. San Francisco Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/san-
francisco-ca/home-values/ [https://perma.cc/4JAQ-PTMV] (last visited Sept. 25, 
2019); Topeka Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/topeka-
ks/home-values/ [https://perma.cc/PWL9-97H5] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
 84. Although many more modestly priced housing markets are in the middle of 
the country (as opposed to the coasts), this is an overgeneralization and there are 
important exceptions. Growing markets like Boise and Austin are becoming more 
and more expensive. See Dean Johnson, What’s Driving Boise’s Hot Housing 
Market?, IDAHO HOUSING & FINANCE ASS’N (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.idahohousing.com/blog/boise-housing-market/ [https://perma.cc/H47Z-
WSM5]; Jonathan Silver, Here’s How Much Austin Prices Have Surged in the Past 5 
Years, AUSTIN CULTUREMAP (Mar. 20, 2019), 
http://austin.culturemap.com/news/real-estate/03-20-19-austin-home-price-increase-
north-america-report/ [https://perma.cc/4TWB-WH5X]. Several population centers in 
North and South Carolina, on the other hand, remain relatively inexpensive. Devon 
Thorsby, The 25 Best Affordable Places to Live in the U.S. in 2019, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 
9, 2019), https://realestate.usnews.com/real-estate/slideshows/best-affordable-places-
to-live-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/2P8E-ZNNP]. 
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moderate housing costs are disproportionately depressed.85  Just as 
growth in GDP has been unevenly distributed among income 
quintiles, economic improvement is also geographically diverse.  For 
example, the nation’s median household income increased 2.4% 
between 2015 and 2016, but different states experienced strikingly 
disparate financial realities during that one year.86  In Louisiana and 
Wyoming, median income fell by 1–2%; in Kansas and Oklahoma, 
median incomes remained virtually flat; and in California, Idaho, and 
Massachusetts, median income increased by more than 4%.87 
Unequal housing cost burdens represent not only location, but also 
reflect job type, race, and marital status of members of a household.  
The most severe housing cost burdens are associated with jobs in 
certain low-paying sectors such as personal care, service, food 
preparation and service, building and grounds maintenance, and 
healthcare support.88  Households with young children are more 
likely to be cost burdened — particularly those headed by only one 
parent — and some 63% of single-parent households pay more than 
50% of household income toward shelter.89  A glimpse into the 
hardships such renters feel helps humanize and explain the impact of 
inadequate wages and resulting housing instability.  The Guardian 
interviewed a single mother of two in Philadelphia, Alicia Hamiel, 
who earns $7.75 an hour working at McDonald’s.90  She works full 
 
 85. Income levels vary widely by employment sector and do not move in lockstep 
with housing costs. See Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 460–62 (explaining how 
regional variation in incomes does not track housing costs). 
 86. See GLORIA C. GUZMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME 2016, 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY BRIEFS (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/acs/acsbr16-
02.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF3P-8WX7]; Gross Domestic Product by State, First 
Quarter 2019, U.S. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gdp-state [https://perma.cc/HL4C-83VQ]; supra note 
29 and accompanying text. 
 87. GUZMAN, supra note 86, at 3. 
 88. NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra note 23, at 3–4. The number of jobs 
available in these lower-paying employment sectors are growing, suggesting that 
affordability problems are not necessarily indicative of inadequate employment level 
but rather of inadequate wages. See Naema Ahmed, Most Jobs Created Since the 
Recession Have Been Low Paying, AXIOS (Sep. 7, 2018), 
https://www.axios.com/most-jobs-created-since-recciu-1536269032-13ccc866-5fb0-
44e8-bd14-286ae09c296f.html [https://perma.cc/5WHP-VRPJ]; Andrew VanDam & 
Heather Long, How the U.S. Economy Turned Six Good Jobs into Bad Ones, WASH. 
POST (Sep. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/09/04/how-us-
economy-turned-six-good-jobs-into-bad-ones [https://perma.cc/CLM8-PGPE]. 
 89. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 28–29. 
 90. Alastair Gee, Outside in America: Minimum Wage, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2017) 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/08/minimum-wage-affordable-
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time and lives in a low-priced one-bedroom apartment with her two 
children, paying only $400 a month, well below the median rental 
price for the region and even the nation.91  But her extremely low 
income is insufficient to afford even that low monthly rent.  “I feel 
like I’m failing as a mom,” The Guardian quotes Hamiel as saying. “If 
I can’t make sure they have a roof over their heads, what am I doing? 
I feel like I’m doing the best that I can.”92 
D. Quality of Home, Quality of Community 
An associated housing problem, connected to both lack of 
affordable units and lack of income, is the problem of uninhabitable 
home quality.  In some places, there may be nearly a sufficient 
quantity of affordable housing units, but the biggest housing issue 
pertains to housing quality.  Many of the units still in use and 
affordable to low-income households without government subsidy are 
in disrepair.93  A majority of units that rent for very low prices, below 
$650 a month, are at least 50 years old and face daunting maintenance 
needs, some of which significantly threaten the health and safety of 
their occupants.94  When weak local housing markets keep both rents 
and landlord profits low, landlords lack the financial incentive and/or 
ability to make improvements to their rental units — they cannot 
recoup these costs through increased rental rates.95  Rents in these 
areas stay mercifully low, but lack of housing quality, coupled with 
lack of any better, affordable alternatives, effectively condemns 
lower-income residents to life in a dilapidated, hazardous 
environment. 
Even housing units that are subject to HUD inspection 
requirements may fail to meet minimal quality standards.  Rondesha 
 
housing-rentals-study [https://perma.cc/7U8W-USMY]; see also Libertina Brandt, 
Here’s How Much it Costs to Rent a One-Bedroom Apartment in 15 Major US 
Cities, BUS. INSIDER (July 24, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/cost-of-one-
bedroom-apartment-rent-major-us-cities-2019-6 [https://perma.cc/TVZ3-JLCX]. 
 91. Gee, supra note 90. 
 92. Id. 
 93. In 2012, the National Association of Homebuilders estimated that “[o]ver 10 
million homes in the U.S. are physically inadequate, about double the number usually 
reported as having even moderate problems,” and explained that “[r]enters of 
inadequate housing are concentrated at the lower end of the income scale.” PAUL 
EMRATH, NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, QUALITY OF THE EXISTING HOUSING 
STOCK: AS GOOD AS YOU THOUGHT? (2012), 
http://www.nahbclassic.org/generic.aspx?genericContentID=180537 
[https://perma.cc/YGY5-ZA54]. 
 94. See RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 3, 15. 
 95. NLIHC OUT OF REACH 2018, supra note 23, at 6. 
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Brooks, for example, lives in a housing unit that receives project-
based Section 8 subsidies from the government under a contract with 
HUD, pursuant to which the unit is required to be habitable.96  Yet, 
according to an NBC News report, “every corner” of her apartment, 
including the living room walls, the back of the sofa, and even her 
daughter’s shoes, is covered in mold.97  HUD is required by law to 
ensure the quality of subsidized housing units to ensure that 
recipients of federal housing assistance do not live in squalor.98  Yet 
nearly 2000 subsidized rental properties failed inspection in 2018, and 
still more technically passed inspection in spite of being beset with 
worrisome health and safety threats such as holes in the ceiling, pest 
infestation, serious mold, and the like.99  In a private meeting with 
tenants in October 2018, HUD officials admitted that “the system is 
broken,” and that understaffed local HUD offices could not 
adequately respond to complaints or thoroughly inspect properties.100 
Tenants like Brooks are not solely dependent on HUD inspectors 
because landlord-tenant law also protects tenants’ right to a habitable 
home.101  But local practices of blacklisting and retaliatory evictions 
undercut tenant legal protections, which can render the right to live in 
a safe and healthy home illusory.102  Professor Paula Franzese 
interviewed several tenants in New Jersey who resided in 
uninhabitable housing, some of it federally subsidized, and found 
widespread fears of landlord backlash kept tenants from asserting 
their rights to habitability: if a landlord evicted or blacklisted a tenant 
 
 96. See Khimm et al., supra note 5. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Federal law authorizing Section 8 subsidies requires that subsidies only be 
provided to units that pass inspections for habitability. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(p) (2016). 
 99. Khimm et al., supra note 5; see also the results of NBC’s FOIA request, 
available at http://media1.s-nbcnews.com/i/today/z_creative/InfillFoiaReacReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QX67-3Y69]. Local authorities in cities including Houston, St. 
Louis, and Chicago, have attempted to address habitability deficits that HUD has not 
addressed. Molly Parker, “Pretty Much a Failure:” HUD Inspections Pass Dangerous 
Apartments Filled with Rats, Roaches, and Toxic Mold, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16, 
2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/hud-inspections-pass-dangerous-
apartments-with-rats-roaches-toxic-mold [https://perma.cc/XKE6-HQ4N]. 
 100. Khimm et al., supra note 5. 
 101. See Paula Franzese et al., The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives: 
Making Real the Promise of Landlord-Tenant Reform, 69 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 1 
(2016); Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine 
Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1446 (1974). Uniform laws have 
endorsed granting tenants the legal ability to withhold rent during the time that the 
rented premises are uninhabitable. REVISED UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & 
TENANT ACT § 402 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005). 
 102. See generally DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 11. 
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in retaliation for complaints about habitability, the tenant would have 
no other affordable options for shelter.103  In one example, Yanira 
Cortez, having lived with mold, rats, and roaches for some time, 
finally withheld rent in protest when her bathroom ceiling 
collapsed.104  In retaliation, before the eviction suit against her had 
even been decided, Cortez’s landlord added her name to a list of 
tenants who had been evicted for nonpayment of rent, a list that was 
used by local landlords to determine whether to rent to a given 
applicant.105  Lack of affordable rental options ties the hands of 
tenants and forces them to accept illegal living conditions.  The 
market in many places offers no good choice to these low-income 
tenants: They can put up with poor quality homes or spend an 
unsustainably high percentage of their income on housing.  
Sometimes, they do both.106 
In addition to facing the problem of uninhabitable housing units, 
lower-income households are also more likely sited in poor quality 
neighborhoods.  Affordable housing is predominantly located in areas 
of concentrated poverty, many of which are unsafe, unsupported, and 
even toxic.107  A majority of the residents of many such 
neighborhoods are people of color, condemned to live in poor quality 
neighborhoods by a history of systemic housing segregation, 
persistent poverty, and inequitable opportunities for advancement — 
all of which directly resulted from federal policies over the past 
several decades.108  Even when residents of such communities pay no 
 
 103. Paula Franzese, A Place to Call Home: Tenant Blacklisting and the Denial of 
Opportunity, 65 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 662, 674 (2018). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See generally DESMOND, EVICTED, supra note 11. 
 107. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 20–24, 54–55, 81 (1993). 
“Ironically, almost every attempt to alleviate housing costs and encourage housing 
equity has resulted in at least some degree of segregation retrenchment.” Andrea J. 
Boyack, Side by Side: Revitalizing Urban Cores and Ensuring Residential Diversity, 
92 CHI.-KENT L. Rev. 435, 448–49 (2017) [hereinafter Boyack, Revitalizing]. 
“Neighborhood matters. Equality of opportunity is a myth when segments of the 
population live in high-crime, distressed neighborhoods.” Id. at 449. To put it another 
way, “where you grow up affects where you wind up.” MANUEL PASTOR & MARGERY 
AUSTIN TURNER, URB. INST., REDUCING POVERTY AND ECONOMIC DISTRESS AFTER 
ARRA: POTENTIAL ROLES FOR PLACE CONSCIOUS STRATEGIES 3 (2010). 
 108. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 107; Andrea J. Boyack, A New 
American Dream for Detroit, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 573, 576–77 (2016) 
[hereinafter Boyack, Detroit]; Kelly DeRango, Discrimination and Segregation in 
Housing, 8 UPJOHN EMP. RES. 1 (2001); Charles L. Nier III, Perpetuation of 
Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal Interpretation of Relining Under 
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more than 30% of their income toward housing costs, they still bear 
significant, if less measurable, costs from living in depressed areas.  
The country’s most impoverished neighborhoods have some of the 
least effective and least supported schools, and children who attend 
these schools have a consequentially diminished potential.109  Crime is 
higher in areas of concentrated poverty, threatening financial and 
physical well-being of area inhabitants.110  Residents of low-income 
neighborhoods lack access to quality jobs, stores with fresh, healthy 
foods, and adequate healthcare.111  There are few neighborhood 
amenities in low-income tracts, and there are more locally 
undesirable land uses (so-called LULUs) that create significant health 
and environmental harms.112  Those unable to pay for shelter in 
 
the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617 (1999); Florence W. Roisman, 
The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Necessity and Means of Promoting 
Residential Racial Integration, 81 IOWA L. REV. 479 (1995); Jacob S. Rugh & 
Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. 
SOC. REV. 629, 630–634 (2010). 
 109. Not only are poorer neighborhoods more likely to have low-performing public 
schools, but families receiving every type of federal housing assistance (public 
housing, housing vouchers, or living in tax-credit-created low-income housing) are 
actually even more likely than other non-assisted poor families to be located near a 
state’s most disadvantaged schools. INGRID GOULD ELLEN & KEREN HORN, POVERTY 
& RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, HOUSING AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL SCHOOLS NEAR FAMILIES WITH FEDERAL HOUSING 
ASSISTANCE 1 (2018). Children in high-poverty neighborhoods attend worse schools 
and are more likely to drop out and are less likely to go to college. See PASTOR & 
TURNER, supra note 107, at 2. 
 110. See ANNA AIZER, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, NEIGHBORHOOD 
VIOLENCE AND URBAN YOUTH 279–89 (2008) (finding that poorer neighborhoods 
increase exposure to crime); ANNE C. CASE & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, NAT’L BUREAU 
OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE COMPANY YOU KEEP: THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY AND 
NEIGHBORHOOD ON DISADVANTAGED YOUTHS 3, 10, 17 (1991) (finding that 
neighborhood can substantially increase a person’s “probability of being involved in a 
crime”); Maqbool et al., supra note 64, at 6. 
 111. See Chiquita A. Collins & David R. Williams, Segregation and Mortality: The 
Deadly Effects of Racism?, 14 SOC. F. 495, 499–504 (1999); Thomas A. LaVeist, 
Segregation, Poverty, and Empowerment: Health Consequences for African 
Americans, 71 MILBANK Q. 41, 45–46, 55 (1993); Maqbool et al., supra note 64, at 2–
3. 
 112. Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: 
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1389–90 (1994); 
Antoine M. Thompson, Environmental Racism — A Quiet Killer in Black 
Communities, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS (Apr. 22, 2019), 
http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2019/apr/22/environmental-racism-black-
communities/ [https://perma.cc/J2ZD-R7J6]. Disparate exposure to pollutants has 
been shown by multiple scientific studies. For example, a 2012 study of air quality 
demonstrated a significant inequality of exposure to poor air quality based on 
neighborhood, which also created a disparate impact based on race and ethnicity. 
Michelle L. Bell & Keita Ebisu, Environmental Inequality in Exposures to Airborne 
2019] RESPONSIBLE DEVOLUTION 1209 
healthy communities are therefore often condemned to live and raise 
their family in a neighborhood with deficits that diminish current and 
future opportunities for advancement.  Living in poor quality 
neighborhoods perpetuates intergenerational poverty and results in 
lower quality and duration of life.113 
II. TREATING SYMPTOMS AND SEARCHING FOR A CURE 
Housing unaffordability is a plague on our society.  Federal, state, 
and local governments have been attempting to treat this socio-
economic disease for decades.  Methods of treatment vary, from 
limiting prices that housing providers can charge or mandating the 
production of affordable housing units,114 to creating government-
owned low-price housing,115 to providing offsets and subsidies that 
either encourage increased affordable housing supply or subsidize 
households’ ability to pay housing costs.116  Many of these treatments 
have directly or indirectly improved certain people’s housing burdens, 
but only a fraction of those affected by unaffordable housing receive 
publicly funded benefits, and some of the efforts to make housing 
affordable have caused troubling side effects.117  In addition, 
federalism complexities and poorly designed policies make some 
government housing expenditures haphazard, inequitable, and 
 
Particulate Matter Components in the United States, 120 ENV’T. HEALTH PERSP. 
1699, 1700–01 (2012). 
 113. See generally Maqbool et al., supra note 64. Children relocated into higher-
opportunity neighborhoods enjoy measurably better health outcomes. See MEGAN 
SANDEL ET AL., CTR. FOR HOUSING POL’Y, HOUSING AS A HEALTH CARE 
INVESTMENT: AFFORDABLE HOUSING SUPPORTS CHILDREN’S HEALTH 4 2016. The 
Moving to Opportunity experiment showed that if young children were relocated to 
higher-quality neighborhoods, they were more likely to be able to break the multi-
generational cycle of poverty, but that moving to higher-quality neighborhood later 
in life had significantly fewer measurable positive effects. See Raj Chetty et al., The 
Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the 
Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. 855, 889–891 
(2015). For the purposes of the Moving to Opportunity experiment, a “high 
opportunity neighborhood” was defined as a neighborhood with poverty rates below 
15, labor force participation rates above 60%, more than 20% of adults having 
completed college, and more than 70% of the neighborhood being occupied by non-
Hispanic white households, with more than 200,000 low-wage jobs located within five 
miles of the center of the neighborhood. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., URB. 
INST., BENEFITS OF LIVING IN HIGH OPPORTUNITY NEIGHBORHOODS: INSIGHTS FROM 
THE MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY DEMONSTRATION 2 (2012). 
 114. See infra Part II.A. 
 115. See infra Part II.B. 
 116. See infra Parts II.C and II.D, respectively. 
 117. See, e.g., Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 487–90. 
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wasteful.118  Furthermore, the spending allocated primarily to treat 
unbearable symptoms of housing unaffordability may not translate 
into helping to cure the problem.119 
Part II of this Article discusses four categories of governmental 
responses to the problem of housing unaffordability.  Section A 
examines government limits on housing prices through rent control 
regulations and inclusionary zoning requirements.  Section B 
considers public housing.  Sections C and D discuss supply-side and 
demand-side housing subsidies that allocate public funds to, on the 
one hand, offset the cost of creating and rehabilitating housing units, 
and, on the other hand, to offset the costs charged to households for 
housing, on the other. 
A. Controlling the Price 
In an unregulated market, housing consumers (renters and buyers) 
bear the burden of increasing housing costs — and in most of the 
country, the law does not change this cost allocation baseline.  
Generally, when market prices increase for any good or service, a 
would-be buyer must either pay more to obtain that good or service 
or go without it.  In the context of housing, however, some 
jurisdictions have enacted local laws establishing direct and indirect 
price controls, even though many states’ laws explicitly prohibit local 
price controls for housing except in a temporary “emergency”.120  
 
 118. “As a nation, we both pay too much and pay too little toward housing.” Id. at 
458 (discussing inefficiencies and unsustainable program design and implementation 
in the context of housing). 
 119. Id. at 457–58. 
 120. At the end of 2018, local rent control only existed in four states (California, 
Maryland, New Jersey, New York) and the District of Columbia. See Residential 
Rent Control Law Guide by State, LANDLORD.COM, 
http://www.landlord.com/rent_control_laws_by_state.htm [https://perma.cc/TS6L-
UMC9]. In each case, state law constrains municipal authority to impose controls on 
rents. In California, for example, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act of 1995 
limited local governments from expanding then-existing price controls on rental 
housing, so that homes built after 1995 are free from local rent controls and cities’ 
rent stabilization regimes are unable to expand beyond what they covered in 1995. A 
ballot initiative to remove these state-level restrictions on municipal rent control was 
defeated in 2018, but in 2019, state legislators proposed various bills to roll back the 
1995 Act to give local governments more flexibility to set rental rates.  See, e.g., A.B. 
36, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (allowing rent controls to apply to housing more 
than twenty years old), A.B. 1482, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (preventing 
landlords from increasing rents by more than a specified percentage above yearly 
inflation); Caroline Basile, Rent Control Back on the Table in California, 
HOUSINGWIRE (Mar. 15, 2019), housingwire.com/articles/48443-rent-control-back-on-
the-table-in-california [https://perma.cc/2PQW-N3FQ]. In other areas of the country, 
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Historically, rent control ordinances were exclusively matters of local 
law, but in 2019, Oregon became the first jurisdiction to establish rent 
control at the state level.121  Controlling the price that can be charged 
for housing shifts costs onto housing providers, a move that is 
controversial and allegedly counterproductive in the long term.122  
 
state statutes explicitly prevent localities from creating rent control regimes unless 
there is a “housing emergency.” For example, Florida law provides: 
No law, ordinance, rule, or other measure which would have the effect of 
imposing controls on rents shall be adopted or maintained in effect except 
as provided herein and unless it is found and determined, as hereinafter 
provided, that such controls are necessary and proper to eliminate an 
existing housing emergency which is so grave as to constitute a serious 
menace to the general public. 
Fla. Stat. § 166.043 (2001). Local rent control legislation is most common in New 
York. See supra note 120. New York City amended its rent control laws in 2019, and 
the amended rent control laws are currently the subject of litigation claiming that the 
legislation violates the Constitution. See Complaint, Cmty. Hous. Improv. Program v. 
City of New York Rent Guidelines Bd., No. 1:19-cv-04087 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2019). 
Among other things, the complaint alleges that “[t]he New York City Housing 
‘Emergency’” has been “declared every three years for the last 50 years with no 
rational basis for the decision[.]” Id. at 59; see also Bobby Allyn, New York 
Landlords Call Rent Control Laws “Illegal Taking” in New Federal Lawsuit, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (July 17, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/17/742875001/new-york-
landlords-call-rent-control-laws-an-illegal-taking-in-new-federal-lawsu 
[https://perma.cc/L48Y-BNHB]. 
 121. Sasha Ingber, Oregon Set to Pass the First Statewide Rent Control Bill, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/27/698509957/oregon-set-
to-pass-the-first-statewide-rent-control-bill [https://perma.cc/V9QQ-FPHL]; Elliot 
Njus, Oregon Gov. Kate Brown Signs Nation’s First Statewide Rent Control Law, 
OREGONIAN (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2019/02/oregon-
gov-kate-brown-signs-nations-first-statewide-rent-control-law.html 
[https://perma.cc/ED7E-XHFZ]. The Oregon law caps annual rental increases at 7% 
above inflation, with certain rental housing excepted. Id. 
 122. Richard Epstein, one of the most outspoken legal critics of rent control 
legislation, claims that economists are “well nigh unanimous in their condemnation of 
rent control statutes.” Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient 
Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 759–60 (1988) (citing Bruno S. Frey et 
al., Consensus and Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical Inquiry, 74 AM. 
ECON. REV. 986 (1984) (noting that over 98% economics surveyed believed that rent 
control would negatively impact housing supply)). Critiques of rent control from 
Epstein and economists, however, have been criticized in turn by some urban 
planners, social scientists, and some other legal theorists. See, e.g., Kenneth K. 
Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Controls Restore A Free Market?, 54 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1231, 1232–33 (1989) (citing several studies that purportedly show a lack of 
negative impact of rent control on housing supply); Note, Reassessing Rent Control: 
Its Economic Impact in A Gentrifying Housing Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835, 
1843–55 (1988) (making empirical, analytical, and policy arguments for rent control 
to counteract the negative implications of gentrification). A recent comparative study 
of 40 years of municipal rent control in New Jersey concluded that moderate rent 
control regimes have no impact on quality or quantity of housing. Joshua D. 
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Homebuying markets in the United States operate independently of 
government price controls — homes are bought and sold for whatever 
price a willing buyer and a willing seller agree on.  Unregulated 
pricing is the reality in a majority of US rental markets as well, with 
the exception of a few local governments that have enacted price 
controls for certain rental units, typically in the form of rent 
stabilization and vacancy decontrol regulation.123 
Rent control is a politically divisive, much-debated concept in the 
law.  The federal government has, for the most part, allowed states 
and municipalities self-determination on the issue.  Although housing 
price regulations have been challenged as unconstitutional takings, 
the Supreme Court has never (yet) invalidated a rent control 
ordinance on constitutional grounds.124  Economists criticize rent 
control regulations for their market disrupting effects, pointing out 
that decreasing landlord profits will push housing providers out of the 
 
Ambrosius et al., Forty Years of Rent Control: Reexamining New Jersey’s Moderate 
Local Policies after the Great Recession, 49 CITIES 121, 123 (2015). 
 123. In five of the six jurisdictions that permit rent controls, local governments 
have enacted a variety of regulations affecting rental rates, including rent ceilings, 
limitations on rental increases, and, in many cases, vacancy decontrols. Although 
applicability of local rent control is limited by state law in California, see supra note 
116, local rent regulation is still quite popular. See, e.g., BERKLEY, CAL. MUN. CODE § 
13.76.060 (2018) (establishing a board that sets and periodically adjusts rent ceilings 
for rental units as permitted by state law); S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 37.8(b)(1)(A) 
(2019) (limiting annual rent increases to a maximum of 7%). New Jersey permits its 
municipalities to enact rent controls, and there are over 100 different rent control 
regimes in that state. See generally N.J. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, DIV. OF CODES & 
STANDARDS, LANDLORD-TENANT INFO. SERVS., 2009 RENT CONTROL SURVEY (2019) 
https://www.nj.gov/dca/divisions/codes/publications/pdf_lti/rnt_cntrl_srvy_2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W8W3-44P4]. For a discussion of various types of rent control 
statutes and legal vulnerabilities of each type, see Jakob S. Harle, Challenging Rent 
Control: Strategies for Attack, 34 UCLA L. REV. 149, 155–70 (1986). In 2019, Oregon 
became the first jurisdiction to pass a statewide rent control law. See supra note 121 
and accompanying text. 
 124. In 1919, the Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia law granting a 
commission temporary oversight of lease terms for properties in the city, holding that 
the rental housing market in Washington, D.C. was monopolized. Block v. Hirsh, 256 
U.S. 135, 157 (1921). More than 60 years later, in the case of Pennell v. City of San 
Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), the Court upheld a California rent control ordinance, 
specifically holding that it did not amount to a taking and did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause because the ordinance was designed to promote “consumer 
welfare” and took into account a landlord’s financial situation. Id. at 13–15. The 
Supreme Court reiterated its holding from Pennell in later cases. See, e.g., Yee v. City 
of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 529 (1992). Rent control ordinances, like any statute, 
must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose to be valid. See 
Pennell, 485 U.S. at 859. This modest burden is easily met in the case of rent control 
ordinances, since those ordinances are established to fulfill the legitimate government 
purpose of ensuring adequate affordable housing. See id. (“tenant hardship 
provisions are designed to serve the legitimate purpose of protecting tenants”). 
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market, ultimately driving down housing supply.125  Some critics also 
cite unfair distributive effects of rent control ordinances, arguing that 
such regulations inequitably allocate the costs of unaffordable 
housing to impacted landlords rather than to the taxpaying public as a 
whole.126  Market dysfunction — perhaps due to monopolistic or 
exploitative pricing — might provide an economic justification for 
rent controls, but most rental regulations do not specifically target 
inefficiencies of poorly functioning markets, but instead are largely 
politically motivated quick answers to widespread complaints that 
rents are “too damn high.”127  It may be cheap, fast, and easy for 
governments to reduce rents by using their police power to pass a law 
restricting prices, but involuntary price controls may be 
counterproductive in the long term and create fairness concerns akin 
to regulatory takings.128 
In recent years, local governments have increasingly employed an 
indirect tool to indirectly mandate affordable rental pricing: 
inclusionary zoning.129  Like rent regulation, inclusionary zoning is 
 
 125. Economic theorists assert that rent control reduces both the quantity and 
quality of housing in a market. In the short run, there will be wait lists for housing 
units or units will be misallocated based on favoritism, bribes, and discrimination. In 
the long term, the supply of rental housing will diminish, particularly if conversion to 
condominium ownership is an available alternative.  Empirical studies have posited 
that rent control is net wealth reducing for society because the benefits to tenants do 
not exceed the costs to landlords. See Epstein, supra note 122, at 759–63. 
 126. In his concurrent opinion in Pennell, Justice Scalia opined that, 
The traditional manner in which American government has met the 
problem of those who cannot pay reasonable prices for privately sold 
necessities — a problem caused by the society at large — has been the 
distribution to such persons of funds raised from the public at large through 
taxes, either in cash (welfare payments) or in goods (public housing, 
publicly subsidized housing, and food stamps). Unless we are to abandon 
the guiding principle of the Takings Clause that “public burdens . . . should 
be borne by the public as a whole,” Armstrong [v. United States, 364 U.S. 
40, 49 (1960)], this is the only manner that our Constitution permits. 
Pennell, 458 U.S. at 21–22 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 127. “Rent is too DAMN high!” was the slogan popularized by habitual fringe 
New York mayoral and gubernatorial candidate Jimmy McMillan and his self-named 
“Rent Is Too Damn High Party.” See generally Rent Is Too “Damn” High, 
http://www.rentistoodamnhigh.org/index.html [https://perma.cc/23BE-WNEN]. 
 128. Economics Professor Richard Muth likened rent control to “drinking to 
excess,” theorizing that in both cases, “its benefits are realized first and the costs are 
paid at a later date.” Richard F. Muth, Redistribution of Income Through Regulation 
in Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 691, 693–94 (1983). 
 129. Inclusionary zoning refers to local land use laws that mandate the construction 
of affordable housing as a condition for other housing development. For a helpful 
overview of inclusionary zoning, see Michael Floryan, Cracking the Foundation: 
Highlighting and Criticizing the Shortcomings of Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning 
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attractive to local governments grappling with housing unaffordability 
because it requires no outlay of funds.130  Inclusionary zoning is more 
than merely the absence of exclusionary zoning, a legal construct that 
creates a myriad of ill effects on housing markets, including inflated 
costs, segregation, and sprawl.131  Instead, inclusionary zoning is the 
use of land regulation tools to mandate the creation of low-priced 
rental units as a prerequisite for new development in a community.  
Inclusionary zoning increases the supply of affordable housing in a 
community (at least initially), but achieves such increases without 
purchasing voluntary commitments to produce affordable housing, as 
does the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, for example.132  When a 
government employs grants, tax credits, and financing subsidies to 
grow the supply of affordable housing, it pays a private entity to 
produce low-priced rental units.  But when a government uses 
inclusionary zoning to increase the supply of affordable housing, it 
merely mandates that same result by law, without expending public 
funds.133  Although inclusionary zoning schemes have been 
challenged as unconstitutional takings in the form of exactions, courts 
have determined inclusionary zoning can be a valid exercise of police 
power — promoting the public purpose of increasing affordable 
 
Practices, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1039, 1051 (2010). Inclusionary zoning has become 
increasingly popular, and by 2018, over 500 municipalities have enacted some form 
of inclusionary zoning. William J. Diehl, An Olympic Relay Race-Passing Atlanta’s 
Public Housing to Public-Privative Partnerships from the 1996 Olympic Games to 
Today, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L., 575, 601 (2018). On the 
other hand, other states have recently specifically prohibited local inclusionary 
zoning mandates. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 66.1015 (2018) (“No city, village, town, or county 
may enact, impose, or enforce an inclusionary zoning requirement”). 
 130. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1167, 1188 (1981) (“Inclusionary requirements are essentially excise taxes on the 
activity of homebuilding.”); Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s 
Contributions to Both Affordable Housing and Residential Integration, 54 
WASHBURN L.J. 585, 600 (2015); Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, In Defense of Inclusionary 
Zoning: Successfully Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 972–74 
(2002); EPSTEIN, supra note 68, at 64; Floryan, supra note 129, at 1053. 
 131. Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal 
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 781–82 (1969); Boyack, Exclude, 
supra note 8, at 454 (discussing exclusionary zoning); Iglesias, supra note 130, at 600 
(discussing the need to enact inclusionary zoning ordinances to counteract the 
adverse effects of decades of exclusionary zoning). 
 132. For a discussion on LIHTCs, see infra notes 192–205 and accompanying text. 
 133. Brian R. Lerman, Note, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning — The Answer to 
the Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383, 385–86 (2006); 
Iglesias, supra note 130, at 600. 
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housing supply.134  Nevertheless, inclusionary zoning remains 
controversial and continues to be criticized on both legal and 
economic grounds on bases similar to critiques levied against rent 
controls.135 
Both rent control and inclusionary zoning occur at the local 
government level, and although they are technically revenue neutral, 
economists caution that both could negatively impact affordable 
housing supply and ironically drive up housing costs in the long 
term.136  In addition, both approaches potentially raise takings issues 
that would not exist with government expenditure of public funds to 
promote housing affordability.  Sustainable solutions to unaffordable 
housing, therefore, will likely involve an investment of public funds 
even though doing so can be politically fraught. 
B. Public Ownership 
Public ownership of housing allows governments to ensure 
affordable pricing without the potential adverse market effects and 
takings concerns that arise over regulatory controls of housing costs.  
When a government controls the resource itself, it can act to price the 
resource to achieve consumer affordability rather than to maximize 
profit.  Public control and pricing can be economically justified in 
cases of a “natural monopoly” (like a city’s water or sewage system) 
and in cases where demand is inelastic and public welfare concerns 
support universal access.137  Public housing can be conceptualized as a 
 
 134. 2910 Ga. Ave. LLC v. D.C., 234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 316 (D.D.C. 2017); Home 
Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. City of Chi., 213 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1029 (N.D. Ill. 
2016); Cal. Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 979 (2015). 
 135. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 68, at 69–70. Epstein cites to the experience of 
San Jose, California to illustrate his contention that inclusionary zoning adversely 
affects housing supply. Id. In the seven years before inclusionary zoning was enacted 
in San Jose, 28,000 new homes were built, and in the seven years after the 
inclusionary zoning program was enacted, only 11,000 new homes were built, of 
which 770 were affordable. Id. at 70. Epstein then queries, “is the community better 
off with 770 affordable units at the price of 17,000 aggregate units?” and concludes 
that it is a “terrible tradeoff.” Id; see also Ellickson, supra note 130, at 1188 
(concluding that the inclusionary zoning requirements “are essentially excise taxes on 
the activity of homebuilding.”). 
 136. See supra notes 122, 125, 130. 
 137. See Frank A. Wolak, Public Utility Pricing and Finance, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 2 (Steven N. Durlaf & Lawrence E. Blum 
eds., 2008) (explaining the concept of economic justifications for and proper pricing 
of public utilities). There is a compelling argument that low-income housing is not a 
“natural monopoly,” and that public utility theory does not therefore apply to the 
resource, but demand inelasticity may create an alternate basis to apply the theory in 
this context. 
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public utility, and its justification turns on finding that because the 
resource (housing) is a necessity with inelastic demand, and is subject 
to out-of-reach costs (for lower income people), making public 
distribution and pricing of the resource is optimal.  When the 
government owns a resource, any gap between the cost to produce 
the resource and the cost consumers pay to enjoy it will be borne by 
the public at large rather than by certain private landlords (as is the 
case under price control legislation).138  Public management of a 
resource means that the government chooses its pricing rather than 
allowing it to be set by the market.  Although government ownership 
can ensure lower prices, it also means that resource management and 
allocation are not subject to market discipline.139  Public ownership 
schemes must grapple with such issues. 
Public ownership does, however, enable consumers to obtain 
access to resources at reasonable prices.  Thus, in the abstract, the 
publicly owned, affordably priced housing could be a good way to 
provide homes to low-income renters who cannot afford to pay 
market rates for shelter.  Public shelter programs currently exist at 
state and local levels, targeting populations with critical, but often 
temporary, housing needs, such as women fleeing domestic abuse and 
people who are homeless.140  There are also about one million 
 
 138. After all, regulatory takings claims are essentially based on the argument that 
it is unfair to impose the costs of a public benefit on a handful of private owners 
rather than on the public at large. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104, 139 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The question in this case is 
whether the cost associated with the city of New York’s desire to preserve a limited 
number of ‘landmarks’ within its borders must be borne by all of its taxpayers or 
whether it can instead be imposed entirely on the owners of the individual 
properties.”). Public ownership of a regulated resource avoids this problem by 
distributing the cost of subsidized access across all taxpayers. 
 139. See A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 543, 548 (1995) (analyzing accountability concerns that arise over federal 
government corporations). 
 140. HUD’s Office of Special Needs Assistance Programs provides funding to state 
and local governments as well as non-profit entities to be used to “quickly rehouse 
homeless individuals and families.” Homelessness Assistance, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & 
URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/homeless 
[https://perma.cc/YTT6-R85D] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). Because the number of 
homeless individuals and families is rapidly increasing, such state and local run (and 
partially federally funded) shelter programs continue to be a critical element of 
housing policy. Scott Greenstone, Is Seattle’s Homeless Crisis the Worst in the 
Country?, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/homeless/is-seattles-homeless-crisis-the-worst-in-the-country/ 
[https://perma.cc/BA76-58MC] (quantifying and discussing the ten cities with the 
most extreme homeless challenges). See, e.g., GISELLE ROUTHIER, COALITION FOR 
THE HOMELESS, STATE OF THE HOMELESS 2018 2, 4 (2018), 
https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/wp-
2019] RESPONSIBLE DEVOLUTION 1217 
federally funded public housing units — the remnant of twentieth-
century federal public housing programs — in our rental housing 
inventory.141  But those housing programs were implemented in 
problematic ways that further concentrated poverty (and crime) and 
exacerbated racial inequality throughout the country.142  Some of the 
problems with public housing came from siting of the properties — 
predominantly in very low-income, high-crime, often racially 
segregated tracts — and some of the problems came from the physical 
design and maintenance of the projects themselves.143 
By the 1990s, in reaction to the notorious failings of public housing 
projects, the federal government essentially ceased producing public 
housing and created programs transitioning many existing public 
housing developments away from government ownership and 
control.144  Since then, a quarter million public housing units — an 
 
content/uploads/2018/03/CFHStateoftheHomeless2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASX4-
RNYK] (tracking and projecting the homeless population and demand for emergency 
shelter in New York City). Federal funding is available to help shelter victims of 
domestic violence through the Family Violence Prevention and Services Program. 
Family Violence Prevention Services, BENEFITS.GOV, 
https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/626 [https://perma.cc/5N7H-CRAG] (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2019). The number of homeless people in the United States has increased 
over the past few years, most recently by 3800 in 2017. Some 1.4 million people, 
including 147,000 families with children, used a homeless shelter at some point during 
2016. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 34. 
 141. HUD’s Public Housing Program, HUD, 
https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog [https://perma.cc/U8AA-D5HV] 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2019). 
 142. Joseph Heathcott, The Strange Career of Public Housing: Policy, Planning 
and the American Metropolis in the Twentieth Century, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 360, 
367–70 (2012); Gregory A. Byrne et al., Taking Stock of Public Housing, PUB. 
HOUSING AUTHORITY DIRECTORS ASS’N 2 (2003), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/doc_25737.doc [https://perma.cc/7AQE-97NJ]; 
Joseph Heathcott, The Strange Career of Public Housing: Policy, Planning and the 
American Metropolis in the Twentieth Century, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 360, 367–70 
(2012). 
 143. Policy Basics: Public Housing, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 15, 
2017) [hereinafter CBP on Public Housing], https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-
basics-public-housing [https://perma.cc/KSV3-VCEC]. 
 144. “Congress has abandoned public housing properties, public housing residents, 
and the notion that the federal government should continue to own affordable 
housing.” Shamus Roller & Jessica Cassella, The Promise and Peril of HUD’s RAD 
Program, SHELTERFORCE (July 30, 2018), https://shelterforce.org/2018/07/30/the-
promise-and-peril-of-huds-rad-program/ [https://perma.cc/GLK3-SV7P] (opining that 
what is really “broken” is Congress’s perception of “the value of public housing, 
based largely on racist mythologies about the people who live in subsidized 
properties, about violence, and the ‘undeserving’ poor”). With some limited 
exceptions, the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 banned nearly 
all construction of net new public housing units after 1999. Quality Housing and 
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average of 10,000 each year — have been demolished or otherwise 
removed from the housing stock.145  Another 60,000 public housing 
units have been converted to units supported by project-based 
subsidies through Section 8.146  Even though public housing has been 
subject to harsh criticism, some 2.6 million people still live in just 
under one million public housing units throughout the country.147  
Eliminating public housing units can cause low-income families to 
lose access to affordable housing if they are not provided with 
equivalent options and supports.148  Moreover, HUD has an 
inconsistent record in adequately providing for displaced low-income 
public housing tenants.149 
Although funding and oversight for public housing come from 
HUD, these properties are managed locally by about 2900 public 
housing agencies (PHAs).150  Public housing provides homes for some 
of the most impoverished households in the country, the 
overwhelming majority of which (90%) are composed of the elderly, 
those with disabilities, or those who meet work requirements.151  
 
Work Responsibility Act of 1998, PUB. L. No. 105-276, § 9, 112 STAT. 2461, 2256 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 145. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., ADVOCATES’ GUIDE 2017: A PRIMER ON 
FEDERAL AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 4–8 
(2017), http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/2017_Advocates-Guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GML3-XNWS]; see also Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD), 
Nat’l Housing L. Project (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nhlp.org/resources/rental-
assistance-demonstration-rad/ [https://perma.cc/8GWB-Y39F]; CBP on Public 
Housing, supra note 143. 
 146. The voucher programs were established by HUD in 1974 under the authority 
of Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937. Vouchers provide for payment from HUD to 
landlords for a portion of rents in excess of 30% of the tenant’s gross income. Section 
8 Rental Certificate Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/programdescription/cert8 [https://perma.cc/K3EG-7GF2]; Policy 
Basics: Housing Choice Voucher Program, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 2 
(2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics-housing-1-25-
13vouch.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS4C-L7CG]; see also CBP on Public Housing, supra 
note 143. HUD has authorized another 185,000 additional public units to be 
converted in the future. Id; see infra notes 245–63. 
 147. “HUD data indicate that the number of public housing units fell from 1.1 
million in 2006 to 1.0 million in 2016.” RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 32. 
“[P]ublic housing units are located in all 50 states and several territories, one in five 
of them in rural areas.” CBP on Public Housing, supra note 143. 
 148. Roller & Cassella, supra note 144. 
 149. Id. 
 150. CBP on Public Housing, supra note 143. 
 151. Units are available only to low-income families, with incomes at 80% of the 
local median income or lower. At least 40 of new families admitted to public housing 
each year must be “extremely low-income,” defined as having an income at or below 
30% of the local median. Id. 
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Families housed in such units pay 30% of their income as rent, while 
the federal government supposedly bears the operating and 
maintenance costs associated with the housing that are not covered by 
rental receipts.152  But in practice, however, Congress has consistently 
underfunded public housing.153  In 2010, HUD estimated that decades 
of deferred maintenance and lack of upgrades had created a public 
housing upkeep deficit of $26 million.154   The public housing 
approach to reducing the costs of housing is critically important to the 
people who live in such units and, for certain populations (disabled 
veterans, for example), may be the best housing solution.155  
Government housing has, in many cases, been dismissed as a 
failure,156 but public ownership and provision of housing for 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. Funding for public housing comes from both the Public Housing Operating 
Fund (to cover operating costs) and the Public Housing Capital Fund (to cover 
capital improvements), but in all but two years since 2002, the Public Housing 
Operating Fund has been deliberately underfunded. Id. In a similar vein, necessary 
capital improvements to public housing have been consistently deferred, however 
Congress did fund The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative in 2010 and the HOPE VI 
program, which provided a small number of grants to revitalize distressed public 
housing developments. Id. Douglas Rice & Barbara Sard, Decade of Neglect Has 
Weakened Federal Low-Income Housing Programs: New Resources Required to 
Meet Growing Needs, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 15 (2009), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/decade-of-neglect-has-weakened-federal-low-income-
housing-programs [https://perma.cc/YJR6-S4DC]. 
 154. MERYL FINKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., CAPITAL NEEDS 
IN THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM (2010), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PH_CAPITAL_NEEDS.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/TFX9-NBU5]. 
Congress’s failure to adequately fund public housing, along with many 
instances of mismanagement in sites across the country, has left housing 
authorities in untenable positions: demolish or convert to other types of 
HUD housing assistance through RAD. The program serves as a powerful 
tool for the preservation of public housing units, but it comes with a host of 
challenges. 
Roller & Cassella, supra note 144. 
 155. The majority of public housing inhabitants today are elderly or disabled (or 
both). Public Housing: Image Versus Facts, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV. (May 
1995), https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/ushmc/spring95/spring95.html 
[https://perma.cc/VX9K-EDVK]. 
 156. See, e.g., Edward G. Goetz, The Audacity of HOPE VI: Discourse and the 
Dismantling of Public Housing, 35 CITIES 342, 342–46 (2013) (comparing public 
housing residents’ positive perspective regarding public housing with the “discourse 
of disaster” generally used to vilify public housing in order to justify dismantling 
public housing as something “deviant, dysfunctional, or obsolete”); Ben Austen, The 
Last Tower: The Decline and Fall of Public Housing, HARPER’S MAG. (Apr. 2012), 
https://harpers.org/archive/2012/05/the-last-tower/ [https://perma.cc/2BML-V5DV] 
(calling Cabrini-Green in Chicago a “nightmare vision of public housing, the 
ungovernable inner-city horrors that many believe arise when too many poor black 
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vulnerable populations would be an effective tool to combat housing 
unaffordability if appropriately designed and implemented.157 
C. Subsidizing Production Costs to Increase Affordable Housing 
Supply 
The gap between the supply of and demand for low-cost rental 
housing is a significant part of the housing affordability puzzle, and 
government spending to encourage an increase in the supply of 
affordable rentals and the preservation of existing affordable units is 
a critical part of the solution to the affordable housing crisis.158  
Economists prefer efforts to increase housing supply over efforts to 
mandate pricing or subsidies of consumers’ housing costs because 
increasing the supply of units can help stabilize the supply-demand 
 
folk are stacked atop one another in too little space”); Howard Husock, How Public 
Housing Harms Cities, CITY J. (2003), https://www.city-journal.org/html/how-public-
housing-harms-cities-12410.html [https://perma.cc/C3V6-UXTL] (“Housing projects 
radiate dysfunction and social problems outward, damaging local businesses and 
neighborhood property values.”). 
 157. In the case of the extremely low-income residents of public housing with 
special needs for additional supportive services, housing challenges cannot be solved 
through increasing the supply of affordable units in the broader market. For these 
populations, public housing is likely the best solution. See, e.g., Ehren Dohler et al., 
Supportive Housing Helps Vulnerable People Live and Thrive in the Community, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/supportive-housing-helps-vulnerable-people-
live-and-thrive-in-the-community [https://perma.cc/C38J-GRGK]; Peter W. Salisch, 
Jr., Does America Need Public Housing?, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 689, 730–31, 736 
(2012). 
 158. There are numerous government programs encouraging housing supply and 
supporting housing demand for both owners and renters, funded through HUD, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the 
U.S. Treasury Department. See generally CAROL N. BROWN, EXPERIENCING 
HOUSING LAW 626 (2016). Many of the programs focus on increasing housing supply, 
reasoning that increasing supply of a good will result in reducing its market price. See 
Vicki Been, City Nimbys, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 227–28 (2018). Some 
affordable housing advocates and scholars caution that although increasing the 
supply of affordable housing units will help affordability, merely increasing the 
supply of housing units in general might not improve affordability if the overall 
supply of land in a given market is artificially constrained, by local land use 
regulations. VICKI BEEN ET AL., NYU FURMAN CTR., SUPPLY SKEPTICISM: HOUSING 
SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY, 3–8 (2017) [hereinafter BEEN, SUPPLY SKEPTICISM] 
https://furmancenter.org/files/Supply_Skepticism_-_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4HYB-6HDZ]; see also What is Preservation?, NAT’L HOUSING TR., 
http://www.nationalhousingtrust.org/what-preservation [https://perma.cc/6XPJ-
5SCC]. See generally JOSEPH GYOURKO & RAVEN MOLLOY, REGULATION AND 
HOUSING SUPPLY 1 (2014). 
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disequilibrium in the housing market for lower price points.159  
Creating more affordable units leverages natural economic forces160 
and theoretically produces longer-term benefits for housing 
adequacy.  Increasing the supply can be framed as an investment in 
the housing system as a whole, not just a stop-gap measure to 
minimize the impact of costly housing on specific households.161 
Federal programs play a huge and vital role in helping to fund the 
production costs and encouraging the growth of affordable housing 
supply.162  The various federal programs providing financial 
incentives designed to increase the supply of affordable housing are 
legion, and a description of all the various methods and specifics is 
beyond the scope of this Article.163  Subsidy and incentive programs 
exist for both saleable homes and rental units.164  Financial assistance 
 
 159. See generally Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14 (focusing on creating an 
economic justification for supply-side housing initiatives). 
 160. Basic economic theory holds that increasing supply of a good while holding 
demand constant will lead to a decrease in price. See OPENSTAX, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS ch. 3.2 (2018), https://opentextbc.ca/principlesofeconomics/chapter/3-2-
shifts-in-demand-and-supply-for-goods-and-services/ [https://perma.cc/25MP-95SY]; 
see also supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 161. For a lengthier discussion on the import of supply-side affordability programs, 
see Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 473–81; see also Boyack, Equitably, supra 
note 31, at 132–47. 
 162. It is difficult to precisely allocate the share of affordable housing funding 
among federal, state, local, and non-profit and for-profit sources because these 
various governmental and private providers often act in concert and combine efforts. 
For example, federal funding is provided to state housing finance entities who 
employ both federal and state-level tax credits and bond financing options, combined 
with federal grants and non-profit contributions and private debt or equity financing. 
See, e.g., State Housing Finance Agencies: At the Center of the Affordable Housing 
System, NAT’L COUNCIL ST. HOUSING AGENCIES (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.ncsha.org/resource/hfas-at-the-center/ [https://perma.cc/6N6S-FF5E]; see 
also Declining Federal Housing Funding, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING, 
https://inclusionaryhousing.org/inclusionary-housing-explained/what-problems-does-
iz-address/declining-federal-housing-funding/ [https://perma.cc/Y9JS-UYEK] (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2019). Some housing finance providers are difficult to categorize as 
federal or local. For example, the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) are local 
lenders established by federal law and administered both federally and locally. The 
FHLBanks have funded the creation of more than 800,000 affordable housing units. 
See Affordable Housing, FHLBANKS, http://www.fhlbanks.com/affordable-
housing.html [https://perma.cc/W6LS-N7UK] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
 163. For a more complete list of federally funded or managed programs that 
promote the supply of affordable housing, see HOME Tenant-Based Rental 
Assistance, HUD EXCHANGE, https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/ 
[https://perma.cc/4572-MFBK] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). Federal programs intersect 
with multiple other affordable housing programs administered through state and 
local agencies as well as public-private partnerships. Id. 
 164. See infra Section II.D. 
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delivered may be in the form of a tax credit,165 a grant,166 financing 
assistance decreasing the cost of capital,167 low-cost government 
financing,168 direct funding of specific production or rehabilitation 
costs,169 public-private partnerships,170 or one of a myriad of other 
structures.171  The essential goal and impact of all these incentive 
programs are similar: the government offers a financial incentive in 
exchange for a commitment to produce a certain number of housing 
units, rented at specified affordable levels for specified periods.172 
 
 165. See, e.g., infra notes 192–205 and accompanying text (discussing the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit). 
 166. See, e.g., infra notes 206–10 and accompanying text (discussing the HOME 
Investment Partnerships Program and the Community Block Development Grant 
Program). 
 167. Bond financing is often used to supplement tax credits when amassing capital 
for affordable housing projects. See, e.g., Michael J. Novogradac, Financing 
Affordable Housing, CIRE MAG., https://www.ccim.com/cire-
magazine/articles/financing-affordable-housing/?gmSsoPc=1 [https://perma.cc/9KYP-
GQ8Z] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
 168. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provide loans to multi-family developers, but 
focus on lending on for market-rent housing developments. Although subsidizing 
market-rent housing units does not directly increase the supply of affordable housing, 
it increases overall housing supply, and this can lead to more existing affordable units 
becoming available for rent by lower income households. See, e.g., Andrea J. Boyack, 
Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role and Control of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U.L. REV. 1489, 1547–51 (2011) [hereinafter Boyack, 
Fannie/Freddie]; see also Boyack, Equitably, supra note 31, at 147–59. 
 169. See, e.g., infra notes 175–78 and accompanying text (discussing the Housing 
Trust Fund). 
 170. See, e.g., PETER W. SALSICH, JR., AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 69–91 (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy eds., 
2009); Hunter L. Johnson, New Funding for Affordable Housing Encourages Public-
Private Partnerships, CCIM INST., https://www.ccim.com/cire-magazine/articles/new-
funding-affordable-housing-encourages-publicprivate-partnerships/?gmSsoPc=1 
[https://perma.cc/CJ3P-Y66U] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019); see also infra notes 181–91 
and accompanying text (discussing federal programs that established private-public 
partnerships for affordable housing, such as the HOPE VI program and the Rental 
Assistance Demonstration). 
 171. Urban Institute has an online interactive tool that provides much information 
about the options available for funding affordable housing creation. See Pamela 
Blumenthal et al., How Affordable Housing Gets Built, URB. INST. (July 26, 2016), 
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/how-affordable-housing-gets-built 
[https://perma.cc/E8CZ-JELA] (referencing the online tool available at 
http://apps.urban.org/features/cost-of-affordable-housing/ [https://perma.cc/2SJG-
MNK2]). Inventive developers create new combinations and processes each year. See 
Stockton Williams, Preserving Multifamily Workforce and Affordable Housing: New 
Approaches for Investing in a Vital National Asset, URB. LAND INST. 19–21 (2015), 
http://uli.org/wp-content/uploads/ULI-Documents/Preserving-Multifamily-
Workforce-and-Affordable-Housing.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MHN-ZZRA]. 
 172. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) offers a 10-year tax credit in 
exchange for an investment in affordable housing and requires that a developer set 
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One of the most cost-effective ways to support supply adequacy in 
affordable housing is to preserve and maintain existing affordable 
housing units, many of which are aging badly and rapidly exiting the 
national rental unit inventory.173  Approximately 10,000 affordable 
units a year are lost to obsolescence and poor management and 
upkeep.174  The Housing Trust Fund (HTF) is one source of federal 
monies that can be used for preservation and rehabilitation of existing 
affordable housing.  The HTF was established in 2008 under the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act to “provide[ ] block grants to 
states to build, rehabilitate, or preserve housing affordable to 
extremely low income households . . . .”175  The HTF received no 
funding from Congress for the first eight years of its existence, but in 
2015, Congress finally authorized funding.176  Congress provided a 
total of $660 million to the HTF in the three years following.177  To 
date, states have used or earmarked most of the HTF funds they have 
and will receive for projects serving “people experiencing 
homelessness, people with disabilities, elderly people, or other special 
needs populations.”178  Many projects funded in part by the HTF 
employ other affordable housing resources as well, particularly the 
 
aside either 20% of the constructed or rehabilitated units as rent restricted and 
occupied by households with incomes below 50% AMI or 40% of the units as rent 
restricted and occupied by households with incomes below 60% of AMI during a 30-
year affordability period (inclusive of a 15-year compliance period an another 15-year 
extended use period). See infra notes 192–205 and accompanying text. During the 
affordability period, rents are set at 30% of the 50% or 60% AMI respectively. See 
Brown, supra note 158, at 628–29. 
 173. “Rehabilitating an existing affordable apartment can cost one-third to one-
half less than building a new apartment. Without preserving existing affordable 
housing, we fall two steps back for every step we take forward.” What Is 
Preservation?, NAT’L HOUS. TR., https://www.nationalhousingtrust.org/what-
preservation [https://perma.cc/Q48N-22MP] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
 174. See NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., BALANCING PRIORITIES: 
PRESERVATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD OPPORTUNITY IN THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
TAX CREDIT PROGRAM BEYOND YEAR 30 8 (2018) [hereinafter LIHTC Beyond 30], 
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Balancing-Priorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BST-
T529]; 
 175. ED GRAMLICH, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., GETTING STARTED: FIRST 
HOMES BEING BUILT WITH 2016 NATIONAL HOUSING TRUST FUND AWARDS 1 
(2018), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/NHTF_Getting-Started_2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VA9Q-4BEK]. 
 176. Id. at 1–2. 
 177. Id. Failure to fund the HTF was blamed on the Financial Crisis and, 
specifically, the government bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, entities that 
pursuant to the Federal Housing Finance Agency, were intended to contribute to the 
HTF. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not deemed financially able to make these 
contributions until 2015. Id. 
 178. Id. at 2. 
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LIHTC, the HOME program, and the FHL Banks’ Affordable 
Housing Program, in addition to state or local funds.179 
Other preservation efforts have attempted to revitalize poorly 
maintained public housing units by leveraging private capital.  A 
series of programs have created public-private partnerships to 
improve the quality of public housing units.180  Some of these 
programs have reduced the number of publicly held units or 
converted some publicly held units into privately held low-income 
units (or both) in exchange for improvements to unit and 
neighborhood quality.181  From 1992 to 2011, HUD’s primary public-
private partnership program was the controversial HOPE VI 
program.182  Beginning in 2010, HOPE VI was gradually replaced by 
the Choice Neighborhoods program, which focused on rehabilitating 
severely distressed public housing and improving the energy 
efficiency of such units.183  In 2012, HUD launched the Rental 
Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, which enabled the 
government to “leverage public and private debt and equity” to 
 
 179. See infra notes 186–195, 200–204 and accompanying text (discussing these 
programs). 
 180. Some grant programs, such as the Capital Magnet Fund, requires $10 of 
private financing to leverage every $1 of public funding provided. The Capital 
Magnet Fund provides development and other loan capital for economically 
distressed, underserved communities and is funded with a portion of the assessments 
made on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s new business. Federal Funding for 
Affordable Housing, LOCAL HOUSING SOLUTIONS (2019), 
https://www.localhousingsolutions.org/fund/federal-funding-for-affordable-housing/ 
[https://perma.cc/YG6C-8MKN]. 
 181. For the history of programs reducing, rehabilitating, and privatizing public 
housing, see Anne Marie Smetak, Private Funding, Public Housing: The Devil in the 
Details, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 3–4 (2014). For an extensive discussion of the 
many programs currently available, see generally NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. 
COALITION, 2019 ADVOCATES’ GUIDE: A PRIMER ON FEDERAL AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY PROGRAMS (2019), https://nlihc.org/explore-
issues/publications-research/advocates-guide [https://perma.cc/5GM9-96PR]. 
 182. Failure to provide voucher replacements for destroyed public housing was 
legally problematic under HOPE VI. See, e.g., Cabrini-Green Local Advisory 
Council v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 96 C 6949, 1997 WL 31002, at *2 (N.D. Ill., Jan 22, 
1997). 
 183. Choice Neighborhoods provides for rehabilitation or replacement of public 
housing units in connection with a neighborhood “Transformation Plan.” The Choice 
Neighborhoods program provided Housing Choice Vouchers for any units that were 
not replaced or rehabilitated. Choice Neighborhoods, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. 
DEV., https://www.hud.gov/cn [https://perma.cc/355V-K3C2] (last visited Oct. 11, 
2019). 
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preserve and update public housing units.184  RAD allows for public 
housing units to become privately owned, albeit subject to long-term, 
mandatorily renewable contracts with HUD providing project-based 
Section 8 rental assistance.185  Such public-private partnerships allow 
for more flexible financing arrangements and may be able to achieve 
rehabilitative goals with a smaller outlay of public funds.186  Congress 
initially capped the RAD program at 60,000 units but later  
authorized an additional 225,000 units.187  In 2018, the RAD program 
rehabilitated its 100,000th unit.188  Because the RAD program uses 
private equity and debt funding, albeit in concert with public funds 
and government credit, the program is ostensibly more “cost neutral” 
— a politically attractive selling point.189  Involving private money 
and control in previously public housing saves the government money 
and potentially allows for improvements that may not otherwise have 
been funded by Congress, but partnering with private developers 
comes at a cost.  There have been troubling instances of HUD 
delegating control of RAD housing to private entities to the 
 
 184. Rental Assistance Demonstration, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/RAD [https://perma.cc/8XYX-YTTH] (last visited Aug. 5, 
2019). 
 185. See infra note 245, and accompanying text (discussing Section 8 rental 
assistance). 
 186. Gordon Cavanaugh, Public Housing: From Archaic to Dynamic to 
Endangered, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 228, 233, 235–37 
(2005); Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD), NAT’L HOUSING L. PROJECT (Sept. 
7, 2017), https://www.nhlp.org/resources/rental-assistance-demonstration-rad/ 
[https://perma.cc/9KYU-9DS7]. 
 187. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 5. 
 188. HUD issued a press release and a flyer promoting the milestone. RAD, U.S. 
DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV. 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Housing/documents/RAD_100000_Homes_20180813
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U34-R5H8]. RAD has been heavily marketed as the best 
solution to an aging public housing inventory, and the HUD website celebrates 
successful RAD conversions through photo essays and case studies (RAD Photo 
Essays and Case Studies, RAD, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/RAD/news/case-studies [https://perma.cc/DW3F-CBQ5] (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2019)), newsletters (RAD Newsletter, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. 
DEV., https://www.hud.gov/RAD/news/newsletter [https://perma.cc/65BX-CCTF] 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2019)), media coverage (RAD Events, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & 
URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/RAD/news/events [https://perma.cc/RA87-SMQ5] 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2019)), design contests (Curb Appeal Project, U.S. DEP’T 
HOUSING & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/RAD/pha-curbappeal 
[https://perma.cc/PF8B-TZ92] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019)), and “RADBlast!” listserve 
email updates (RADBlast!, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/RAD/news/radblasts [https://perma.cc/S76N-SA6P] (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2019)). 
 189. RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION, supra note 184. 
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detriment of the low-income occupants.190  Moreover, RAD re-
developments often result in a net loss of affordable housing units, 
even though the quality of remaining units typically improves.  
Protections built into the RAD system ensure that additional housing 
vouchers replace publicly owned units lost.191 
In 1986, Congress created the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) program to incentivize the production of affordable 
housing.192  LIHTC is currently the largest support for increasing 
affordable housing supply, measured in terms of the number of units 
it has created.193  LIHTC has financed the construction or 
preservation of about three million housing units since 1987, about 
70,000 affordable rental units per year.194  Under this program, the 
IRS provides a ten-year tax credit to developers selected by local 
PHAs who build housing units to be occupied by and affordable to 
low-income households for 30 years.195  These tax credits are of 
limited supply and have been in high demand since their inception 
because their value can be immediately capitalized and used to offset 
 
 190. For example, in a RAD property in Hopewell, Virginia, private managers 
refused disability-required accommodation requests of a resident, a denial which may 
have contributed to the resident’s subsequent death. Roller & Cassella supra note 
146. Roller and Cassella assert that violation of RAD tenants’ rights are examples of 
“perils on the path” to privatization, and they caution that “[t]o deliver on its 
promise, the program requires more oversight from HUD, and local advocates must 
be involved in RAD conversions to support low-income residents.” Id. The 
Government Accounting Office Report on RAD agrees; see generally, U.S. GOV’T 
ACCT. OFF., GAO-18-123, RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION: HUD NEEDS TO 
TAKE ACTION TO IMPROVE METRICS AND ONGOING OVERSIGHT (2018), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690210.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUR7-GUEZ]. 
 191. See generally CAROLINA K. REID, TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS. INNOVATION, U.C. 
BERKELEY, LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HOUSING: ASSESSING THE EARLY 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION (2017), 
http://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/RAD_Report_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GY7R-GL8H]. 
 192. The LIHTC was created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and is codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 42. The IRS provides guidance and advice for distributing and using the 
LIHTCs. See LIHTC Beyond 30, supra note 174, at 5–6; NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. 
COAL., supra note 181 
 193. See RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 32–33; see also LIHTC Beyond 
30, supra note 174, at 4. 
 194. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 5. 
 195. LIHTC Beyond 30, supra note 174, at 4. LIHTC affordability periods are 
technically 15-year periods that can be renewed once. See, e.g., OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. 
& RES., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WHAT HAPPENS TO LOW INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROPERTIES AT YEAR 15 AND BEYOND? (2012), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal//publications/pdf/what_happens_lihtc_v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/38DD-X6VD]. States receive low-income housing tax credits 
equivalent to $2.35 per person (2016 figures), and local PHAs determine which 
developers are awarded LIHTCs for which specific qualifying developments. 
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development costs.196  Developments qualify as “low-income” for 
LIHTC purposes if rents are affordable for low-income households, 
but such rents are not necessarily low enough to be affordable for 
very low-income or extremely low-income households.197  Many 
households who rent LIHTC units, therefore, remain cost burdened 
unless they obtain additional rental assistance, for example through 
housing voucher programs.198 
Although the LIHTC program has been a successful tool for 
promoting affordable housing supply, it faces challenges, starting with 
the fact that between 2020 and 2029, over 500,000 current LIHTC 
units will reach the end of their 30-year affordability period.199  
Extending affordability requirements for such units will likely require 
additional federal funding, possibly cannibalizing funding that 
otherwise would be allocated to create new LIHTC developments.200  
Some states, foreseeing the problems that expiring affordability 
periods would eventually cause, expanded the affordability period — 
 
 196. For several years running, California Senator Maria Cantwell has annually 
proposed increasing the number of LIHTCs available as a way to grow the supply of 
affordable housing units in areas of the country where supply is the biggest problem. 
OFFICE OF U.S. SENATOR MARIA CANTWELL, MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF THE 
GROWING AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS: EXPANDING AND IMPROVING THE 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT (2017); see also Sarah Brundage, Cantwell & Hatch 
Reintroduce Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act with Support of Over 
2,000 Businesses and Organizations, AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING A.C.T.I.O.N. 
BLOG (Mar. 7, 2017), http://rentalhousingaction.org/blog/2017/3/7/sens-cantwell-
hatch-reintroduce-affordable-housing-credit-improvement-act-with-support-of-over-
2000-businesses-and-organizations [https://perma.cc/9UP6-K9VR]. The Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act reduced corporate tax rates and therefore the value of investments in 
LIHTC properties; the effect of this change on LIHTC value and therefore demand 
has not yet been determined. Urban Institute Evaluates the Low Income Housing 
Tax Credit, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (Jul. 23, 2018), 
https://nlihc.org/resource/urban-institute-evaluates-low-income-housing-tax-credit 
[https://perma.cc/GS9Q-R37M]. 
 197. Rents for designated low-income units created pursuant to the LIHTC are set 
at the amount that is “affordable” for (namely, 30% of) a household with an income 
of either 50% or 60% AMI, depending on the affordability designation chosen by the 
developer. See supra note 172. 
 198. A Furman Center report found that LIHTC recipients tend to have higher 
incomes than other assisted households and that 70% of ELI households in LIHTC 
homes have other forms of rental assistance and nearly all of the remaining 30% of 
ELI households in LIHTC homes spend more than 30% of gross household income 
on housing. NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra note 36, at 10. 
 199. LIHTC Beyond 30, supra note 174, at 4. Affordability periods for 478,000 
LIHTC units will expire by 2028. RENTAL HOUSING 2017 supra note 19, at 33–34. 
 200. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 33–34. Tax reform proposals to 
expand funding in order to address the expiration of the initial affordability periods 
are considering eliminating the 4% LIHTC program, which accounted for about half 
of housing unit production in 2015. Id. at 6. 
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under state law — for periods beyond the 30-year federal limit.201  
Because, the few state-level extensions that exist were enacted only 
after 2000 and do not apply retroactively, they will not affect any 
LIHTC units in those states until 2030 or later.202  The federal 
government has not yet addressed the issue of expiring LIHTC units, 
although there are pending proposals to renew LIHTC affordability 
periods, possibly in conjunction with proposals revisiting the of 
optimal siting of affordable units.203 
The LIHTC program faces objections primarily for its location of 
units, not its affordability duration.  Only 29% of LIHTC units are 
located in neighborhoods that offer their residents enhanced 
economic opportunity through local labor markets, high-quality 
educational opportunity, transit access, and a healthy environment, 
and only 9% of these are in mixed-income (as opposed to low-
income) neighborhoods.204  Like many other federal programs, 
LIHTC seems to have increased the affordable housing supply 
primarily in impoverished, poor-quality neighborhoods, thus 
concentrating and perpetuating poverty in addition to the housing 
need that federal affordable housing funding is supposed to 
address.205 
HUD also provides various grant funds to private developers to 
build low-income housing rentals and homes for sale pursuant to 
numerous criteria, including the Home Investors Partners Program 
(HOME), a grant program designed to fund state and local efforts to 
create housing affordable to low-income households, and the 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), a HUD program 
with broader housing objectives that has been active since 1975.206  
HOME is the largest federal block grant used to create affordable 
 
 201. Id. at 34. California requires an addition 25-year affordability period for 
LIHTC properties, and New Hampshire, Utah, and Vermont require an additional 69 
years of affordability. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. LIHTC Beyond 30, supra note 174, at 18–21 (discussing possible approaches 
that include neighborhood quality considerations in addition to renewing or replacing 
expiring LIHTC units). 
 204. Id. at 13–14. 
 205. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Incl., 135 
S. Ct. 2507, 2525-26 (2015); In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit 
Qualified Allocation Plan, 848 A.2d 1, 7–8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); LIHTC 
Beyond 30, supra note 174, at 13–18 (giving details regarding the poor neighborhood 
quality for places where most LIHTC units are located). 
 206. Home Investment Partnerships Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/affordablehousing/programs/h
ome/ [https://perma.cc/RNT2-K27R] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
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housing and provides flexible funding for states and localities that can 
be used for “building, buying, and/or rehabilitating affordable 
housing for rent or homeownership or providing direct rental 
assistance to low-income people.”207  HOME provides both housing 
grants to local governments and tenant-based rental assistance 
(subsidizing demand) and requires matching grants from other 
sources.208  CDBG funds are allocated to create and rebuild low-cost 
housing for sale or rent in areas with particular needs, including 
locations that have faced significant destruction due to disaster or 
financial collapse, but these grants also can be used for demand 
subsidies such as down-payment assistance.209  Federal funding for 
CDBG grants has been significantly reduced over time, and in 2018, 
the Trump administration threatened to eliminate the program before 
finally agreeing to retain CDBG under lower funding levels than 
previously provided.210 
The various supply-enhancing programs, mostly federally funded, 
have created a significant number of affordable rental units, without 
which the affordable housing crisis would be far worse.  But 
affordability relief from such programs may be kicking the proverbial 
can down the road.  First, mandated affordability for federally 
incentivized, but not publicly owned, units is bound by a fixed period, 
and it is not always clear what happens to such units when the period 
expires.211  Second, siting of units produced under the various supply-
 
 207. Id. 
 208. Home Tenant-Based Rental Assistance, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/home/topics/tbra/#policy-guidance-and-faqs 
[https://perma.cc/3NXC-KBWU] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
 209. Ed Gramlich, Community Development Block Grant Program, NAT’L LOW 
INCOME HOUSING COALITION, https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-
2017/2017AG_Ch08-S02_Community-Development-Block-Grant.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AG4Z-BS6H] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
 210. DARIA DANIEL, NAT’L ASS’N OF CTYS., 2019 POLICY BRIEF: SUPPORT LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS THROUGH THE COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT (CDBG) PROGRAM (2019), 
https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/CDBG20201920Leg20Conferenc
e20-20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN23-HP4T]; URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE, 
supra note 13. 
 211. The concern regarding imminent expiration for LIHTC units is a case in point. 
Some policy analysts and scholars have floated the idea of creating permanent 
affordability mandates for certain properties, but permanent land use requirements 
can be tricky and raise concerns of how to handle future needs for flexibility. At least 
one proposal includes making project-based voucher properties “permanently” 
affordable. Amy Glassman, Project-Based Voucher Reforms Will Facilitate 
Development of Affordable Units but Should Be Taken Further, 18 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 71, 76 (2008). Housing for especially vulnerable 
populations in need of additional supportive services is sometimes conceived of as 
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side programs is problematic.  On the one hand, it makes sense to 
place affordable housing in areas where lower-income households 
currently reside and where land costs are relatively low, but such 
placements keep lower-income households in poor neighborhoods 
and limits opportunities and future outcomes for such renters, their 
children, and grandchildren.  Poor siting of affordable housing can 
increase the likelihood that a perpetual need for government housing 
assistance is passed on to future generations.  HUD directives 
regarding affordable housing siting are somewhat contradictory on 
this point, simultaneously preferring siting in places where the largest 
low-income populations are located and where land is cheapest, but 
also requiring that HUD monies be used to “affirmatively further fair 
housing,” as required under the Fair Housing Act, by promoting 
desegregation.212 
Furthermore, PHA attempts to locate affordable housing 
developments in higher-income communities are more likely to be 
resisted by community residents.213  Current legislative proposals 
 
“permanently affordable” rather than affordable for a particular period of time. Peter 
W. Salsich, Jr., Toward A Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of 
Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 507–08 
(2007). Community land bank structures attempt to achieve permanent affordability 
by separating out the price for land and for improvements on the land and holding 
the ownership of the land separately, by the land bank entity, thus reducing the price 
paid for property by the proportion of the property’s value allocated to the land 
itself. The government could potentially explore a similar method of permanent 
affordability where ownership is split among residents or landlords and the public 
land bank company. See Julie Gilgoff, Local Responses to Today’s Housing Crisis: 
Permanently Affordable Housing Models, 20 CUNY L. REV. 587, 590–95 (2017); 
James J. Kelly, Jr., Sustaining Neighborhoods of Choice: From Land Bank(Ing) to 
Land Trust(Ing), 54 WASHBURN L.J. 613, 619–24 (2015); Julia Bartolf Milne, Will 
Alternative Forms of Common-Interest Communities Succeed with Municipal 
Involvement?: A Study of Community Land Trusts and Limited Equity 
Cooperatives, 38 REAL EST. L.J. 273, 275 (2009). 
 212. In 2015, HUD released a final rule to require and support local efforts to 
deliberately desegregate housing patterns through aid allocation decision-making at 
the local level. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42, 272 (July 
16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 576, 903), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/affht_pt.html#final-rule [https://perma.cc/9U7H-
UY7P]; see also, AFFH Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV. 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/AFFH-Fact-Sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UD9A-2XYQ] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). In January 2018, 
Secretary Carson announced that HUD would delay implementing the AFFH Rule 
until 2020. See Kriston Capps, The Trump Administration Just Derailed a Key 
Obama Rule on Housing Segregation, CITYLAB (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/01/the-trump-administration-derailed-a-key-
obama-rule-on-housing-segregation/549746/ [https://perma.cc/B3AT-7PRD]. 
 213. Local resistance to affordable housing in more affluent communities is an 
aspect of a tendency sometimes known by its descriptive acronym NIMBY, meaning 
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specifically incorporate mandates to place affordable housing in 
neighborhoods offering better opportunities to their residents.214  
Appropriate placement of affordable units can be conceived of as an 
investment in reducing poverty and its associated housing cost needs 
for the future.  Sustained housing self-sufficiency not only requires an 
increase in the number of quality affordable housing units; it also 
requires that those units provide low-income households access to 
quality neighborhoods.215 
 
“not in my backyard.” NIMBYism with respect to affordable housing has occurred 
throughout the country. See, e.g., JOSHUA M. ZEITZ, WHITE ETHNIC NEW YORK: 
JEWS, CATHOLICS, AND THE SHAPING OF POSTWAR POLITICS 190–94 (2007) 
(describing resistance to affordable housing in Forest Hills, Queens, New York City); 
see also Jake Blumgart, Integrating Whitman, SHELTERFORCE (May 4, 2016), 
https://shelterforce.org/2016/05/04/integrating-whitman/ [https://perma.cc/5XCB-
PYUH] (describing resistance to affordable housing in Philadelphia); Maya 
Dukmasova, Opposition to Affordable Housing in Jefferson Park is Nothing New for 
Chicago, CHI. READER (Feb. 23, 2017),  
https://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/2017/02/23/opposition-to-
affordable-housing-in-jefferson-park-is-nothing-new-for-chicago 
[https://perma.cc/2BER-LU53] (describing resistance to affordable housing in 
Chicago). More recently, there has been a movement in reaction to the dearth of 
affordable and market housing to resist all development except for housing, with new 
housing developments being expressly welcomed in communities. This tendency is 
known by the acronym YIMBY, meaning “yes in my backyard.” “YIMBYs push for 
reductions on zoning restrictions to increase the supply of housing, reasoning 
that all new housing, market-rate as well as subsidized, helps to keep housing prices 
under control.” Roderick M. Hills, Why Do So Many Affordable Housing Advocates 
Reject the Law of Supply and Demand?, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/09/18/why-do-so-many-affordable-
housing-advocates-reject-law-supply-demand/ [https://perma.cc/28J3-97LD]. Most 
affordable housing advocates agree that any housing supply increase will eventually, 
directly or through filtering, improve affordability. Vicki Been of the Furman 
Institute points out that adding supply of higher-rent units may increase prices but 
not affordability if land use is constrained. See BEEN, SUPPLY SKEPTICISM, supra note 
158, at 5, 8–10. 
 214. See Chetty et al., supra note 113, at 897–98; see also Ingrid Gould Ellen & 
Keren Mertens Horn, Points for Place: Can State Governments Shape Siting Patterns 
of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Developments?, HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 13–14 
(2018). Case in point: the proposed American Housing and Economic Mobility Act 
not only provided for increased funding for housing production, but takes specific 
steps to make higher quality neighborhoods accessible to low-income individuals. S. 
3503, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-
bill/3503/actions [https://perma.cc/N6F3-EB2Q]. A new version of the proposal was 
introduced in the Senate in March 2019. S. 787, 116th Cong. (2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/787/actions 
[https://perma.cc/UR53-HDY5], which the National Low Income Housing Coalition 
has endorsed. See American Housing and Economic Mobility Act, NAT’L LOW 
INCOME HOUSING COALITION, https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Warren-HEOM-
Bill.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU2Z-97DR] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
 215. See Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 464–65. 
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D. Subsidizing Households’ Ability to Pay for Housing 
The federal government spends billions of dollars annually 
subsidizing housing costs, but the vast majority of such spending 
disproportionately benefits the wealthiest homeowners rather than 
the neediest renters.  Federal funds can pay for or offset a consumer’s 
housing costs in various ways, including through payment vouchers 
(paid to consumers or housing providers), federally funded reductions 
of home acquisition costs, or tax benefits that offset the cost of 
housing. 
The vast majority of federally funded housing benefits come in the 
form of tax deductions, capital gains deferrals, and other U.S. Tax 
Code preferences for homeowners.216  There are no equivalent tax 
subsidies available for renter households.  Many homeowner tax 
benefits technically offset the cost of financing home acquisition 
rather than the home’s purchase price itself, but because the vast 
majority of homebuyers pay for their homes in large part with 
mortgage financing, the cost-subsidizing impact is almost the same.217  
 
 216. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U.L. 
REV. 329, 339 (2009) (estimating the lost tax revenue cost of homeownership 
subsidies at $207 billion); see also William G. Gale et al., Encouraging 
Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 Tax Notes 1171, 1171 (2007) (explaining 
that the mortgage interest deduction “drains significant revenues from the treasury 
every year,” does little to impact the homeownership rate, and “provides much larger 
benefits to high-income households” than to other households); Mark Andrew 
Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are 
the Tax Benefits of Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 159–69 
(2005) (calculating total tax subsidies for homeownership as aggregating over $400 
billion, and identifying the mortgage interest deduction alone as “by far the single 
largest itemized deduction,” costing $200 billion). 
 217. The mortgage interest deduction was not actually created in order to promote 
homeownership. The deduction is a residual tax benefit that remained after tax 
reform in the 1980s that disallowed deductions for other sorts of interest payments. 
See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RES. SERV., R41596, THE MORTGAGE INTEREST 
AND PROPERTY TAX DEDUCTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 4 (2014); James R. 
Follain & David C. Ling, The Federal Tax Subsidy to Housing and the Reduced 
Value of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 147, 147–68 (1991) 
(discussing how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 “reduced the value of the mortgage 
interest deduction, especially for low and middle-income households” by increasing 
the standard deduction and by making certain formerly deductible expenses 
nondeductible). Retroactively, homeownership promotion and housing affordability 
have been cited as justifications for allowing home mortgage interest payments to be 
deducted from federal taxable income. President Reagan, for example, cited the 
deduction as a key component of advancing “the American Dream.” Robert 
Hardaway, Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause and Effect, 35 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 33, 51 (2009). Although the mortgage income deduction has 
become a fixture in tax policy, there is scant evidence that it does or has ever 
increased the homeownership rate. In fact, the consensus of economists and other 
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The largest and most notorious of the homeowner tax benefits is the 
mortgage interest deduction (MID) which allows homeowners to 
deduct their mortgage interest payments (up to a certain limit).218  
The Tax Code grants owners other tax benefits as well, including 
other sorts of deductions, for example, for property taxes paid, and 
deferral of capital gains, none of which are available to renters.219  
Tax benefits available to homeowners do not target low-income 
populations, although caps on available deductions do provide some 
limit on the size of the tax benefit a household can recognize.220  
 
scholars is that the deduction either has no effect on homeownership or acts to subtly 
reduce homeownership by contributing to higher home prices and larger home 
mortgages. See Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The 
Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1391 
(2000) (“None of the evidence from economists or from other countries suggests that 
the repeal of the home mortgage interest deduction would reduce demand for owner 
occupied housing or home ownership rates.”); see also Christian A.L. Hilber & Tracy 
M. Turner, The Mortgage Interest Deduction and Its Impact on Homeownership 
Decisions, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 618, 635 (2014) (finding that mortgage interest 
deductions had no statistically significant impact on homeownership attainment in 
aggregate); Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest Deduction?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/05/magazine/who-needs-the-
mortgageinterest-deduction.html [https://perma.cc/VG7E-V38Q] (“Economists don’t 
agree on much, but they do agree on this: the interest deduction doesn’t do a thing 
for homeownership rates. If you eliminated the deduction tomorrow, America would 
have the same number of homeowners.”). 
 218. Although politically popular, the vast majority of taxpayers, and even the 
majority of homeowners, do not benefit from the mortgage interest deduction 
because they take the standard deduction in lieu of itemizing deductions on their tax 
returns. See Phyllis C. Taite, Taxes, the Problem and Solution: A Model for 
Vanishing Deductions and Exclusions for Residence-Based Tax Preferences, 59 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 361, 363, 378 (2015) (finding that the mortgage interest 
deduction subsidizes wealthier homeowners while providing little-to-no-benefit to the 
vast majority of the population because only a small minority of low income 
homeowners itemized their deductions because the mortgage interest deduction was 
not likely to exceed the standard deduction); see generally William C. Handorf, 
Government Fiscal Policy and the Housing Market, 47 REAL ESTATE REV. J. 27 
(2018) (describing the effect the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will have on MIDs). 
 219. In addition to the mortgage interest deduction, owners can also deduct 
property tax payments, and can defer capital gains on home sales and need not count 
imputed income for rental value of the home in which they live. See Patric H. 
Hendershott & Michael White, The Rise and Fall of Housing’s Favored Investment 
Status, 11 J. HOUSING RES. 257, 257–61 (2000); APGAR, supra note 77, at 11–12; see 
also 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2017) (exclusion of gain from sale of principle residence); 26 
U.S.C. § 164(a)(1) (2017) (state, local and foreign real property taxes are deductible); 
26 U.S.C. § 280A(g)(2) (1999) (rental income generated from dwelling unit will not 
be included in gross income). 
 220. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 reduced the cap for the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction to $750,000 (from $1,000,000) for mortgage loans made after 2017 and 
increased the standard deduction. 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3)(F)(II-IV) (2018) (lowering 
the cap on the deduction to $750,000 for mortgages but not retroactive); 26 U.S.C. § 
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Meanwhile, increasing the standard deduction available to all 
taxpayers makes deduction benefits less relevant to a majority of 
households and reduces the disparate tax treatment among renters 
and owners.221 
Many discussions of federal affordable housing policy omit entirely 
any discussion of the MID, reasoning that this tax benefit provides a 
cost subsidy to any (itemizing) homeowner, not just low-income 
households.222  But the MID is a federal expenditure that reduces the 
cost of housing for those who own homes (if they itemize their tax 
returns), and, at an annual estimated cost of between $70 and $100 
billion, it represents the largest line item in the federal budget that 
subsidizes housing costs.223  In stark contrast to the limited supply of 
subsidies available to a mere quarter of low-income renters, the huge 
MID subsidy is available to all homeowners with mortgage loans, 
should they choose to itemize their tax returns.224  As with any tax 
deduction, the MID provides the largest benefits to households with 
the highest incomes, and because the amount of the deduction is 
higher for taxpayers with bigger mortgages, up to the applicable cap, 
it provides the most significant benefits to people with the most 
 
63I(7)(A)(i-ii) (2017) (increasing the standard deduction). Increasing the standard 
deduction makes the mortgage interest deduction even less broadly applicable — a 
homeowner would have to have an outstanding mortgage principle of approximately 
$460,000 or more for itemization to equal a deduction higher than the standard one. 
See Handorf, supra note 218, at 3. The cap on the amount of mortgage interest that is 
deductible does somewhat mitigate the deduction’s benefits to the very highest 
income (and most expensive home-owning) taxpayers, though. See Dean Stansel & 
Anthony Randazzo, THE REASON FOUND., UNMASKING THE MORTGAGE INTEREST 
DEDUCTION: WHO BENEFITS AND BY HOW MUCH? 9 (2011), https://reason.org/wp-
content/uploads/files/mortgage_interest_deduction_2013_update.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BA8A-Q6PF]. 
 221. Several states offer renters a tax credit under state income tax. See Logan 
Allec, Here are the States that Give Renters a Tax Credit, RENT.COM (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://www.rent.com/blog/states-with-a-renters-tax-credit/ [https://perma.cc/JP9T-
9PH5]. 
 222. See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and 
Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 
(2010). 
 223. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the cost of the mortgage 
interest tax deduction in 2016 would represent a $79.2 billion tax expenditure in 2016. 
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL 
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017 33 (Comm. Print 2013). 
 224. See, e.g., Daniel Hemel & Kyle Rozema, Inequality and the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, 70 TAX L. REV. 667, 672 (2017); Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax 
Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How and Why the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 757–58 (2012); Boyack, 
Sustainable supra note 10, at 473–74 
2019] RESPONSIBLE DEVOLUTION 1235 
expensive homes and biggest mortgage loans.225  More than four-
fifths of the MID cost subsidy accrues to those in the top income 
quintile, and owners of expensive homes in expensive cities benefit 
more than owners of modestly priced homes in less inflated housing 
markets.226  Having the largest taxpayer-funded housing subsidy go 
almost exclusively to offset housing costs for the wealthiest 
homeowners is inequitable in the extreme.  As Will Fischer and 
Barbara Sard explained in a policy brief for the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, the federal government spends four times as much to 
offset housing costs for households with annual incomes above 
$200,000 as it does for households with incomes below $20,000.227 
Overall, about 60 percent of federal housing spending for which 
income data are available (counting both tax expenditures and 
program spending) benefits households with incomes above 
$100,000. The 7 million households with incomes of $200,000 or 
more receive a larger share of such spending than the more than 50 
million households with incomes of $50,000 or less, even though 
lower-income families are far more likely to struggle to afford 
housing.228 
Housing cost subsidies to households that do not suffer a housing 
cost burden do nothing to increase housing affordability — they are 
simply publicly funded windfalls enriching the already rich.229 
 
 225. See, e.g., Hemel & Rozema, supra note 224, at 667–70. The benefit of the 
mortgage interest deduction increases as the size, price, and indebtedness of the 
home increases (up to the cap), suggesting that the main effect of the deduction is to 
raise home prices and mortgage amounts, results that run directly counter to housing 
affordability and stability goals. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The 
Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 37, 39 
(2003) (“While the deduction appears to increase the amount spent on housing, it 
also appears to have almost no effect on the homeownership rate.”); see also Dennis 
J. Ventry Jr., The Fake Third Rail of Tax Reform, 135 TAX NOTES 181, 181–86 (2012) 
(analyzing why higher-income households capture a disproportionate share of the 
MID); Mann, supra note 217, at 1361 (“The home mortgage interest deduction thus 
constitutes an upside-down subsidy — the greater the need, the smaller the 
subsidy.”). 
 226. Fischer & Sard, supra note 6, at 1. “Most homeownership expenditures go to 
the top fifth of households by income. More than four-fifths of the value of the 
mortgage interest and property tax deductions goes to households with incomes of 
more than $100,000, and more than two-fifths goes to families with incomes above 
$200,000.” Id. 
 227. Id. at 2–3. 
 228. Id. at 1–2. 
 229. ADAM CARASSO ET AL., URB. INST., MAKING TAX INCENTIVES FOR 
HOMEOWNERSHIP MORE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT, app. at tbl.2 (2005) (showing 
how households in higher income percentiles are more likely to receive tax benefits 
than households in lower percentiles and will benefit less from these benefits); Alfred 
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There are, of course, federal housing cost subsidies that provide 
targeted benefits to lower-income households.  Several federal (and 
some state) programs provide down payment assistance for first-time 
and lower-income homeowners.230  The FHA, the Department of 
Agriculture, and the Veterans Administration all have programs that 
provide down payment assistance, reducing acquisition costs for 
homebuyers, many of whom are low- or middle-income.231  The FHA 
also provides mortgage insurance to qualifying homebuyers, 
increasing access to and decreasing the cost of credit, thereby 
subsidizing homeownership costs.232  Although not always categorized 
as a subsidy, the federal government’s support and underwriting of 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks 
similarly operates to reduce the cost of home mortgage borrowing 
and reduces acquisition costs for many homebuyers.233 
 
M. Clark III, Homelessness and the Crisis of Affordable Housing: The Abandonment 
of a Federal Affordable Housing Policy, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 85, 101–02 
(2016); J. B. McCombs, Refining the Itemized Deduction for Home Property Tax 
Payments, 44 VAND. L. REV. 317, 328–30 (1991). Furthermore, there is ample 
evidence that the mortgage interest deduction does nothing to improve the 
homeownership rate in the country. Gale et al., supra note 216, at 1171 (“Evidence 
suggests . . . that the mortgage interest deduction . . . does little if anything to 
encourage homeownership. Instead, it serves mainly to raise the price of housing and 
land and to encourage people who do buy homes to borrow more and to buy larger 
homes than they otherwise would.”). 
 230. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., ADVOCATE’S GUIDE 2018: A PRIMER ON 
FEDERAL AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 4–10 
(2018), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-2018/2018_Advocates-Guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YXR4-UPS2]. 
 231. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716–23 (1992); Self-Help Homeownership Opportunity 
Program (SHOP), U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/shop/ [https://perma.cc/2HBR-7TN5]; Reiss, 
supra note 1, at 1090–91. 
 232. Reiss, supra note 1, at 1090–91. Professor David Reiss questions the 
appropriate level of government down payment assistance, pointing out that 
homebuyers who do not contribute sufficient amounts of their own capital to 
purchase homes are more likely to eventually default on their mortgages and lose 
their homes, along with their subsidized housing benefits. Id. at 1079–81. 
 233. See Boyack, Equitably, supra note 31, at 126–30 (describing Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, along with Federal Home Loan Banks and their various predecessor & 
associated entities, purchase mortgage loans made to qualifying homeowners on 
qualifying homes on the secondary mortgage market); Boyack, Fannie/Freddie, supra 
note 168, at 1495–1500. Secondary market purchases provide liquidity to home 
mortgage markets and reduce the cost of mortgage credit, making homebuying more 
accessible and borrowing cheaper. Id. When the system works as anticipated, this cost 
reduction is revenue neutral because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac use private funds 
for their secondary market purchases, but the federal government expended 
significant money preserving and funding these secondary mortgage market 
participants when the mortgage market crashed in 2008. Id. at 1520–21. 
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Non-tax federal home mortgage subsidies have a problematic 
history.  Until the Fair Housing Act of 1968, these subsidies were 
primarily — and sometimes exclusively — available to white 
homebuyers acquiring homes in racially segregated, white-only 
neighborhoods.234  The federal programs and policies subsidizing 
home mortgage borrowing with federal money and credit were 
instrumental in increasing the homeownership rate in the twentieth 
century and establishing an intergenerational pattern for wealth-
building through homeownership.235  But the housing and wealth 
benefits distributed through these programs were provided 
predominantly to white households.236  Persistent gaps in 
homeownership and wealth between black and white households 
reflect the lasting impact of this disparate allocation of federal 
housing subsidies.237  Race-based underwriting criteria developed by 
 
 234. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 63–75; see also JACKSON, supra note 1, at 191–
218. Although race-based and disparately provided mortgage assistance is illegal 
today, federally subsidized access to credit still seems to be unevenly distributed. See 
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, DESPITE GROWING MARKET, AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND LATINOS REMAIN UNDERSERVED 1–5 (2017), 
https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-
publication/crl-2016hmda-policy-brief-sep2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/35NX-QY2N]; 
Drew DeSilver & Kristen Bialik, Blacks and Hispanics face extra challenges in 
getting home loans, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/01/10/blacks-and-hispanics-face-extra-challenges-in-getting-home-loans/ 
[https://perma.cc/4AT5-SN8K]; Aaron Glantz & Emmanuel Martinez, Kept Out: For 
People of Color, Banks Are Shutting the Door to Homeownership, REVEAL (Feb. 15, 
2018), https://www.revealnews.org/article/for-people-of-color-banks-are-shutting-the-
door-to-homeownership/ [https://perma.cc/AJF4-LWCD]; Sarah Mikhitarian, Black 
Mortgage Applicants Denied at More Than Twice the Rate of Whites, ZILLOW (Apr. 
19, 2018), https://www.zillow.com/research/black-white-mortgage-denials-19616/ 
[https://perma.cc/4QNK-TM4N]. 
 235. DAVID RUSK, THE BROOKINGS INST., CTR. ON URBAN & METRO. STUDIES, 
THE “SEGREGATION TAX”: THE COST OF RACIAL SEGREGATION TO BLACK 
HOMEOWNERS 2 (2001), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/rusk.pdf [https://perma.cc/U294-55BJ] (“Home equity is the 
typical American family’s most important financial asset, and an important vehicle 
for transmitting wealth from generation to generation.”); Stephen G. Gilles, The 
Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 670 n.300 (2006) (“According 
to a 2004 study of census data by the Pew Hispanic Center, the median net worth of 
renters is only 1% of the median net worth of homeowners.”); Brown, supra note 216, 
at 332 (“Homeownership in America has historically been viewed as a solid 
investment both financially and as a means of living the American Dream,” but 
“homeownership has never been a good financial investment for either the vast 
majority of African-American homeowners or for low-income homeowners.”). 
 236. See Brown, supra note 216, at 349; Rothstein, supra note 1, at 63–75, 177–93. 
 237. See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 177–93. 
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the federal government also established the geography of residential 
racial segregation that still exists today.238 
The federal government has historically allocated a majority of its 
financial support for housing to benefit white, wealthy owners of 
expensive homes.239  Numerous politicians have justified supports for 
homeownership generally based on purported autonomy-promoting, 
citizenship-enhancing, and wealth-building benefits of 
homeownership,240 but any such benefits have been distributed 
unevenly.241  Furthermore, despite decades of government spending 
that ostensibly promoted homeownership and subsidized housing 
costs for owner households, the homeownership rate today has 
decreased to 64%, the same level it was in the early 1990s.242  It is well 
below the rate in several other developed countries that do not 
subsidize home buying.243  At the same time, U.S. median home 
prices in 2019 are higher than they have ever been, and 
homeownership is therefore even more financially out of reach for an 
ever-increasing segment of the population.244 
The majority of federal housing expenditures benefit homeowners 
rather than renters, but the federal government does spend a 
substantial amount of money each year subsidizing low-income rental 
housing costs.  This is often done through Section 8 voucher 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. A. Mechele Dickerson, Public Interest, Public Choice, and the Cult of 
Homeownership, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843, 858 (2012); Rothstein, supra note 1, at 
63–75. 
 240. See Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 225, at 38. 
 241. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 3, 19–20; Brown, supra note 216, at 
349–62; see also Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, The Transition to Home 
Ownership and the Black-White Wealth Gap, 84 REV. ECON. STAT. 281, 281 (2002); 
Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting and 
Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 IND. L. REV. 1199, 1207–08 (2001); 
Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
53, 68 (2006). 
 242. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 3 (stating that the national 
homeownership rate has recently increased to 63.9%). 
 243. Laurie Goodman et al., The US Homeownership Rate Has Lost Ground 
Compared with Other Developed Countries, URB. INST. (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/us-homeownership-rate-has-lost-ground-
compared-other-developed-countries [https://perma.cc/T8DC-3F7K]; United States 
Home Ownership Rates, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/united-
states/home-ownership-rate [https://perma.cc/C852-P49J] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019, 
2:13 PM). 
 244. STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 1–2. 
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programs.245  Housing vouchers obligate the government to pay the 
difference between the rental amount that would be affordable to a 
given renter, based on that renter’s income, and the lesser of the 
actual rent charged and a reasonable market rent for the unit in 
question.246  There are several different types of housing voucher 
programs, the two most significant being project-based vouchers 
(PBVs) and housing choice vouchers (HCVs), both authorized under 
Section 8.247  There are currently 1.2 million project-based subsidy 
units and more than 2 million HCVs,248 but HUD has never provided 
sufficient subsidies to fund the affordability gap for all, or even a 
majority, of low-income households with cost burdens.249  Because 
federal funding for vouchers decreased (or at least insufficiently 
increased) as the intensity of cost-burdens increased among an ever-
growing number of renters, the percentage of low-income households 
receiving federal subsidies has declined over the past 20 years.  In 
2000, HUD provided housing assistance to about a third of needy 
low-income renter households; today, HUD only has funding to assist 
one fourth.250  Because demand for vouchers exceeds supply, the local 
PHAs who distribute the vouchers must determine who among the 
 
 245. The voucher programs were established by HUD in 1974 under the authority 
of Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937. Vouchers provide for payment from HUD to 
landlords for a portion of rents in excess of 30% of the tenant’s gross income. Section 
8 Rental Certificate Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/programdescription/cert8 [https://perma.cc/452E-J84N] (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2019); see also CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: 
HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM 1 (2017), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics-housing-1-25-
13vouch.pdf [https://perma.cc/G66B-W3J8]. 
 246. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 245. 
 247. See generally Section 8 Rental Certificate Program, supra note 245. 
 248. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, RENTAL ASSISTANCE IS EFFECTIVE 
BUT SERVES ONLY A FRACTION OF ELIGIBLE HOUSEHOLDS 10, 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-24-09hous-sec2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ETX-TG7E] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
 249. See BRUCE KATZ & MARGERY AUSTEN TURNER, BROOKINGS INST., 
RETHINKING U.S. RENTAL HOUSING POLICY: BUILD ON STATE & LOCAL INNOVATION 
4–5 (2008); Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949 
to 1999, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 489, 497–98 (2000). Ironically, vouchers can also 
create a problematic economic effect by nudging housing prices up in a market 
because they increase tenants’ ability to pay. Boyack, Sustainable, supra note 10, at 
489–90. 
 250. The population of low-income renter households increased by 29% from 2001 
to 2015 (from 14.9 million to 19.2 million), but during that period the number of very 
low-income households receiving rental assistance rose only 14%, from 4.2 million to 
4.8 million, causing the share of very low-income households receiving assistance to 
decline from 28% to 25%. RENTAL HOUSING 2017, supra note 19, at 32; see also 
STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 5. 
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needy renters receive assistance and who does not.251  There are 
various allocation schemes that PHAs use to distribute vouchers, 
usually preferring certain categories of renters (often veterans or 
recently homeless households), and then allocating remaining 
vouchers (if any) either on a first-in-time basis or even by lottery.252  
Waitlists for available vouchers can be long and wait times can exceed 
two years.253 
PBVs attach to a specific unit and are not portable, whereas tenant 
recipients of HCVs can move and take their vouchers with them.254  
Because PBVs apply to designated units, they could be deliberately 
sited in higher opportunity areas, but most of them are not and, 
instead, are located in low-income neighborhoods.255  PBVs are 
therefore subject to the same sorts of criticisms that apply to public 
housing and grant- and tax-subsidized low-income units located in 
poor quality neighborhoods.  HCVs are more numerous than PBVs 
and avoid some of the siting problems that PBVs face because they 
can be used anywhere a tenant finds housing as long as the landlord 
agrees to accept the vouchers.256  But that is the rub.  In most states, 
landlords are free to refuse payment of rent in the form of HCVs.257  
 
 251. HOUS. COMM’N BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE: NEW 
DIRECTIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY 11 (2013); NLIHC Out of Reach 2018, supra 
note 23, at 3. 
 252. U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, PHA GUIDEBOOK TO 
ENDING HOMELESSNESS 8 (2013). 
 253. In Boston, for example, more than 10,000 people applied for just 73 additional 
vouchers issued in November 2014. Katie Johnson, Demand Soars for Affordable 
Housing in Boston Area, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 28, 2014), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/28/demand-for-affordable-housing-
soars/hCb4RSkLTbpqdMJR1eCYTI/story.html [https://perma.cc/U8E3-TH7J]; see 
also; Millions of Families on Voucher and Public Housing Waiting Lists, NAT’L LOW 
INCOME HOUS. COAL. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://nlihc.org/resource/millions-families-
voucher-and-public-housing-waiting-lists [https://perma.cc/8WR7-D5QM]; Bolton et. 
al., supra note 21, at 5. 
 254. Barbara Sard, Project-Based Vouchers, in NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
COALITION 2018 ADVOCATES’ GUIDE 4–48 (2018), 
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-2018/Ch04-S12_Project-Based-
Vouchers_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD2N-QR2R]. 
 255. Note that location itself may be far less objectionable than neighborhood 
upkeep, amenities, and safety, and inner-city neighborhoods are likely better 
conceived of as insufficiently supported economically than somehow inherently 
“deficient” and “places of despair.” Lisa T. Alexander, Hip-Hop and Housing: 
Revisiting Culture, Urban Space, Power, and Law, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 803, 805–07 
(2012). 
 256. Brown, supra note 158, at 699. 
 257. Federal law does not require that landlords accept Section 8 vouchers towards 
rent, but state law in 13 states and local law in several municipalities specifically 
prohibits landlords from discriminating against voucher holders. Housing Choice 
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Landlords are virtually guaranteed payment from the government for 
the amount represented by an HCV but sometimes refuse to accept 
vouchers, perhaps because of conscious or unconscious 
discrimination, based on source of income, socio-economic class, or 
other factors.258  A small handful of states have outlawed source-of-
income-based discrimination in rental housing,259 and Congress 
periodically proposes expanding the Fair Housing Act protections to 
cover people who are denied housing because they pay with a 
voucher.260  Unless and until such protections apply, however, 
landlords can and do refuse to rent to low-income renters with 
vouchers, and this significantly impairs the utility of the HCVs.261  In 
 
Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact
_sheet [https://perma.cc/99NM-RSFP]. Even in such states, however, enforcement is 
“generally weak” and landlords still often discriminate against voucher holders. 
Ingrid Gould Ellen, What Do We Know about Housing Choice Vouchers?, 30 
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 1, 1–2 (2018), 
https://furmancenter.org/files/What_do_we_know_about_housing_vouchers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZR8R-6FZF]. 
 258. Socioeconomic status “is tightly linked to race, minority status, sex, and 
disability,” so it is difficult to tease out the reasons that landlords may refuse to rent 
to housing voucher recipients. Kinara Flagg, Mending the Safety Net Through Source 
of Income Protections: The Nexus Between Antidiscrimination and Social Welfare 
Law, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 201, 220 (2011). For a more thorough discussion of 
the issues surrounding source of income discrimination, see Jenna Bernstein, Section 
8, Source of Income Discrimination, and Federal Preemption: Setting the Record 
Straight, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1407, 1412 (2010); Stefanie DeLuca, Why Don’t More 
Voucher Holders Escape Poor Neighborhoods, NYU FURMAN CTR. (Oct. 2014), 
http://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/why-dont-more-voucher-holders-escape-
poor-neighborhoods [https://perma.cc/CUA3-DQYJ]; Ellen, supra note 257, at 2. 
 259. As of January 2019, the following states have laws prohibiting discrimination 
against housing voucher holders: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION 
COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A 
SUCCESSFUL HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM 6–29 (2019), 
https://prrac.org/pdf/AppendixB.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM7X-RB7Y]. There are 
source of income discrimination prohibitions in California, Delaware, and Wisconsin 
as well, but these do not apply to voucher holders. Id. at 6, 10–11, 28–29. In addition, 
over 80 local municipalities have regulations prohibiting source of income 
discrimination in rental housing. See id. at 30–128. 
 260. For example, the proposed “American Housing and Economic Mobility Act” 
expands the Fair Housing Act along several metrics, including banning source of 
income discrimination. For a discussion of how and why the Act should be expanded 
to cover voucher-based discrimination, see Tamica H. Daniel, Bringing Real Choice 
to the Housing Choice Voucher Program: Addressing Voucher Discrimination 
Under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 769, 772 (2010). 
 261. See generally J. Rosie Tighe et al., Source of Discrimination and Fair Housing 
Policy, 32 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 3 (2016) (discussing and providing evidence for this 
type of discrimination). There is “rampant discrimination from private landlords” 
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addition, even if landlords agree to take vouchers, tenants are 
financially precluded from renting in areas where housing units rent 
at higher-than-median levels since the voucher will not cover rental 
amounts in excess of “reasonable” market rents (median rents in the 
region).262  These limitations likely contribute to the fact that only 8% 
of voucher recipients live in neighborhoods where fewer than 10% of 
residents are poor.263  Furthermore, because HUD oversight of 
subsidized housing units is sometimes spotty, thousands of voucher 
recipients live in uninhabitable homes.264 
III. OPTIMIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 
The government’s job of ensuring that the nation’s housing is 
sufficiently affordable is made up of at least three components: (1) 
designing and implementing programs to improve housing markets; 
(2) funding necessary housing programs and housing cost subsidies 
for households with remaining needs; and (3) providing and enforcing 
laws that guarantee adequate housing rights (for households) and 
impose sufficient housing obligations on state and local governments 
and instrumentalities that lead to long-term improvements in housing 
equity.  The debate regarding the appropriate role for the federal 
government in affordable housing sometimes erroneously conflates 
these components.  Congress has embraced affordable housing 
devolution conceptually, but seems to see it as a way of avoiding 
ultimate responsibility.265  Affordable housing devolution will only 
 
against voucher recipients. Brentin Mock, New Orleans’ Leading Affordable-
Housing Developer Explains Its Lack of Affordable Housing, CITYLAB (Sept. 3, 
2015), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/09/new-orleans-leading-affordable-
housing-developer-explains-its-lack-of-affordable-housing/403351/ 
[https://perma.cc/EQH9-WCQ3] (describing a developer’s advice to landlords in 
post-Katrina New Orleans to refuse to rent to voucher recipients). 
 262. HUD’s Small Area Fair Market Rent demonstration explored the possibility 
of defining reasonable rents for voucher purposes based on zip code rather than 
region in order to allow voucher recipients better access to higher priced 
neighborhoods. MERYL FINKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., SMALL 
AREA FAIR MARKET RENT DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION, at v (2017); see 24 C.F.R. 
§§ 888.113, 982.503 (2018). 
 263. Housing Voucher Policy Designed to Expand Opportunity Targets Areas 
That Need It, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/housing-voucher-policy-designed-to-expand-
opportunity-targets-areas-that-need-it [https://perma.cc/M6PB-VFF3]. 
 264. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
 265. Congress is not solely to blame. The Trump Administration has proposed 
annual budgets (for FY18, FY19 and FY20) that significantly reduce affordable 
housing’s federal funding. See President Trump Proposes Drastic Cuts to Affordable 
Housing Programs, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (Mar. 11, 2019) 
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succeed, however, if Congress remains responsible for setting 
standards and providing adequate funds.  Local and regional decision 
makers are likely better at understanding and addressing the 
affordable housing needs of specific geographic areas, and they 
should be empowered and encouraged in their efforts.  After all, 
housing markets are inherently local, significantly shaped by state and 
local markets and laws.  However, federal leadership in setting and 
enforcing standards of fairness is needed to ensure equitable 
treatment for vulnerable populations throughout the country and to 
avoid the negative external impacts that local affordability crises 
create.  Furthermore, the federal government is the only level of 
government that can provide sufficient funding to sustainably 
decrease housing inequity.  Pragmatic necessity justifies federal 
financial and legal responsibility for solving the housing crisis, and the 
history of federal housing policy provides the compelling moral 
imperative for the federal government’s continuing accountability in 
fair and affordable housing. 
Part III.A first explains how the federal government would have 
sufficient revenues to fully fund housing needs if allocations and 
priorities within housing policy were changed.  Part III.B then 
articulates the pragmatic, economic, and moral justifications for 
reallocating policy priorities and government resources. 
A. Full Funding for Housing Affordability Programs 
The federal government has the financial capacity to meaningfully 
invest in affordable housing creation.  Like Dorothy in the Wizard of 
Oz, the government has “always had the power” to fulfill this quest, if 
only it recognizes how to use it.266  The federal government could 
very quickly at least double or triple its investment in affordable 
housing solutions merely by reallocating resources from one category 
of housing expenditures, namely, those benefiting wealthy 
homeowners that do not improve housing affordability, to 
expenditures that do address housing cost burdens.267  Federal 
 
[hereinafter NLIHC, Trump 2020 Budget], https://nlihc.org/resource/president-
trump-proposes-drastic-cuts-affordable-housing-programs [https://perma.cc/PJF2-
U2TC]. This communicates the executive branch’s lack of concern for the ability of 
low-income households to pay housing costs and reside in habitable homes. 
 266. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939) (“Glinda: You’ve always 
had the power to go back to Kansas. Dorothy: I have?”). 
 267. Robert Collinson et al., Low Income Housing Policy, in ECONOMICS OF 
MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 59–61 (Robert A. 
Moffitt ed., 2016) https://www.nber.org/chapters/c13485.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6GS-
4MWP] (calculating that nearly $40 billion annual funds are allocated to means-
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housing policy today provides benefits to people who do not 
financially need them.268  The impact of reallocating those benefits to 
those who do, in fact, struggle to pay for housing could be designed as 
essentially budget-neutral, although the wealthiest homeowners 
would pay a slightly higher tax without the MID, freeing up tax 
revenues to be used in subsidizing very low income households and 
investing in housing and neighborhood infrastructure.269  In addition 
to recapturing unjustifiable tax benefits currently subsidizing wealthy 
homeowners, Congress should adopt and encourage local 
governments to adopt measures to reduce administrative costs and, 
through more effective delegation of program management to PHAs, 
minimize multi-layered bureaucratic waste.270 
The growing magnitude of need among low-income renters 
provides both a moral and economic imperative for reallocation of 
federal funding from homeowner subsidies toward the creation of 
affordable rentals and adequately subsidizing the housing 
affordability gap for the nation’s neediest households.  Current 
subsidies unjustifiably provide economic benefits disproportionately 
to median and above-median income homeowners while the vast 
majority of low-income rental households receive no federal housing 
 
tested housing programs, like vouchers, and LIHTC expenditures make up another 
$6 billion, comparing that total of $46 billion spent on affordable rentals to the 
“roughly $195 billion” of homeowner subsidies created by the mortgage interest 
deduction alone). 
 268. “Most of the government’s spending on housing, or roughly $195 billion of an 
estimated $270 billion, goes toward subsidizing homeowners through the tax code.” 
Id. at 61. See also Jenny Schuetz, Under US Housing Policies, Homeowners Mostly 
Win, While Renters Mostly Lose, BROOKINGS INST. (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/under-us-housing-policies-homeowners-mostly-
win-while-renters-mostly-lose/ [https://perma.cc/NWL4-AX6L]. 
 269. In 2015, for example, the government spent $190 billion to assist in 
homebuying and renting, and about three-fourths of that amount subsidized 
homeownership costs for high-income households. See Fischer & Sard, supra note 6. 
Also, “[l]ess than 30 percent of federal housing spending in 2015 went to renters . . . . 
Owners received more than 70 percent of federal housing subsidies, despite making 
up less than two-thirds of all households and just 40 percent of those with severe 
housing cost burdens.” See id.; see also BRUCE KATZ, BROOKINGS INST., CUT TO 
INVEST: REFORM THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION TO INVEST IN INNOVATION 
AND ADVANCED INDUSTRIES 4–5 (2012), brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/06-mortgage-interest-deduction.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C3AW-YLJ7]. 
 270. Current and prior legislative proposals have detailed numerous ways to 
decrease the administrative costs of housing programs. See, e.g., Will Fischer, 
Streamlining Federal Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Oct. 
21, 2015), https://www.cbpp.org/housing/streamlining-federal-rental-assistance 
[https://perma.cc/DN5D-XFM9]. 
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assistance at all.271  In addition, homeowner subsidies are provided 
without any dignitary costs, while renter subsidies, when provided, 
come with stigma, autonomy constraints, and possibly with onerous 
behavioral mandates.272  Homeowner housing costs subsidies are 
fairly invisible (delivered mostly through tax benefits and mortgage 
subsidies) and impose no autonomy limitations or behavioral 
requirements, for example limiting where recipients may live or 
requiring them to work a certain number of hours.273  Rental housing 
assistance, on the other hand, is more visible and carries a stigma.274  
Subsidies delivered via vouchers or placement in designated homes 
also practically limit choice concerning the neighborhood in which to 
live and, sometimes, the quality of one’s home.275  Because the 
majority of rental assistance recipients end up living in poor quality 
neighborhoods, their opportunities for future improvements to 
income and quality of life for generations to come are severely 
curtailed.276  In many cases, rental housing assistance does little to 
improve long-term prospects and diminish long-term need.277  Such 
allocations treat some of the symptoms of unaffordable housing, but 
they insufficiently address its underlying causes. 
 
 271. See supra notes 245–49 and accompanying text. 
 272. There is no stigma associated with claiming deductions related to 
homeownership. See Kevin Gu, An Origin of Welfare Stigma, RAMAPO J.L. & SOC’Y 
(2016), https://www.ramapo.edu/law-journal/files/2016/01/An-Origin-of-Welfare-
Stigma.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3QY-U7L8]. But stigmas associated with receiving 
governmental rental subsidies are significant and well documented. See, e.g., Paul 
Boudreaux, An Individual Preference Approach to Suburban Racial Desegregation, 
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 561–62 (1999); Steven J. Eagle, “Affordable Housing” 
As Metaphor, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301, 314 (2017); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How 
Government Housing Perpetuates Racial Segregation: Lessons from Post-Katrina 
New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 713–14 (2011). 
 273. See supra notes 212–25 and accompanying text. 
 274. See Kristi Andrasik, When It Comes to Housing, Your Voucher is Your 
Stigma, REALCLEAR POL’Y (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.realclearpolicy.com/blog/2016/10/04/when_it_comes_to_housing_your_v
oucher_is_your_stigma_1724.html [https://perma.cc/UA7N-X64P]; Emily Badger, 
How Section 8 Became a ‘Racial Slur,’ WASH. POST (June 15, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/15/how-section-8-became-a-
racial-slur/?utm_term=.e56ffeb042f2 [https://perma.cc/B6LL-MG8T]; Maria Elkin, 
What Everyone Gets Wrong about Affordable Housing, NEW AMERICA (Aug. 24, 
2017), https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-174/what-everyone-gets-wrong-
about-affordable-housing/ [https://perma.cc/FE2M-2CMF]; see also infra note 305 
and accompanying text. 
 275. See generally supra notes 255–63 and accompanying text. 
 276. See Richard D. Kalenberg, An Economic Fair Housing Act, CENTURY 
FOUND. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/economic-fair-housing-
act/?agreed=1 [https://perma.cc/BH4H-LHW9]. 
 277. See generally Boyack, supra note 10. 
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Congress should immediately re-allocate funding first toward 
alleviating the symptoms for those three million very low-income and 
extremely low-income households with HUD-identified worst-case 
housing needs — those households that allocate more than 50% of 
their income to housing or live in substandard conditions or both.278  
Once the worst case needs are met, Congress should channel funding 
toward creating long-term solutions to the lack of affordable housing 
supply in higher opportunity neighborhoods, with the expectation 
that investing in sufficient affordable housing in quality 
neighborhoods for all low-income households will decrease the 
percentage and number of households requiring rental subsidies in 
the future.  The federal government should also address the needs of 
the nation’s 7.5 million severely cost-burdened homeowners, many of 
whom suffered wealth and housing affordability losses due to 
predatory lending schemes and the fallout from the Financial 
Crisis.279 
Funding of housing need through national channels avoids the 
problem that plagues all local funding regimes: the places with the 
greatest need for government assistance produce the smallest amount 
of tax revenue.280  Congressional allocations based on local needs 
rather than local means smooth out the difference between localities 
with fewer financial resources and those with more robust ability to 
self-fund, creating a more equitable distribution of aid.  Distressed 
municipalities can use federal funding to build neighborhood 
infrastructure, investing in improvements that, once again, will pay 
 
 278. See WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2017, supra note 21, at 2. 
 279. See generally JAMES H. CARR ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF REAL ESTATE 
BROKERS, THE STATE OF BLACK HOUSING IN AMERICA (2016), 
http://www.nareb.com/site-files/uploads/2016/08/NAREB-SHIBA-REPORT-2016-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAZ8-L73N]; Sean Veal & Jonathan Spader, Nearly a 
Third of American Households Were Cost-Burdened Last Year, HARV. UNIV. JOINT 
CTR. FOR HOUSING STUD. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/more-
than-a-third-of-american-households-were-cost-burdened-last-year/ 
[https://perma.cc/L3HH-LK8E]. Pending legislation proposals include aid for 
struggling homeowners. For a summary of the Foreclosure Crisis and its impacts, see 
supra note 61. 
 280. This is one reason that poor neighborhoods, and particularly neighborhoods 
with the lowest-cost housing, are also neighborhoods with the relatively weakest 
public schools. See INGRID GOULD ELLEN & KEREN HORN, POVERTY & RACE RES. 
ACTION COUNCIL, NYU FURMAN CTR. & UNIV. OF MASS. BOSTON, HOUSING AND 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL SCHOOLS NEAR 
FAMILIES WITH FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE 1 (2018), 
https://furmancenter.org/files/HousingLocationSchools2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X88F-4KUV]. 
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long-term dividends in terms of greater resident opportunities, 
wealth, and municipal resources.281 
B. Pragmatic, Economic, and Moral Justifications for Federal 
Responsibility 
Pragmatics, economics, and history all warrant a significant federal 
government role in improving the equities of housing markets.  
Federal law limitations on state and local housing laws are essential 
because local laws can be and are used to impose unjustifiable costs 
on vulnerable, low-income populations.282  The most cost-effective 
way to make lasting improvements in housing affordability is through 
limiting the efficacy of exclusionary land use regulations, prohibiting 
source-of-income discrimination by landlords, and ensuring 
adequately habitable premises in low-income housing units.  
Exclusionary zoning’s constitutionality should be rethought and 
limited to separation of harmful and incompatible uses only; local 
land use laws should not be permitted to restrict the residential 
integration of disparate economic classes.283  To date, states have 
found it difficult to rein in local governments from using their land 
use regulations to directly or indirectly exclude low-income 
households from their communities, with the notable exception of 
New Jersey, where a series of lengthy and hard-fought legal 
challenges has given birth to the Mount Laurel doctrine that requires 
each locality to include its “fair share” of affordable housing.284  A 
 
 281. See Robert O. Zdenek, The Art and Science of Community Economic 
Development, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 331, 331–33 (2004) 
(reviewing and summarizing MIHAILO TEMALI, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES AND TOOLS TO REVITALIZE YOUR 
NEIGHBORHOOD (2002)). 
 282. ADVISORY COMM’N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUS., 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., “NOT IN MY BACK YARD”: REMOVING BARRIERS 
TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 3 (1991); Kristine Nelson Fuge, Exclusionary Zoning: 
Keeping People in Their Wrongful Places or a Valid Exercise of Local Control?, 18 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 148, 151 (1996); Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner 
City: Class Transformation, Concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of the 
Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 6 (2006); Henry A. Span, How the Courts 
Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2001); see also U.S. 
ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F. 
Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 283. Andrea J. Boyack, American Dream in Flux: The Endangered Right to Lease 
a Home, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 203, 208–11 (2014); see also Boyack, 
Revitalizing, supra note 107, at 471–74. 
 284. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 
A.2d 390, 411–22, 433, 441–51 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of 
Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713, 724–25, 732–34 (N.J. 1975). The 
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renewal of traditional, constitutional protections of private property 
rights at the federal court level, however, could push back against 
local laws creating neighborhood exclusions and allow market forces 
to naturally grow affordable housing supply.285  Local, regional 
exclusions can be combatted through both federal mandates and 
assisted regional coordination for housing markets that cross 
jurisdictional boundaries.  Regional coordination is imperative in 
interconnected housing markets because exclusions in one area 
impose cost externalities on other communities in the region.286  
Treating multi-jurisdictional housing markets as a whole will better 
address neighborhood quality concerns, residential desegregation, 
and regional affordability.287  It will also enable coordination for 
 
Mount Laurel doctrine, articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the 1975 
case of the same name, stated that all municipalities in the state have an “affirmative 
obligation” to meet their “fair share” of affordable rental housing in order to meet 
regional needs. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 420. The Mount Laurel doctrine has 
been foundational for fair-housing and affordable-housing advocates to push for 
inclusive siting of low-income and moderate-income housing developments, and the 
case and its doctrine have been frequently cited in litigation around the country. For 
more details on the Mount Laurel case, its circumstances, impacts, and the continuing 
struggle to apply the associated legal doctrine, see generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET 
AL., CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND 
SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB (2013). 
 285. There are many discussions of how land use regulations affects affordable 
housing. See, e.g., JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND 
USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 84–89 (2d ed., West 2003) 
(discussing minimum lot sizes and building setback lines); Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part I–The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 
(1990) (discussing minimum lot sizes); Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 
13 J.L. & ECON. 71, 101–102 (1970) (discussing minimum lot sizes in Houston, a city 
purportedly without zoning); see also Eliza Hall, Divide and Sprawl, Decline and 
Fall: A Comparative Critique of Euclidean Zoning, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 915, 925–27 
(2007); Michael Lewyn, The (Somewhat) False Hope of Comprehensive Planning, 37 
U. HAW. L. REV. 39, 69–70 (2015); Michael Lewyn, You Can Have It All: Less Sprawl 
and Property Rights Too, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1093, 1131–33 (2007); Michael Lewyn, 
Zoning and Land Use Planning, 44 REAL EST. L.J. 558, 558–63 (2016); Boyack, 
Revitalizing, supra note 107, at 448–57. 
 286. Lavea Brachman, New State and Federal Policy Agendas: Realizing the 
Potential of America’s Legacy Cities and Their Regions, in REBUILDING AMERICA’S 
LEGACY CITIES: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE INDUSTRIAL HEARTLAND 276–77 (Alan 
Mallach ed., 2012); see also Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 
21 J.L. & POL. 505, 532, 546 (2005); Abraham Gutman et. al., Health, Housing, and 
the Law, 11 NE. U.L. REV. 251, 310–12 (2019) (discussing various regional 
coordinated efforts to address housing deficiencies); Megan Haberle & Philip 
Tegeler, Coordinated Action on School and Housing Integration: The Role of State 
Government, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 949, 957 (2019) (discussing how the “absence of 
widespread regional solutions” has hamstrung attempts to desegregate communities 
and public schools). 
 287. Brachman, supra note 286, at 277. 
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infrastructure projects, such as public transit, that should rationally be 
considered at the regional level.288 
In a similar vein, federal Fair Housing law should be expanded to 
prohibit housing discrimination based on a tenant’s (or home 
purchaser’s) source of income, for example, using vouchers to pay 
rent.289  Eliminating legal source-of-income housing discrimination 
would increase the quantity and quality of homes available to housing 
aid recipients, making the federal rental subsidies more effective and 
more likely to achieve long-lasting improvements for the recipients.  
Federal law could also be expanded to create a minimum level of 
property rights protections for tenants, either through an expanded 
judicial interpretation of constitutional property and civil rights or 
through affirmative legislation.  At a minimum, tenants across the 
country should be guaranteed the right to withhold rent for 
uninhabitable premises,290 be protected from retaliatory eviction and 
 
 288. Id. 
 289. See supra notes 248–54 and accompanying text. Although several states have 
passed legislation protecting against source of income discrimination, and although 
expanding FHA to cover source of income discrimination has been proposed, 
Congress has not yet acted to protect voucher recipients’ ability to obtain housing. 
One reason that proposals to expand FHA protections have not passed, however, has 
been that the issue of source of income discrimination has been bundled with other 
classifications that are more politically controversial. For example, current legislative 
proposals involve expanding FHA protections to discriminatory housing actions 
based on sexual preference and gender identity as well as those based on source of 
income. See, e.g., Affordable Housing Crisis Act of 2018, S. 3231, 115th Cong. (2018); 
American Housing and Economic Mobility Act of 2019, S. 787/H.R. 1737, 116th 
Cong. (2019). Although such expansions may very well be warranted, political 
expediency argues that source of income discrimination should be separately 
considered by Congress to increase the likelihood of the measure actually being 
passed. 
 290. The implied warranty of habitability is part of state landlord-tenant law, but 
there are significant differences from state-to-state. See generally Memorandum from 
Alice Noble-Allgire to the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act Drafting 
Comm. (Feb. 2, 2012), https://www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/Research-Memo-re-
50-State-Survey-of-the-Warranty-of-Habitability.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ3V-
2RFD]. Although about half of the states have adopted the Universal Residential 
Landlord Tenant Act, even in those states, the law pertaining to the implied warranty 
of habitability in residential leases is not uniform. Id. at 14. In some jurisdictions, 
tenants have an absolute right to withhold rent while residing in premises that the 
tenant considers uninhabitable; in other places, a tenant can sue for a rent reduction 
but must continue to pay rent (at least into an escrow account) pending court 
determination of inhabitability. Id. at 16–17. There may be utility in harmonizing 
such laws or at the very least creating a federal floor for fair treatment of tenants. 
Several scholars have suggested legal changes that could help the implied warranty of 
habitability better achieve its tenant protection purposes. See, e.g., Melissa T. 
Lonegrass, Convergence in Contort: Landlord Liability for Defective Premises in 
Comparative Perspective, 85 TUL. L. REV. 413, 415 (2010) (suggesting a judicial 
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tenant blacklisting,291 and be ensured the right to counsel in eviction 
proceedings.292  Federal law could create, and federal courts could 
ensure, a residential tenants’ bill of rights.293 
Federal funding provided to local governments and agencies 
provides another method for incentivizing equitable and appropriate 
local housing policies and programs. HUD already exercises control 
over the PHAs and imposes federal policy mandates by attaching 
conditions to the receipt of federal housing funds.294  The strings 
attached to federal funding need to follow a well thought-out, 
consistent plan for long-term systemic improvements and not change 
haphazardly to reflect the political concern du jour.  For example, if 
new low-income housing should be built in high opportunity 
 
reframing of harms to tenants from uninhabitable premises); Franzese et al., supra 
note 101, at 42–43 (2016) (suggesting better enforcement mechanisms). 
 291. See Desmond, Unaffordable, supra note 11, at 4–5; Franzese, supra note 103, 
at 675–76. 
 292. Ken Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants 
in Eviction Proceedings in New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527 (1991); 
Rachel Kleinman, Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1509–17 (2004); Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The 
Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants 
in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 562–76 (1988). New York 
recently passed a law — “the first of its kind in the nation” — that guarantees legal 
representation for low-income tenants facing eviction. Andrew Scherer, The Right to 
Counsel for Tenants Who Face Eviction, N.Y. L. SCH.: CITYLAND (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.citylandnyc.org/the-right-to-counsel-for-tenants-who-face-eviction/ 
[https://perma.cc/69G3-S33D]. San Francisco, the District of Columbia, and 
Philadelphia have all taken steps towards enacting similar supports for low-income 
tenants facing eviction. Clare Pastore & John Pollock, Into the Breach: Progress on 
the Right to Counsel in Civil Matters, 41 L.A. LAW. 13, 14 (2018); DESMOND, 
EVICTED, supra note 11, at 303–04. 
 293. Currently, federal law essentially establishes only two areas of protection for 
residential tenants: protection from discrimination under FHA and protection from 
eviction due to landlord foreclosure in the Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure Act, 
expanded into a permanent law in May 2018. Congress Permanently Authorizes the 
Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure Act, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 
(May 29, 2018), https://nlihc.org/resource/congress-permanently-authorizes-
protecting-tenants-foreclosure-act [https://perma.cc/3JAY-H6NA]. Federal law does 
not mandate counsel in eviction proceedings, require habitable quality of rented 
premises, or otherwise impose a floor for state landlord-tenant law. The U.S. 
Department of Defense, however, is in the process of preparing and promulgating a 
“Tenant Bill of Rights” creating supplemental legal tenant protections for service 
personnel in rental housing. U.S. Military Plans Release of Tenant Bill of Rights, 
U.S. ARMY (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.army.mil/article/218198/us_military_plans_release_of_tenant_bill_of_rig
hts [https://perma.cc/J3QL-6RW9]. 
 294. MAGGIE MCCARTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41654, INTRODUCTION TO 
PUBLIC HOUSING 11 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41654.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q5ES-QCGP]. 
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neighborhoods, this mandate needs to be clear and consistent.  Funds 
can also be earmarked for specific purposes to achieve public policy 
goals.  For example, the federal government can require that state 
and local governments provide emergency shelter for otherwise 
homeless households.  Ideally, consistency in funding allocation 
requirements could be ensured by legislation clarifying HUD’s 
mission and priorities. 
HUD should map out specific steps that localities must take to help 
dismantle the effects of generations of housing segregation rather 
than affirmatively requiring PHAs to prove, essentially, that their 
planned use of funds will not make racial segregation worse.  It is 
imperative that the federal government not only recommit to 
requiring that local programs “affirmatively further fair housing,” but 
also map out how to achieve FHA’s residential racial integration 
mandate.  Persistently segregated housing patterns create a host of 
costly social problems, so de-segregation will help decrease housing 
assistance needs in the long run.295  Housing segregation increases 
racial tensions and violence,296 concentrates poverty,297 enables a 
“secession of the successful,”298 and leads to disinvestment in 
neighborhood services for essential public goods, such as parks, 
libraries, and even schools.299  Desegregation can be encouraged 
through strategic siting of housing options for lower-income 
households,300 increasing access for minority households to higher 
opportunity neighborhoods, and subsidizing mortgage capital in a way 
designed to make up for decades of discriminatory credit 
allocation.301 
 
 295. See generally supra notes 1, 234–44 and accompanying text. 
 296. See Jeannine Bell, Can’t We Be Your Neighbor? Trayvon Martin, George 
Zimmerman, and the Resistance to Blacks as Neighbors, 95 B.U. L. REV. 851, 870–71 
(2015). 
 297. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Saving Mount Laurel?, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 
1615 (2013). 
 298. Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the “Secession of the 
Successful”: Democracy and Fairness Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675, 
1679–83 (2001). 
 299. ELLEN & HORN, supra note 109, at 1; Boyack, Detroit, supra note 108, at 604;; 
Kalenberg, supra note 276. 
 300. See generally Boyack, Revitalizing, supra note 107. 
 301. The homeownership rate among black households is not only significantly 
lower than that of white households, black households are the “one group that has 
made no appreciable progress” when it comes to homeownership. STATE OF 
HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 3. The homeownership rate should not be an end in 
itself, since unsustainable homeownership has created a net decline in the wealth and 
housing stability for many black households. See Reiss, supra note 1, at 1091. 
1252 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
There is an economic cost to allowing unaffordable local housing 
markets to persist.  Local unaffordable housing creates both negative 
externalities in the region and artificially represses regional economic 
growth.302  Housing unaffordability imposes adverse social effects and 
economic costs, locally, regionally, and nationally.  For one thing, 
high housing costs has lead to an increased need for various forms of 
state and federal welfare assistance.303  Housing instability decreases 
income, decreasing federal and state tax revenues, and increasing the 
burden on federal and state social services.304  When housing 
unaffordability leads to homelessness, the costs are very extreme.305  
In 2015 alone, the federal government spent $4.5 billion to address 
homelessness.306  In addition, housing cost-burdens drive down 
economic growth by discouraging people from locating in the most 
productive, but most expensive, areas of the country.307  Local 
decision-makers should not be permitted to impose such negative 
economic impacts on the country as a whole. 
 
 302. See DANIEL SHOAG, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, REMOVING BARRIERS TO 
ACCESSING HIGH-PRODUCTIVITY PLACES 8 (2019), 
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Shoag_PP_web_20190128.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P9CK-YVLK] (explaining that local and national economies are 
adversely affected by barriers to entry into vibrant labor markets that expensive 
housing creates); see also BEEN, SUPPLY SKEPTICISM, supra note 158, at 10–12. 
 303. See Jeff Larrimore & Jenny Schuetz, Assessing the Severity of Rent Burden 
on Low-Income Families, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (Dec. 22, 2017) 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/assessing-the-severity-of-
rent-burden-on-low-income-families-20171222.htm [https://perma.cc/W7HX-GJ46]. 
 304. Id. 
 305. See NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN 
AMERICA 36 (2015), http://endhomelessness.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-
state-of-homelessness.pdf [https://perma.cc/85SE-6EBW] [hereinafter STATE OF 
HOMELESSNESS]. Unaffordable housing is a huge factor contributing to homelessness, 
and homelessness itself is costly. See Julien P. Doucette-Préville, The Challenge of 
Homelessness to Spatial Practices, 8 ONT. INT’L DEV. AGENCY J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
111, 114–15 (2015) (discussing urban redevelopment plans addressing homeless 
populations); Stefan G. Kertesz et al., Permanent Supportive Housing for Homeless 
People — Reframing the Debate, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2115, 2115–16 (2016) 
(explaining that even if a purely economic analysis would not justify a Housing First 
approach, a broader conception of the costs of chronic homelessness would). More 
than half a million people are homeless on any given night in the United States, and 
more than half of them are located in the country’s highest cost metropolitan areas. 
STATE OF HOUSING 2018, supra note 16, at 34. Although recent improvements in 
shelter programs for homeless individuals and families, such as the “housing first” 
model, have provided important supports for homeless persons, housing affordability 
remains an underlying issue in many cases, contributing to instability and intermittent 
homelessness. Id.; see generally Desmond & Gershensen, supra note 19. 
 306. See STATE OF HOMELESSNESS, supra note 305, at 4. 
 307. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14, at 17–19. 
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Federal housing policy of decades past provides a final justification 
for decisive financial and legal actions by the federal government to 
improve housing inequity.  Historically, federal housing policy 
cemented a geography of racial residential segregation throughout 
the country.308  Federal housing policy destroyed cohesive 
communities of color by enabling “slum clearance” efforts that 
ultimately decreased social supports and diminished opportunities for 
advancement among poor and minority urban residents.309  Federal 
housing policy helped concentrate poverty into environmentally 
hostile and neglected neighborhoods.310  It spurred environmentally 
problematic suburban sprawl and disinvestment in America’s cities.311  
Along with tax policy, it operated to transfer billions of dollars of 
wealth from low-income households to reward homeownership 
among the nation’s most wealthy.312  It also incentivized irresponsible 
mortgage lending that destabilized the financial and housing systems 
of the country (and the world) and destroyed household wealth and 
housing stability throughout the nation, particularly for households of 
color and low-income renters and owners alike.313  After creating 
such widespread, persistent harms for the country’s most 
impoverished and vulnerable households, the federal government 
cannot in good faith now disclaim responsibility for improving 
housing quality and affordability for the adversely impacted groups. 
Adequate financial investment in affordable housing creation and 
neighborhood improvement is critical for the health and future of the 
 
 308. See generally Rothstein, supra note 1. 
 309. Id.; see also Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 519–22 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 310. Rothstein, supra note 1, at 177–93. 
 311. See JACKSON, supra note 1, 190–94 (exploring the government’s complicity in 
and the social costs of the phenomenon of suburbanization). 
 312. Michelle D. Layser, How Federal Tax Law Rewards Housing Segregation, 93 
IND. L.J. 915, 962 (2018); see also Donald A. Krueckenberg, The Grapes of Rent: A 
History of Renting in a Country of Owners, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 9, 9–10 
(1999) (explaining the “ideology of property” and how federal preferences for 
homeownership reflect this); APGAR, supra note 77, at 5 (criticizing the government’s 
subsidization of homeownership and cataloguing the harms mis-incentives to 
purchase real property have created) 
 313. See generally CARR ET AL., supra note 279; see also Abbye 
Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage Discrimination in Consumer Bankruptcy, 57 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1041, 1064 (2015) (cataloguing the disparate wealth destruction caused by the 
Financial Crisis); Shelby D. Green, Testing Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Post-
Crisis Self-Preservation Policies Under the Fair Housing Act, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
477, 517–18 (2018) (explaining how government policy choices before, during, and 
after the 2008 crisis created negative impacts that “were felt disproportionately by 
minority borrowers”). 
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United States.  It also is the only way for the federal government to 
start making amends for federal policy’s historic negative impacts on 
low-income households and communities of color.  Setting 
appropriate legal standards to protect less economically and 
politically advantaged citizens (low-income households and tenants) 
is wise policy.  Devolution to local experts regarding specific 
programmatic design and implementation makes sense, but the 
federal government remains financially and morally responsible for 
ensuring the success of these efforts. 
IV. FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY RISK MANAGEMENT 
Even though the federal government can and should play an 
essential funding, coordinating, and justice-promoting role in 
developing affordable housing throughout the country, reliance on 
federal solutions is risky — particularly in today’s polarized political 
environment.314  Despite federal government dysfunction,315 there 
have recently been some small hopeful steps in the realm of federal 
housing policy.  First, the previously untouchable MID was slightly 
modified by prospectively (and temporarily) lowering its cap.316  
Second, Congress slightly increased funding for affordable housing 
under the past few budgets, including finally allocating funds to the 
 
 314. See generally DARREL M. WEST, DIVIDED POLITICS, DIVIDED NATION: 
HYPERCONFLICT IN THE TRUMP ERA (2019). Polarization is reflected differently in 
state and local politics. See Richard Florida, Are Local Politics as Polarized as 
National? Depends on the Issue, CITYLAB (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://www.citylab.com/life/2019/04/polarization-cities-education-labor-public-
opinion-taxes/587746/ [https://perma.cc/C2Z5-U2AA]; Amalie Jensen et al., City 
Limits to Partisan Polarization in the American Public (Mar. 2019) (unpublished 
paper), http://williammarble.co/docs/CityLimits-Mar2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/29EK-
WRTR] (showing “affordable housing” as an issue that is relatively more polarizing 
in some localities, but enjoys a relative consensus of opinion in others, compared to 
the consistently partisan issues of labor unions and education). 
 315. See M. Akram Faizer, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: A Potential Cure 
for the Trump Phenomenon, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 61, 68 (2016); Mihir Zaveri et al., 
The Government Shutdown Was the Longest Ever. Here’s the History, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-
government-shutdown.html [https://perma.cc/33LL-V2EQ]. Although news stories, 
opinion pieces, and articles about federal government dysfunction during the Trump 
administration are legion, federal government dysfunction is not a recent 
phenomenon. See generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE GOVERNING CRISIS: 
EXPLORING SOLUTIONS (2014), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/dysfunction20V720052
012.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP6L-W3VU]. 
 316. See supra notes 222–32 and accompanying text. 
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Housing Trust Fund.317  In addition, community development 
innovations, such as the provisions in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017 for local development of “Opportunity Zones,” may indicate an 
increased willingness to invest in housing and neighborhood 
infrastructure.318  But recent federal actions and inactions have also 
created sizable problems and concerns for affordable housing policy 
and funding now and in the future.  Taking the same general 
approach as in previous years of his administration, President Trump 
has proposed a budget for fiscal year 2020 that cuts funding for HUD 
by $9.6 billion (an 18% reduction of its budget), eliminates funding for 
the Housing Trust Fund and public housing capital repairs, and 
significantly reduces funding for the Housing Choice Voucher 
program through raising tenant payment responsibilities.319  The 
House Appropriations Subcommittee’s proposed 2020 budget, on the 
other hand, renews or increases funding for all rental housing 
assistance programs, supportive housing programs, and programs 
addressing homelessness.320  Another worrisome development is 
HUD’s refusal to implement the Affirmatively Furthering Fair 
Housing (AFFH) Rule it created in 2015 to further the purposes of 
the Fair Housing Act. Instead of taking steps to address increasing 
residential segregation, HUD Secretary Carson announced that HUD 
will “reinterpret” the AFFH Rule, presumably to undercut the need 
 
 317. See generally supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text; Senate Committee 
Approves Robust Funding for Affordable Housing in FY 19, NAT’L LOW INCOME 
HOUSING COALITION (June 11, 2018), https://nlihc.org/resource/senate-committee-
approves-robust-funding-affordable-housing-fy19-0 [https://perma.cc/BCM8-ALGK]. 
 318. See, e.g., Jared Bernstein, Opportunity Zones: Can a Tax Break for Rich 
People Really Help Poor People?, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/14/opportunity-zones-can-tax-
break-rich-people-really-help-poor-people/ [https://perma.cc/Q4RB-ATKX]; Lori 
Chatman, Opportunity Zones: What They Are, Why They Matter, AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING FIN. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.housingfinance.com/news/opportunity-
zones-what-they-are-why-they-matter_o [https://perma.cc/XYS8-RLQP]; 
Opportunity Zones, ECON. INNOVATION GROUP, https://eig.org/opportunityzones 
[https://perma.cc/8JHU-WF62] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019 7:34 PM); Catalina Vielma, 
Opportunity Zones and Tax Credits: A Match Made In . . . ?, AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
FIN. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.housingfinance.com/finance/opportunity-zones-and-
tax-credits-a-match-made-in_o [https://perma.cc/85C5-36RN]. For a more cynical 
analysis, see Gbenga Ajilore, How a Tax Break Meant for Low-Income Communities 
Became a Mini Tax Haven for the Rich, TALK POVERTY (Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://talkpoverty.org/2018/12/13/tax-break-low-income-opportunity-rich/ 
[https://perma.cc/A4SJ-R323]. 
 319. NLIHC, Trump 2020 Budget, supra note 265. 
 320. See House Releases Robust FY2020 Housing Spending Bill, NAT’L LOW 
INCOME HOUSING COALITION (May 22, 2019), https://nlihc.org/resource/house-
releases-robust-fy2020-housing-spending-bill [https://perma.cc/N5FV-KXUC]. 
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for any affirmative integration efforts.321  There are other worrisome 
housing developments too. For example, HUD proposed a new rule, 
implementing a Trump executive order, that creates unrealistically 
onerous work requirements for low-income housing subsidy 
recipients, the overwhelming majority of whom either are already 
working full time or cannot work due to a disability or need to care 
for a family member.322 
Politicized agency actions and dysfunction in the federal 
government threaten not only its ability to make new laws and 
funding allocations, but also the ability of the government to operate 
in the ordinary course.  Disagreements regarding appropriations led 
to the longest federal government shutdown in history from 
December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019.323  The shutdown negatively 
impacted federal employees and contractors whose salaries were 
deferred or reduced by inhibiting their ability to meet housing costs 
and other expenses.324  The shutdown also interrupted HUD 
 
 321. See Kriston Capps, The Trump Administration Just Derailed a Key Obama 
Rule on Housing Segregation, CITYLAB (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/01/the-trump-administration-derailed-a-key-
obama-rule-on-housing-segregation/549746/ [https://perma.cc/G9KS-EBEG]; House 
GOP Members Call for HUD to Rescind AFFH Rule, Secretary Carson Says HUD 
will “Reinterpret” the Rule, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (Apr. 30, 
2019), https://nlihc.org/resource/house-gop-members-call-hud-rescind-affh-rule-
secretary-carson-says-hud-will-reinterpret [https://perma.cc/JM8X-HM2C]. 
 322. Kriston Capps, Why HUD Wants to Raise the Rent, CITYLAB (Apr. 25, 
2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/hud-ben-carson-work-requirements-
rent-hikes/558920/ [https://perma.cc/QM29-CYUF]. The proposed work requirement 
is unrealistic and will be ineffective because (a) the vast majority of extremely low-
income renters already work in low-wage jobs; (b) many low-income aid recipients 
are unable to work because of age (26% are seniors) and/or disability (22% are 
disabled); and (c) the overwhelming majority of non-elderly/disabled housing aid 
recipients who are not already working full time are either full-time students or 
single-adult caregivers to young children or a household member with a disability. 
NLIHC 2019 GAP REPORT, supra note 36, at 9; see also NLIHC, Trump 2020 Budget, 
supra note 265. 
 323. This 35-day shutdown of the federal government arose from appropriations 
disagreement with respect to funding a border wall. Zaveri et al., supra note 314. 
 324. Salary interruptions for federal employees caused worries with respect to 
employees’ ability to make monthly rental and mortgage payments for housing. 
Letter from Campaign for Housing and Community Development Funding to Sen. 
McConnell et al., (Jan. 8, 2019) [hereinafter CHCDF Letter], 
https://cdn.theatlantic.com/assets/media/files/chcdf_letter_re_government_shutdown_
010819.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V2W-3BSL]. Federal employee housing payments due 
in January 2019 alone were estimated to be over $400 million in aggregate. Shawn M. 
Carter, Workers Going Unpaid during the Shutdown Owe $438 Million in Rent and 
Mortgage Payments This Month, CNBC (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/15/federal-workers-who-arent-being-paid-oew-438-
million-for-housing.html [https://perma.cc/6P8J-3VJP]; see also Liz Frazier Peck, The 
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operations and reduced the efficacy of affordable housing 
programs.325  For example, the critical repairs and upkeep for public 
housing units that had been planned for December and January had 
to be deferred,326 and over 1000 project-based rental assistance 
contracts expired during the shutdown, leaving over 40,000 extremely 
low-income households with no housing assistance.327  Funding 
 
Real Financial Impact of the Government Shutdown on Workers, FORBES (Jan. 14, 
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizfrazierpeck/2019/01/14/the-real-financial-
impact-of-the-government-shutdown-on-workers/#596d26c242b5 
[https://perma.cc/JTK8-9TJR]. News reports during the shutdown bear witness to 
widespread worry and even panic among those who are to some extent dependent 
upon federal housing assistance or management. See, e.g., Suzy Khimm & Laura 
Strickler, ‘There’s No Money’: Shutdown Freezes HUD Funds for Low-income 
Senior Citizens, NBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-
house/there-s-no-money-shutdown-freezes-hud-funds-low-income-n957386 
[https://perma.cc/C7LZ-4XKL]; Tracy Jan & William Wan, Food Stamps, Rent Aid 
and the Safety Net for American’s Poorest at Risk as Shutdown Drags On, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/food-stamps-
housing-subsidies-and-other-services-for-vulnerable-americans-in-jeopardy-as-
shutdown-drags-on/2019/01/09/e025549c-1374-11e9-803c-
4ef28312c8b9_story.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/4J2F-3WGH]; Khushubu 
Shah, ‘We Are Being Held Emotionally Hostage’: Shutdown Hits Affordable 
Housing, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jan/10/government-shutdown-affordable-
housing-hud-trump [https://perma.cc/A9RU-9PL4]. A statement issued by the Trump 
Administration advised landlords with federal employee tenants to cover any unpaid 
rents “with reserves” and suggested that federal employees could offer to perform 
upkeep services in kind in lieu of making rental or mortgage payments. See Mariana 
Alfredo, A Government Agency Shared Tips for Employees to Send to Landlords 
While the Shutdown Leaves Them without Paychecks, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2018 
2:51 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/government-shutdown-agency-shared-
tips-for-employees-to-send-to-landlords-2018-12 [https://perma.cc/5X4Q-Z8LT]. 
 325. See generally Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) in the Event of a 
Government Shutdown, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/GENERALFAQS.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TJ93-9E6K] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019); CHCDF Letter, supra note 
324. HUD was shuttered during the government shutdown and Deputy Secretary 
Pam Patenaude, the highest-ranking HUD official with any housing experience, quit. 
Jacob Gaffney, HUD Deputy Secretary Pam Patenaude Resigns, Ends 35-Year 
Career in Housing, HOUSINGWIRE (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/47714-hud-deputy-secretary-pam-patenaude-
resigns [https://perma.cc/CZP3-NTAN]. 
 326. ; Glen Thrush, Shutdown’s Pain Cuts Deep for the Homeless and Other 
Vulnerable Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/us/politics/government-shutdown-housing-
services.html [https://perma.cc/LS5H-JJMG]; CHCDF Letter, supra note 324. 
 327. Brakkton Booker, Thousands Face Threat of Eviction After HUD Contracts 
Expire Due to Shutdown, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/11/684414651/thousands-face-threat-of-eviction-after-
hud-contracts-expire-due-to-shutdown [https://perma.cc/Y9TQ-WAP2];; Expired or 
Expiring HUD Project-Based Rental Assistance Contracts (December 2018 to 
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reductions and delays in project-based developments impacted the 
provision of associated supportive services such as assistance for 
disabled individuals and seniors who cannot live independently.328  
The shutdown also put financial pressure on the private landlords and 
other organizations that serve as key partners for federal housing 
programs.329  Diane Yentel, director of the National Low Income 
Housing Coalition, condemned the shutdown, stated that it was 
“incredibly reckless to risk the homes of some of our country’s 
poorest seniors, people with disabilities, and families with children as 
perceived leverage for a fight that has nothing to do with them.”330 
Today’s highly politicized federal government sector may suggest 
that, even though the federal government should, in theory, take 
 
February 2019), NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Shutdown-by-State.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNH6-
FN7A]; Impacts of Government Shutdown on Affordable Housing Programs, 
CAMPAIGN FOR HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. FUNDING (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/FY19_Shutdown_Factsheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R25P-BAWA]; CHCDF Letter, supra note 324. Extremely low-
income households, by definition, have an income that is below 30% of the average 
median income. The median income of a four-person extremely low-income 
household in 2017 was $17,050. WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2017, supra note 21, at 
1. 
 328. CHCDF Letter, supra note 324. 
 329. The effects of a shutdown outlast the weeks during which HUD and other 
government agencies are shuttered. Lengthy shutdowns create market uncertainty, 
raising transaction costs and increasing the hesitancy of various partners regarding 
working with the government in the future. The very real economic costs of 
unpredictability are particularly keen in contexts like affordable housing where there 
is extensive partnering of public and private entities and dependence on 
certifications, funding, and management from federal government actors. See, e.g., 
Thrush, supra note 326. Our increasingly privatized low-income housing system is 
dependent upon cooperation and participation of private landlords, and “the 
experience [of the protracted shutdown] could make private landlords less likely to 
take part in federal housing programs.” Audrey McGlinchy, As Shutdown Drags On, 
Low-Income Housing Providers in Austin Worry Funding for Rent Could Run Out, 
TEXAS STANDARD (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/as-
shutdown-drags-on-low-income-housing-providers-in-austin-worry-funding-for-rent-
could-run-out/ [https://perma.cc/BQ9R-5UA2]. 
 330. Sanjana Karanth & Arthur Delaney, Some Renters Are Already Facing 
Eviction, Thanks to the Shutdown, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/shutdown-low-income-renters-housing-programs-
section-8-eviction_n_5c3e1823e4b01c93e00e1a86 [https://perma.cc/JYE5-T7UC]. The 
shutdown resulted from disagreements between Congress and President Trump 
regarding border security. Peter Lawrence, House Approved 2019 Omnibus 
Appropriations Would End Shutdown, Increase HUD Funding but Wall Funding 
Impasse Prevents Enactment, NOVOGRADIC: HUD RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 8, 
2019), https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/house-approved-2019-
omnibus-appropriations-would-end-shutdown-increase-hud-funding-wall-funding 
[https://perma.cc/EX6E-HRVL]. 
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responsibility for providing adequate financial, legal, and policy 
support for affordable housing, actually relying on federal agencies to 
fulfill this responsibility is unwise.  If a particular administration is 
hostile to Congressional affordable housing goals, it can effectively 
undercut the achievement of those goals by staffing (or understaffing) 
decisions regarding government agencies.331  Considering the 
willingness of certain segments of the federal government to use 
housing programs as pawns in a political power play suggests that 
trusting the federal government to simply do the right thing may be 
hopelessly naïve.332 
There are some ways to mitigate the risk of reliance on the federal 
government to consistently and correctly do its job, but these require 
bold steps by Congress in passing targeted legislation that would 
narrow the scope of federal agency discretion and mandate specific 
outcomes and funding adequacy for affordable housing.  Specifically, 
some of the affordable housing mandates that Congress should 
consider include: 
 
• Shoring up property rights protections in order to rein in local 
land use regimes that unjustifiably restrict the supply and 
location of affordable housing and otherwise constrain market 
efficiencies, impose economic harms, and effectively re-
entrench patterns of residential segregation.333 
• Guaranteeing particular legal protections for tenants 
individually and low-income households as a group.334 
• Expanding the Fair Housing Act to include source-of-income 
discrimination.335 
 
 331. For a fascinating look at the role of agency rulemaking and inaction in the 
context of separation of powers and the blurry line between “law” and “not-law” 
actions by the government, see David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative 
Preemption, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 293 (2015). 
 332. Professor Steven Eagle, for example, doubts that the federal government can 
or will take steps to improve affordable housing. See generally Steven J. Eagle, 
“Affordable Housing” as Metaphor, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301 (2017). 
 333. See generally SHOAG, supra note 302; see also supra notes 283–88 and 
accompanying text. 
 334. For example, shoring up state protections of premises habitability. See supra 
notes 96–106, 290–93 and accompanying text. Another critically important tenant 
protection that could be ensured is a right to legal counsel in evictions. The presence 
or absence of an attorney in an eviction proceeding significantly affects the outcome, 
and more than 90% of tenants lack legal counsel in that context. See Desmond, 
Unaffordable supra note 11, at 5. 
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• Requiring greater accountability in the use of HUD funds to 
further Fair Housing purposes.336 
• Repealing the MID while legally mandating that all increased 
revenues from its elimination be allocated to fund affordable 
housing initiatives.337 
• Expanding supply-producing initiatives, such as the LIHTC 
program, to address affordable supply deficits338 and the 
expiring affordability periods of existing low-income housing,339 
specifying that the majority of new affordable housing units be 
created in higher quality neighborhoods.340 
• Mandating sufficient funding to cover the affordability gap, at 
least with respect to all very low-income families.341 
• Guaranteeing publicly provided shelter programs for the most 
vulnerable populations (extremely low- and no-income 
households that are homeless, disabled, or elderly).342 
 
Congress could also invest in long-term improvements to housing 
equity through a variety of initiatives that combat past discrimination 
 
 335. See supra notes 257–62, 289 and accompanying text (discussing the 
importance of and lack of protection against source-of-income discrimination by 
private landlords in a majority of states). 
 336. This would effectively mandate the substance of HUD’s 2015 AFFH Rule. 
See supra note 321 and accompanying text. Currently, the AFFH Rule is vulnerable 
to agency “reinterpretation” and implementation discretion. See id. 
 337. See supra notes 219–29 and accompanying text (discussing the cost and impact 
of the mortgage interest deduction). 
 338. See supra Section II.C (discussing the need and efficacy of supply-side 
supports for affordable housing rehabilitation and production). 
 339. See supra notes 199–203, 211 and accompanying text (discussing the problem 
of expiring affordability periods). 
 340. See supra notes 204–05, 214–15 and accompanying text (discussing the 
importance of siting in the context of affordable housing, particularly for improving 
long-term outcomes of persons residing in affordable housing units). 
 341. See supra notes 249–53 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacy of 
cost subsidies for the nation’s most impoverished households). See generally WORST 
CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2017, supra note 21. See also supra Section I.C (discussing 
shared characteristics and challenges of lowest income households and barriers to 
improvements income). 
 342. See supra notes 37, 155, 178, 307–08 and accompanying text; see also 
LAUVENA STATEN, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY 
PROJECT, PENNY WISE BUT POUND FOOLISH: HOW PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE 
HOUSING CAN PREVENT A WORLD OF HURT 11–28 (2019); Stefan G. Kertesz et al., 
Permanent Supportive Housing for Homeless People — Reframing the Debate, 375 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2115, 2115–16 (2016). Note that “the number of worst case 
[housing] needs has increased by 40.6 percent since 2007, when the recession began, 
and by 65.6 percent (3.29 million households) since 2001.” WORST CASE HOUSING 
NEEDS 2017, supra note 21, at 8. 
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and extreme income inequality. For example, long-term 
improvements in housing equity and affordability could be assisted 
by: 
• Providing funding for infrastructure investment to 
rehabilitate and improve poorer quality neighborhoods 
while specifically preserving residency of current low-
income households located there.343 
• Taking steps to increase pay equity and adequacy for all 
workers.344 
• Providing childcare and healthcare supports for parents, 
particularly single parents with young children.345 
 
 
 343. See Boyack, Revitalizing, supra note 107, at 448–49 (discussing how 
neighborhood improvements in areas of poverty concentration can create improved 
outcomes for low-income households if displacement is avoided); see also Elizabeth 
Kneebone, The Growth and Spread of Concentrated Poverty, 2000 to 2008-2012, 
BROOKINGS INST. (July 31, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/the-growth-
and-spread-of-concentrated-poverty-2000-to-2008-2012/ [https://perma.cc/ZT43-
7QVH] (discussing the neighborhood effects of concentrated poverty in 
neighborhoods with poor education, health, and physical infrastructure). 
 344. Unaffordable housing is both a problem of high housing costs and of low 
incomes. See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, Exploiting the Poor: Housing, Markets, and 
Vulnerability, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 458 (2017); Desmond, Unaffordable, supra note 
11. Part of the reason that housing is becoming less affordable is that incomes are 
growing at a slower rate than rents. Thus, a sustainable solution to unaffordable 
housing will require efforts to make markets more responsive to need as well as 
investment in growing incomes. Brenda Richardson, America’s Housing 
Affordability Crisis Only Getting Worse, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brendarichardson/2019/01/31/americas-housing-
affordability-crisis-only-getting-worse/#79d2e2d104b3 [https://perma.cc/8EE2-
FLKH]. 
 345. Improvements in support for single-parent households, including better 
childcare, healthcare, and parental leave, will pay dividends in available income and, 
thus, housing affordability. See generally GINA ADAMS ET AL., URB. INST., 
STRATEGIES TO MEET THE CHILD CARE NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME PARENTS SEEKING 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING (2016), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/84326/2000938-Strategies-to-
Meet-the-Child-Care-Needs-of-Low-Income-Parents-Seeking-Education-and-
Training.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4TV-XMG8]; Kelli A. Komro et al., Creating 
Nurturing Environments: A Science-Based Framework for Promoting Child Health 
and Development within High-Poverty Neighborhoods, 14 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 111 (2011); Elizabeth A. Mulroy & Terry S. Lane, Housing 
Affordability, Stress and Single Mothers: Pathway to Homelessness, 19 J. SOC. & 
SOC’Y WELFARE 51 (1992). HUD and state agencies do have specific programs that 
aim to support the housing needs of single parents; see, e.g., HUD Public Housing for 
Single Mothers, GRANTS FOR SINGLE MOTHERS, http://singlemothersgrants.org/hud-
public-housing-for-single-mothers/ [https://perma.cc/S6AN-NSNA] (last visited Oct. 
6, 2019, 1:20 PM). 
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In today’s antagonistic political environment, it is increasingly 
irresponsible for Congress to pass the buck when it comes to setting 
policy objective and legal mandates.  Giving housing imperatives the 
force of law would keep agencies from playing politics with people’s 
lives. 
To avoid reliance on agency discretion and being caught in the 
crossfire of political power struggles, Congress will have to actually 
pass detailed legislation regarding affordable housing.  The last 
several bills attempting to improve laws regarding affordable housing, 
however, have never even been brought to a vote.346  Legislative 
impotence might be improved if Congress moves away from 
considering issues in a bundled, omnibus bill that includes a wide 
variety and huge number of legal mandates.  It may be more effective, 
as well as more transparent to constituents, if Congress addresses 
housing issues one at a time, in shorter, targeted, more 
understandable legislation.  Single-issue legislation might be able to 
accomplish in baby steps what never-passed omnibus bills do not.  For 
example, the recently proposed American Housing and Economic 
Mobility Act includes numerous legal improvements to our housing 
system,347 but this bill risks dying in committee based on a handful of 
 
 346. See, e.g., Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 3045, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Common Sense Housing Investment Act of 2013, H.R. 1213, 112th Cong. 
(2013); Housing Opportunity through Modernization Act of 2016, H.R. 3700, 114th 
Cong. (2016); Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2017, S. 548, 115th 
Cong. (2017); American Housing and Mobility Act of 2018, S. 3503, 115th Cong. 
(2018); Affordable Housing Crisis Act of 2018, S. 3231, 115th Cong. (2018); 
Affordable Housing and Self-Sufficiency Improvement Act (AHSSI), NAT’L LOW 
INCOME HOUSING COALITION (Jun. 2012), 
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controversial issues included in it.348  On the other hand, the Landlord 
Accountability Act introduced in the House by New York’s 
Representative Velasquez focuses on the single issue of rental 
discrimination based on the use of Section 8 vouchers.349  If Congress 
could successfully enact smaller, specific bills, Congress may start to 
meet its responsibility of effectively shaping federal affordable 
housing law and policy.350 
Housing programs and incentives today are often necessarily 
responsive to immediate and dramatic housing needs, but Congress 
must take a longer view and also invest funds in improving 
neighborhood quality, affordable housing location, the sufficiency of 
gap funding, and residential desegregation.  Addressing these issues 
helps cure the disease of housing unaffordability, not just treat its 
symptoms.  Improving neighborhood quality, residential racial 
integration, and housing instability among low-income households 
will lead to improved household outcomes now and in future 
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generations, eventually reducing the number of cost-burdened 
households and intensity of their unmet housing needs.  Residential 
segregation, for example, is rampant and limits economic potential 
individually and as a society.  Segregation also “reduces social 
cohesion and intergroup trust, increases prejudice, and erodes 
democratic participation.”351  It will take committed, consistent 
investment to undo residential segregation, de-concentrate poverty, 
and improve deficient neighborhood infrastructure.  But such 
investments are necessary for the lasting improvements to housing 
affordability that are the federal government’s responsibility to 
achieve.352 
CONCLUSION 
Unaffordable and poor-quality housing is costly and unfair for the 
many households who struggle to pay for shelter and never obtain a 
stable, quality place to call home.  Unaffordable housing is also bad 
for the country as a whole: It is costly, destabilizing, and 
unsustainable.353  The United States is the wealthiest country in the 
world, and yet ranks far behind many other developed countries when 
it comes to quality of life for its poorest citizens.354  It is unjustifiable 
to cite lack of funding as an excuse for treating only some of the 
symptoms of housing instability and ignoring its underlying causes, 
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particularly when significant public subsidies are already being 
allocated to populations that do not have unmet housing needs.355 
It is within our financial capacity to significantly ameliorate the 
housing instability that millions of Americans face daily, and there are 
ample practical, economic, and moral justifications for the federal 
government assuming a more responsible role in ensuring that 
affordable housing for all becomes a reality.  Affordable housing is a 
complex problem with different solutions required in different 
locations.  Some places primarily need an increase of supply, other 
places need more income supports and subsidies, and other places 
struggle more with deficient housing and neighborhood quality.  
Responsible devolution can be the answer, allowing specifically 
tailored responses to local needs, but only if backed by the full 
financial and legal support of the federal government. 
Congress can erect an improved affordable housing legal 
framework by shoring up property rights of renters and owners and 
mandating investment in long-term neighborhood solutions as well as 
adequate supports for critical short-term household needs.  The 
federal government’s failure to act will lead in the opposite direction, 
resulting in increased homelessness, income- and family-destroying 
housing instability, and intractable poverty throughout the country.  
The federal government must not walk away from a problem that, in 
large part, it helped to create.356  Irresponsible devolution would be 
personally devastating for low-income households, inhumane and 
politically destabilizing, and would rob our country of its most 
precious resource: its human capital. 
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